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    Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to search for the whys and wherefores of success and failure in 
Japan’s 'catching up' and China’s 'slowing down' on the path to modernization / 
Westernization from the mid-nineteenth century to approximately the end of the first 
decade of the twentieth century.  
 
First, in the introduction (Chapter One) I state what is the aim of the thesis; the 
definition of ‘modernization’; literature review; methodology; outline of the thesis; 
and problems and limitations.  
 
Chronologically, I divide the period into four phases for detailed discussion: legacies, 
formative, operative, and consequent. 
   
In ‘the legacies’ (Chapter Two), it is shown that elements of the legacies such as 
territorial integrity, population, and political, military, economic and social 
circumstances in Tokugawa Japan were relatively more conducive to modernization 
along Western lines than those in Ch’ing China. 
   
In the formative phase (Chapter Three), it is shown that the central government and 
regional provincial leaders in Ch’ing China knew little and did almost nothing to 
respond to the menace of the West. By contrast, the Tokugawa Shogunate and more 
particularly regional daimyō and samurai had a deep sense of crisis and early on 
launched a series of reforms.  
   
In the operative phase (Chapter Four), it will be seen that both nations pursued a 
national goal of 'rich nation and strong army'. However, the Self-Strengthening 
Movement in Ch’ing China merely undertook a superficial reform primarily limited to 
military innovation and introduction of Western industrialization in order to maintain 
the old dynastic stability. By contrast, in Meiji Japan, under the post-Restoration 
leadership of an oligarchy of talented and visionary individuals, the government 
launched a full range of reforms in pursuit of the West. 
   
In the consequent phase (Chapter Five), even though China had by now a better 
comprehension of the West and continued some reforms, its path to modernization 
was still frustrated because of the ineffective imperial leadership, and the ethnic 
antipathy and power struggling between the Manchus and the Han officers. In contrast 
with China, Japan’s modernization had shown continuity, integrity, and accumulation 
and acceleration and it had successfully achieved the national goal of 'rich nation and 
strong army' by this stage.  
 
In Chapter Six, I reveal several famous scholars’ comments on this issue of 
comparative modernisation. As well, I humbly set forth a set of criteria to consider 
what might be the best principles and model for a nation undertaking modernization. 
 
A conclusion reviews the thesis and it arguments in Chapter Seven, and is followed by 
a series of appendices and illustrations and bibliography. 
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Style Outline 
 
The Romanization systems used in this thesis are those generally considered standard 
in the English-speaking world: Wade-Giles for Chinese and Hepburn for Japanese. 
Therefore, any translation from Chinese and Japanese language sources follows the 
conventions below.  
 
Chinese Language 
 
Chinese names have the surname first followed by the given name. Also, the first 
letter of each word in names is a capital letter.  
 
Common Chinese geographical names are normally given according to the Peking 
pronunciation of standard Northern Chinese (Mandarin). There are some exceptions, 
such as the capital of Ch’ing China in the Wade-Giles Romanization would be 
Pei-ching, the real pronunciation is Peking, but it still differs from Beijing of the 
pronunciation nowadays. 
 
Regarding Chinese script, all Chinese terms in the main text are given Romanized 
Chinese script followed by the original Chinese script and the English meaning in 
parentheses.     
 
Japanese Language 
 
Similar to Chinese, Japanese personal names have the surname first followed by the 
given name. Also, the first letter of each word in names is a capital letter.  
 
All proper nouns are in Romanised Japanese script with macrons for long vowels, 
except for common terms. Thus Chōshū, but Tokyo (not Tōkyō). 
 
Regarding Japanese script, also similar to the Chinese, all Japanese terms are given in 
Romanised Japanese script followed by the original Japanese script and the English 
meaning in parentheses.  
 
All references will be in the Modern Language Association (MLA) style. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. What is this thesis about? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the situation in the mid-late nineteenth century 
when Western powers, advanced in industrialization and with high achievements in 
science and technology, came to the Far East to demand through so-called 'gunboat 
diplomacy' the opening of ports and trade with such countries as China, Japan, Korea 
and Vietnam. How did these Eastern nations respond to what was arguably the biggest 
challenge in their history? Is there a successful way of reacting to such a critical 
situation, a way permitting defense of one’s nation as well as maintaining national 
wealth?  
   
Without doubt history can be characterised in part by such things as continuity, 
causality and pragmatism. In searching for solutions to such complex and troublesome 
issues as unifying and defending a nation, developing its economy or solving financial 
problems and settling social disturbances, I believe historical experiences provide 
valuable principles which can be applied today to those nations which want to be rich, 
strong and independent. Therefore a comparative analysis of the differences between 
Chinese and Japanese modernization(s) should prove a worthwhile and significant 
theme, being a major instance in human history of a ‘higher advanced’ civilization 
meeting a ‘lower undeveloped’ one. In this particular case, in pursuing the hypothesis 
that there might be such a thing as an achievable and successful way to modernization, 
such as through westernization, the most useful cases to study would seem to be the 
modernization paths of on the one hand China during the Self-Strengthening 
Movement (1861-1895) and subsequent reforms (1896-1911), and on the other Meiji 
Japan (1868-1912). Of particular interest to me is the contemporary idea, common to 
both, of ‘rich nation and strong army’.  
 
 
1.2. What is the meaning of 'modernization'?  
 
Certainly, to avoid confusion, we need to clearly define the terms 'modernization', 
'westernization' and 'industrialization' prior to commencing the main text. I agree with 
Gilbert Rozman’s views expressed in his work The Modernization of China. He says, 
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“We view modernization as the process by which societies have been and are being 
transformed under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution.”1 In a 
broad sense, it is true that 'modernization' can be thought of as a process associated 
with elements such as independent sovereignty in international society; national 
identity; democracy and bureaucratization in domestic politics; a financial and 
economic system to support the three main levels of industry (primary, manufacturing 
and service production); infant survival rate; life expectancy; equitable distribution of 
income; social welfare; and the educational level and cultural enlightenment of its 
people. Through these dimensions, we can examine how successful a nation is in its 
modernization.  
   
However, the term 'modernization' as it appears in this thesis mostly means  
'westernization' because China and Japan were 'latecomers'2 compared with those 
'first-comers'3 such as England, France and the United States, the primary Western 
powers in the mid-late nineteenth century. To face the challenge – indeed potential 
threat – coming from Western powers, these latecomers had to learn Western strong 
points in fields such as military science and industrial technology. Thus the patterns of 
modernization followed by China and Japan were Western in style. 
   
One major factor was the industrial revolution, which emerged firstly in England in 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century and later in France and the United States. 
Industrialization, including both light and heavy manufacturing, accelerated the pace 
of economic development associated with technical and mechanical innovation. It was 
to find a source of materials and mass markets for manufactured goods that in large 
part stimulated the Western powers to search for colonies overseas, and this factor 
made possible the large-scale encounter between the Occident and the Orient.  
   
I think it is necessary to explain why in this thesis I still prefer to use the term 
'modernization' instead of 'westernization' or 'industrialization. On the one hand, 
basically, even though industrialization is linked to the strategy of 'rich nation and 
strong army', the meaning of industrialization and westernization in both countries is 
in each case too narrow to adequately explain every policy adopted in the 
Self-Strengthening Movement (Tzu-chiang yun-tung 自強運動) of China and in the 
Meiji Restoration (Meiji-ishin 明治維新) of Japan. On the other hand, modernization 
is a dynamic, full-scale process in a society not limited by timing or scope. For 
                                                 
1 Gilbert Rozman ed., The Modernization of China. (New York, 1981), p. 3.  
2 Ibid., p 4. Rozman points out “early modernizing countries we refer to as first-comers (primarily 
England, France, and the United States) and successful latecomers (such as Japan and Russia)...."  
3 Idem.  
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instance, though aiming to achieve a rich nation and a strong army China was not 
successful in learning through westernization in the era of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement, and as a result there was a later reform, the Hundred Days Reform (1898), 
mainly for political reasons. There was similarly a 1911 Revolution which brought 
about the abdication of the Manchus as well as the establishment of the Republic of 
China; and the May Fourth Movement of 1919 was based on democracy and science 
in every aspect of the nation’s modernization. Even Japan did not fully complete its 
modernization in the era of the Meiji Restoration, especially in the aspect of 
democracy, even though it won triumphs against its rivals in the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Thus in order to avoid 
inconsistencies regarding the exact meaning of the westernization / industrialization 
of China and Japan in the mid-late nineteenth century, I have selected the term 
'modernization' in the title of my thesis.                 
 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
 
With regard to the topics of China’s modernization and Japan’s Meiji Restoration, 
there are a huge number of books in English, Chinese and Japanese which go into in 
great detail, typically from the perspective of historians. Moreover some specialists 
have even made general comparisons and listed separately various merits and 
demerits along the path to modernization of these two nations. However, 
unfortunately, few have clearly and systematically addressed the core question that 
could be drawn out of this study: “What are the best strategies to cope with the 
challenge from a dominant foreign civilization with particular regard to the 
aspects of a rich nation and a strong army?”  
   
Without doubt, many of these works (see bibliography) can provide valuable material 
for reference. For example, in the case of China: The Cambridge History of China. 
Volumes 10 & 11 edited by John K. Fairbank, The Modernization of China edited by 
Gibert Rozman, China: Tradition and Transformation by John K. Fairbank & Edwin 
O. Reischauer, The Rise of Modern China by Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, and Choung-kou 
chin-tai-shih (Chinese Modern History) by Lee Shou-Kong contain Chinese modern 
history narratives in very great detail. Moreover, some books focus on a particular 
theme, such as Mary C. Wright's The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The 
T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 and Chien Po-Tsan's Wu-hsu pien-fa (The 
Hundred Days Reform) which pay primary attention to political affairs. Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of Treaty Ports, 1842~1854 by J.K. 
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Fairbank and China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations by Immanuel C.Y. Hsu 
discuss China’s international relationships during those times. The Rise of Chinese 
Military Power, 1895-1912 by Ralph L. Powell, A Military History of China edited by 
David A Graff & Robin Higham, Li Hung-Chang and the Huai Army by Stanley 
Spector, and Naval warfare and the Refraction of China’s Self-Strengthening Reforms 
into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895 in Modern Asian Studies, 2004 
(38, 2, May), by Benjamin A. Elman, mainly discuss military issues. China’s Early 
Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan- Huai and Mandarin Enterprise by Albert 
Feuerwerker and Foreign Investment and the Economic Development in China, 
1840-1937 by Hou Chi-Ming address economic and industrial development. The 
Earliest Government Schools in China by Knight Biggerstaff focuses on educational 
history.  
   
Similarly, in the case of Japan there are such works as: A History of Japan: from Stone 
Age to Superpower by Kenneth G. Henshall, The Cambridge History of Japan: 
Volume 5: the Nineteenth Century, The Making of Modern Japan edited by Marius B. 
Jansen, The Roots of Modern Japan by Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Japan: Tradition & 
Transformation by Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan in Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji 
edited by Marius B. Jansen & Gibert Rozman, The Meiji Restoration by W.G. Beasley, 
Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization edited by Marius. B. Jansen & 
Robert Neelly Bellah, Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 
1868-1912 edited by Peter Kornicki, and Kōza Nihon rekishi: Kindai, vol. 7 (The 
study of Japanese History: Modern Period) edited by Rekishigaku kenkyūkai (The 
Association of Historical Studies). In these books, the authors account for, evaluate or 
discuss Japanese modern history thoroughly and precisely. In relation to more 
specialised aspects of Meiji Japan, there are such books as A Political History of 
Japan During the Meiji Era 1867-1917 by Walter Wallace Mclaren, Japanese 
Economic Development: Theory and Practice by Penelope Francks, The Formation of 
Modern Japan: As Viewed from Legal History by Nakamura Kichisaburo, The 
Heritage of Japanese Civilization by Albert M. Craig, Live Machines: Hired 
Foreigners and Meiji Japan by H.J. Jones, and Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in 
The Late Meiji Period by Carol Gluck. These authors have analyzed and described in 
detail, from their different viewpoints, how Meiji Japan was able to be successful in 
its modernization.  
   
Apart from the above, some books or journals have particularly focused on 
comparisons in modernization between China and Japan. For instance: East Asia, The 
Modern Transformation by Fairbank & Reischauer & Craig, Modern China and 
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Japan: A Brief History by Conrad Schirokauer, Modernization in Nineteenth Century 
China and Japan in Japan Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 3 by Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan’s 
Response to the West, the Contrast with China in World Politics, Vol. IX, No. 1 by 
William W. Lockwood, Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan 
in Economic Development and Culture Change, No. II as well as Contrasting Factors 
in the Modernization of China and Japan, Reviewed in World & I by M.J. Levy. These 
English writers give their opinions as to why Japan was faster and China was slower 
in the path to modernization. Apart from that, Chinese and Japanese scholars also 
have their own understanding of this issue. For instance, in Japanese Perspectives on 
China’s Early Modernization, K.H. Kim mentions about eight books written by 
different authors which discuss the comparison between China's and Japan’s 
modernization. In addition, Chung-kuo yang-wu yun-tung yu Jih-pen Ming-chih 
wei-hsin tsai ching-chi fa-chan shang ti pi-chiao (A comparative study of China’s 
‘foreign matters’ movement and Japan’s Meiji modernization from the standpoint of 
economic development), in Li-shih yen-chiu, (Historic Study) 1963 v.1 by Huang 
I-feng & Chiang To, and Ch’ing-chi tung-kuang tzu-chiang-yun-tung yu Jih-ben 
Ming-chih-wie-shin yun-tung ti bi-gou (Comparison between Reforms in China in the 
period of Tung-chih & Kuang-Hsu and the Japanese Meiji Restoration) by Li En-Han, 
also try to offer views on why China was slower than Japan in the matter of 
modernization. 
   
In short, many books have made a great contribution to the themes of this thesis, and 
whether I have ever mentioned them here or not, are quite useful for reference.     
 
 
1.4. Methodology applied 
 
In relation to the study of modernization there are two main schools, notably 
Marxist-Leninist Studies and Modernization Studies,4 and I prefer to select the latter 
to interpret modernization. Moreover, apart from interpretation and evaluation of 
                                                 
4  Marxist –Leninist approaches have the belief in common that the motor of history is the class 
struggle, in other words, they hold that the process of modernization is a kind of shifting confrontation 
between the exploiting (capitalized nations) and the exploited (less-developed countries). Accordingly 
they treat the relationship between the advanced states and less advanced as a global extension of the 
class struggle. In contrast, Modernization Studies advocate two important views, which are different 
from the Marxist. One is that political, economic, manufacturing and demographic and other valuable 
elements should measure the level of development of a nation. The other is that the process of 
modernization in both primary modernizers and latecomers is one of domestic transformation.  
Rozman says he uses an interdisciplinary approach of taking five areas to examine modernization of a 
society in terms of international context, political structure, economic structure and growth, social 
integration, and knowledge and education. However, his theory is closer to the school of Modernization 
Studies. See: Rozman, pp. 7-14.   
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traditional historical methods, the main methodologies applied in this thesis will be 
comparison and analysis in order to present through case study the sought-for 
'successful way to modernization'. Basically the warp and woof of this research will 
rely on two sets of threads: one is through the interdisciplinary fields of diplomatic, 
political, and military; economic, financial and industrial; educational, social and 
cultural views to reexamine the paths of modernization of China and Japan. The other 
is through temporal divisions whereby the modernization of both countries will be 
broken down into into four phases: legacy, formative, operational and consequent 
(outlined briefly below).    
 
                 China                     Japan 
 
Legacy  The situation leading up to 1839 The situation leading up to 1853 
 
Formative From the start of the Opium War  From the U.S. East India         
            to the Peking Treaty following   Squadron commended by  
            the Arrow War (1839~1860)     Matthew Perry calling at Uraga 
          to the Restoration of Imperial 
                                        Rule (1853-1868)                             
           
Operational  From the start of the      From the start of the Meiji    
   Self-Strengthening movement    Restoration to the Treaty of 
   to the Treaty of Shimonoseki     Shimonoseki following the                     
           following the Sino-Japanese    Sino-Japanese War (1868~1895) 
            War (1861~1895)                
       
Consequent  From the end of Sino-Japanese   From the end of Sino- Japanese  
         War to the Revolution of 1911    War to the Death of the Emperor  
            (1895~1911)                  Meiji (1895~1912)  
 
It is necessary to have a timing framework in order to make a synchronous 
comparison of modernization between the two countries. In addition, I need to briefly 
explain here why I chose these four phases to compare Chinese and Japanese 
modernization.  
   
Certainly it cannot be denied that an encounter between West and East happened in 
the sixteenth century5 (Map 1) and even well before that time, but it was not large, 
                                                 
5 See the map ‘European contact to 1700’ in America and Asia in a Changing World collected by Frank 
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profound and full scale. In general, scholars of Asian Studies agree China started its 
modern history from the Opium War in 1839 and Japan started its modern history 
when the four warships of the U.S. East India Squadron, commanded by Commodore 
Matthew Perry, called at Uraga in Japan in 1853. Afterwards, both nations needed the 
following two decades to adjust their response to the challenge of the West. Hence 
this period of time I term the 'formative phase'.  
   
After that, as Kim has observed: “In the 1860s China and Japan embarked on 
significant programs for the introduction of Western science and technology and 
during the next thirty years the two neighbors engaged in a race toward a common 
goal of enriching the country and strengthening the army,”6 and this timing leads into 
what I call the 'operational phase'. This phase also offers a particularly good 
observation point for comparison between the modernization of China and of Japan, 
and especially with regard to the idea of 'Rich Nation and Strong Army'. It should be 
noted that some Marxist scholars 7  claim China started its Self-Strengthening 
Movement from 1864 (to 1895), but I follow the temporal division of 1861 to 1895 
based on the theories of Kim8 and Hsu.9 I therefore agree with these latter scholars 
that the movement started after the Arrow War (1858-1860),10 as opposed to the end 
of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).   
   
As to the following phase, the result of the Sino-Japanese War was the watershed of 
modernization for China and Japan. Defeated, China faced the scramble for 
concessions by the Powers – including the new Asian power Japan – and new 
demands for domestic reform. The winner, Japan, followed this with steps to develop 
its imperialism and militarism, encroaching into Manchuria in China after the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5, and annexing Korea in 1910. This phase I name the 
'consequent phase'. For China, I chose the Revolution of 1911 and for Japan, the death 
of the Meiji emperor in 1912, as the end of the 'consequent phase' as well as the end 
of the comparative timeframe in this thesis.    
  
  
                                                                                                                                            
Gibney, (New York, 1992). This records the Western powers' search for trade with Asian countries.  
6 K. H. Kim. Japanese Perspectives on China’s Early Modernization: the Self-Strengthening Movement, 
1860-1895, a Bibliographical Survey.(Ann Arbor, 1974), p. 1. 
7 For instance: Dai Yi in his essay “Prologue: the Main Stream through the History of Ch’ing Dynasty” 
in The First Seminar of International Study in the History of Ch’ing Dynasty (Taiwan, 2003), believes 
the Self- Strengthening Movement was from 1865 to 1895, p 12.  
8 K. H Kim. 1974, pp. 4-12. 
9 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu. The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), pp. 342-347. 
10 The Arrow Incident happened in October 1856. In order to exact revenge on Ch’ing China, British 
and French Allied Forces captured Guangzhou in 1857, and continued to march forwards into northern 
China until the concluding of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 and the Convention of Beijing in 1860.    
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1.5. Outline of the thesis  
 
The basic structure of this thesis will comprise seven chapters in total.  
  
Chapter One: Introduction includes the aims, literature review, methodologies and 
outline of the thesis. In addition key words such as 'modernization' are defined, and 
there is discussion also of problems or limitations which may occur. 
  
Chapter Two: Legacies discussed the situation in China and Japan prior to the advent 
of the West in the mid-19th century. It covers such matters as territorial integrity, 
population, politics, the military, the economy, and the social situation. 
  
Chapter Three: The Formative Phase focuses on discussion of international 
relationships, political structures and bureaucracy, the economic and financial 
situation, the educational system, the social structure and traditions as well as 
domestic rebellions during this period in both countries. These matters relate to the 
legacies respectively handed down from their pre-modern societies, through which we 
can check the merits and demerits in various aspects regarding the path to 
modernization. Certainly, the question of “how to respond to the challenge of the 
West” is an observational key point in this chapter.   
   
Chapter Four: The Operational Phase compares and analyzes reforms in both China 
and Japan – in China the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861~1895) and in Japan the 
Meiji Restoration in almost three decades (1868~1895). The discussion includes 
decisive political figures, who were in charge of government, and addresses the 
domestic and international challenges of those reforms adopted in the areas of 
diplomacy, politics, economics, finance, taxation, industrialization, education, 
national defense and civil security systems, cultural enlightenment and democratic 
movements. By any account, comparison and analysis of these reforms made by 
China and Japan in three decades are the key points, from which some valuable and 
instructive principles can be drawn out to present the best strategies for the path to 
modernization.   
   
Chapter Five: The Consequent Phase aims to compare the effects of the Sino-Japanese 
War on both nations and to analyze the reasons why the Hundred Days Reform in 
1898, the Decade of Conservative Reform11 after the Boxer Uprising in 1900, and the 
                                                 
11  After the failure of the Hundred Days Reform, the Ch’ing Court launched the Decade of 
Conservative Reform after the Boxer uprising in 1900 till 1911. It included suspension of the 
examination system (1905), the implementation of a program to send students overseas and the setting 
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Revolution of 1911 happened in China, as well as why Japan headed towards 
imperialism and militarism.  
   
Chapter Six: Lessons from History searches for the whys and wherefores of success 
and failure as well as establishing key factors in Japan’s catching up and China’s 
slowing down on the path to modernization, with particular regard to the efficacy of 
the idea of ‘rich nation and strong army’ as the core of this case study. 
   
Chapter Seven: Conclusion is the final chapter and will review the thesis and its 
arguments. 
 
1.6. Problems and limitations  
 
Certainly, it cannot be denied that a topic such as comparing the modernization of 
China and Japan in order to search for a successful strategy to achieve a ‘rich nation 
and strong army’ has its difficulties and limitations. Because of the huge range of 
materials written in different languages it is quite impossible for one MA student to 
read and summarize all of these works in a relatively short time. Particularly in the 
pursuit of extensiveness and exhaustiveness in studying huge amounts of historic 
materials, there is a tendency in academic circles around the world for authors to try 
to use methodologies of collectiveness, comprehensiveness and to be interdisciplinary 
in compiling, interpreting or evaluating history. For instance, with The Cambridge 
History of China, Volume 10: Late Ch’ing , 1800-1911, Part 1 and Volume 11, Part 2 
(edited by Denis Twitchett and John. K. Fairbank), and Meiji Japan: Political, 
Economic and Social History 1868-1912 (edited by Peter Kornicki), one notes that it 
is virtually a case of a different scholar writing each chapter in these books. Thus I 
should say that I have to humbly stand on the shoulders of these giants who have 
made such a great contribution to the topic to set up my theory and to prove the 
hypothesis that “there might be such a thing as an achievable and successful way to 
modernization.” Of course, inevitably some points in the conclusion might contain my 
own subjective views, omissions or defects. As the poet Ziya Pasha12 wrote: 
 
The things I’ve chosen are a drop, no more:   
The undiminished sea still crowds the shore.                              
                                                                                                                                            
up of a preparative conference for constitutional monarchy. See Rozman 1981, pp. 228-231. 
12 Quoted by J.A.G. Roberts in his preface in Modern China: An Illustrated History. (Phoenix Mill, 
1998). 
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Chapter Two: 
 
Comparison and analysis of legacies in China and Japan 
 
 
2.1. The influences involved in the legacies  
 
There is a prerequisite to studying the way China and Japan responded to the 
challenge of the West in the mid-nineteenth century and this concerns the influence of 
the legacies. Thus this chapter will focus on the effect of these legacies for China and 
Japan on their paths to modernization. Through comparison and analysis it will be 
possible to perceive which legacy better fitted which nation for modernization.  
  
 
2.2. Do the legacies affect China's and Japan’s paths to modernization?     
 
As we know modernization is a kind of largely internal process of change in a country 
affecting almost all aspects including political, economic, industrial, military, 
educational, social and cultural, and even the way of thinking of its people. In 
particular, the Western powers transferred their traditions to modernity by means of 
applying modern technology and knowledge from the time of the Industrial 
Revolution1 from the last quarter of the eighteenth century. They were the originators 
of industrialization and had already developed their new technology and knowledge 
for over eighty years before 1840. Thus in the mid-nineteenth century the West was 
much further ahead on the path to modernization than these countries in the East.  
   
Moreover if we study the process of Western modernization in a nation we cannot 
neglect those legacies which have been handed down from pre-modern ages, 
providing a continuing influence on the inheritor-nation. In particular such nations as 
China and Japan have survived for several thousand years and have created a great – 
and according to some – glorious Oriental Civilization in the Asian World, even 
though the Japanese think their culture is unique and quite different from that of 
China.  
   
As a result, certainly the legacies have had a huge influence on the nation preceding 
                                                 
1 In general, the Industrial Revolution is divided into two phases. The first phase was the mechanization 
of lighter industries (cotton and wool) with the harnessing of steam power since the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century. The second phase was the mechanization of heavier industries (iron and steel) from 
1830.  
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modernization. Through case study, it may be possible to find out the size of the 
impact of the legacies on the inheritors on their path to modernization, and especially 
how difficult it is for such nations as China and Japan, in confronting this 
transformation, to decide to what degree they should adopt modernization or abandon 
tradition.      
 
   
2.3. How did the legacies affect China's and Japan’s paths to modernization? 
 
 
2.3.1. China 
 
International relationships and the political situation 
 
Traditionally, China considered itself as the central kingdom, surrounded by countries 
such as Korea, the kingdom of the Ryukyu Islands, Annan (known in ancient times as 
Vietnam), Laos, Burma and the other countries in Southeast and Central Asia under 
the relationship of the so-called Tributary System.2 This comprised a hierarchy to 
show how close the neighbourly intercourse was among them. For example the 
relationship between China and Korea was of the first class.  
   
In 1644, the Ch’ing dynasty was established in China by the Manchu. It basically 
continued the same political systems and international relationships with its 
neighbours as the former Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). However, this was the second3 
time in Chinese history that the country was ruled not by the majority, the Han people, 
but by an alien ethnic minority group, in this case the Manchu, who were only about 2 
percent of the population of the whole empire.4 Under the reign of three wise 
emperors K’ang-Hsi (reigned 1662-1722), Yung-Cheng (reigned 1723-1735) and 
Ch’ien-Lung (reigned 1736-1795), Ch’ing China reached its summit in the dynastic 
cycle and expanded its territory to a huge geographical area (Map 2).5 Its population 
had increased to approximately 430 million6 by 1850. However, the huge population 
growth placed the empire under a great deal of pressure since natural disaster, famine 
and poverty easily brought about disturbances in society.  
                                                 
2 Immanuel. C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), pp. 174-179. Even Japan had 
paid tribute to China for a short period (1404-1549). 
3 The first rule by foreigners in China was the Yuan/ Mongol Dynasty (1280-1368). 
4 Conrad Schirokauer, Modern China and Japan. (New York, 1982), p. 9. 
5 Ibid., p.5. 
6 John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 10. (New York, 1978), p. 109. Also see 
Gilbert Rozman ed., The Modernization of China. (New York, 1981), p.144. 
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In pre-modern China, apart from opening the port of Canton7 for trading with 
overseas countries and keeping a certain diplomatic relationship with the Russian 
Empire, fundamentally the Ch’ing Dynasty adopted a national policy of exclusion. 
With a huge population and a vast area as well as regarding itself as the central 
kingdom in the tributary system, the whole empire was hardly able to review and 
adjust its diplomatic policies with the West when they came to the East and demanded 
the opening of more ports for trading. Similarly, as Fairbank says: 
 
China’s long history as the ancient center of East Asian civilization had 
given her people an inborn sense of superiority to all outsiders. The inertia 
and persistence of traditional patterns and both material and intellectual 
self-sufficiency all made China comparatively resistant and unresponsive 
to the challenge of the West.8  
   
The political situation in Ch’ing China was that of a dynastic state. The whole nation 
was ruled absolutely by a monarchial autocracy and the Imperial Court was the 
representative of the nation. The bureaucracy in the central government consisted of 
Principal Offices including the Grand Secretariat (Nei-Ko內閣), the Grand Council 
(Chun-Chi Ch’u軍機處) Six Boards (Li-Pu吏部 for Civil Affairs, Hu-Pu戶部 for 
Revenue, Ri-Pu 禮 部  for Rites, Ping-Pu 兵 部  for Military, Hsing-Pu 刑 部  for 
Punishment, Kung-Pu工部 for Public Works) and the Coordinate Office and the 
Imperial Department.9 Further, the local administration was divided into four grades: 
Province (18), Circuit (92), Prefecture (between 177-185), and District or Department 
(1500) but excluded special areas such as Mongolia, Manchuria, Sinkiang, Tibet and 
Chinghai.10  
   
K.C. Hsiao points out that in the Ch’ing regime: “The imperial rulers were therefore 
compelled by political necessity to maintain as firm as possible a control of the vast 
realm in order to insure political stability and thus to perpetuate their regime.”11 At the 
summit of the ruling hierarchy, the emperor played the principal role of the whole 
                                                 
7 With the successful pacification of Taiwan in 1683, the Ch’ing government lifed the ban on foreign 
trade, reopened ports of Canton, Chang-Chou (in Fukien), Ningpo and Yun-tai-shan (in Kiangsu) in 
1683. However, in order to avoid the trouble caused by the aggressive British merchants demanding the 
opening of more ports in the north for trading, the Ch’ing’s court opened only Canton to the West. See 
Immanuel. C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), pp. 183-186. 
8 John. K. Fairbank & Edwin O, Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation. (Boston, 1989), p. 
258.  
9 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), pp. 58-70. 
10 Ibid., pp. 71-73. 
11 Gilbert Rozman ed., The Modernization of China (New York, 1981), p. 55. 
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empire. If he could not handle the national machine properly and efficiently, he would 
easily fall into the situation of becoming worn out dealing with the huge volume of 
documents every day and become unable to make decisive policies. At the same time, 
officers of both the central and local governments in the bureaucratic system were 
faithful to their emperor and were really the servants of His Majesty, not of the 
people.  
   
However, because of their suspicions of Han officers, the Ch’ing court adopted the 
resultant policy of mutual checks in the administrative system in order to keep a 
balance of power between Han and Manchus, and this caused administrative 
inefficiency. Moreover the practices of widespread corruption and bribery were very 
common in the government. For example in the reign of Ch’ien-Lung, his favorite 
bodyguard Ho-Shen12(1750-1799), who was finally promoted to the Grand Secretariat, 
bled a fortune of 800 million taels (about $1.5 billion) in his official career, a truly 
massive sum equivalent to the state income for twenty years.13
   
In general, the Ch’ing Dynasty started its downfall during the nineteenth century 
under the weak reigns of emperors such as Chia-Ch’ing (reigned 1796-1820), 
Tao-Kuang (reigned 1821-1850) and Hsien-Feng (reigned 1851-1861). The spirit of 
Chinese official life was passive and was aimed at avoiding any appearance of trouble 
or disturbances in officials’ jurisdictions in order for them to secure promotion. The 
administrators preferred to harmonize or compromise with the local interest groups 
and did not easily innovate. Moreover the administration was not efficient and 
corruption was serious as well. Thus under this political structure the Ch’ing 
government had little capacity to react effectively to the challenge of the West  
 
  
The military situation 
 
The armed forces at the beginning of the Ch’ing Dynasty consisted of the Eight 
Banners established by Nurhachi (1559-1626). Banners were primarily administrative 
organizations, which carried out the functions of raising, supporting and training a 
certain number of troops. His successor, Hong Taiji (1592-1643), expanded the banner 
system to Eight Mongol Banners and Eight Han Banners and his heir, Shun-Chih 
(1644-1661), took advantage of the Ming Dynasty’s (1368-1644) rebellions to 
                                                 
12 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York,1970), p. 166. 
13 The estimates of Ch’ing government revenues pre-1850 roughly reached 40 million taels: referred to 
in Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. East Asia: Tradition & 
Transformation, Revised Edition. (Boston, 1989), p. 568 
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conquer China. However when the Three Feudatories Rebellion (1673-1681) occurred, 
the Banner Forces had become too weak to suppress it. To replace the Banners, the 
so-called 'Green Standard Armies', which originally consisted of surrendered Ming 
armies of Han soldiers and led by Han generals, complemented the Banner Forces to 
repress the rebellion. Thus throughout the eighteenth century these two branches, the 
Banner Forces and the Green Standard Armies, were the backbone of Ch’ing armed 
forces.14 Fundamentally, as Paul Lococo Jr. says, the establishment of the Ch’ing 
military system was aimed at “how to maintain an effective military force, yet insure 
that it could not threaten the ruling dynasty.”15  
   
However, the dynasty’s military, controlled by the Board of War (Ping-Pu), became 
progressively unable to meet the challenges coming from internal rebellions and 
external threats, due to its decay and weakness. From the 1820s to the 1840s 
especially, in order to settle the disorder arising from incompletely assimilated 
non-Han minorities, the Chinese military system started to transfer from the centrally- 
controlled bureaucratization to a new form of local or provincial defensive forces. 
New militias called t’uan lien16團練 (local forces) were established, which could be 
called up by the magistrates of a county or prefecture and were based on the pao-chia
保甲 registrations (a kind of family registry used for organizing local safeguarding). 
Whenever any regional revolt became serious and the national forces could not handle 
this, the new militia would replace the role of the formal forces and be utilized to 
crush these disturbances. From then on, it was the turning point for the Ch’ing 
military system, which was transformed from centralization to decentralization. 
   
In general, the Ch’ing dynasty was backward in its military technology, and the 
military administration was decaying as well. As Fairbank comments: “Without 
training or discipline, they lacked skill and courage in the field and would run before 
the enemy could arrive, being fearless only toward the helpless common people.”17 
Moreover, the navy had no concept of establishing a mobile striking force to secure 
sea power. Chinese naval vessels consisted only of small-scale squadrons equipped 
with a crew of one hundred and half a dozen old-fashioned cannon under separate 
provincial commands, with which it was impossible to defend China nautically 
                                                 
14 Paul Lococo Jr, ‘The Ch’ing Empire’ (Chapter Seven) in David A. Graffand & Robin Highham. ed., 
A Military History of China, (Colorado, U.S.A., 2002), pp. 121-123. 
15 Ibid., p. 121.  
16 The new units t’uan-lien were upgraded militia, recruited by local gentry leaders. They used the 
organizations of lineages, and the prestige and funds of local family notables to establish the local 
forces. See Gilbert Rozman ed., The Modernization of China. (New York, 1981), p.69.   
17 Fairbank, et al. 1965, p. 458.  
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against the Western powers.18  
   
Hsu describes Ch’ing’s military situation as follows:  
 
Instead of studying military arts, the troops led a debauched life of 
gambling, theater-going, watching cock-fights, opium-smoking, and ran 
usury and mortgaging businesses on the side. Unskilled in their military 
profession, they were good for nothing but consuming the government 
stipends.19  
 
The government had to raise about 1.5 million taels per year for the army including 
their families. To support this huge military, one can imagine how heavy the burden 
was on Ch’ing China. Also the corruption in the military was serious: for example, a 
Manchu general Fu-K’ang and his subordinates, in order to put military funds into 
their private coffers, deliberately prolonged the campaign against the Chin-Ch’uan 
rebels.20 Thus from these matters one can perceive the seriousness of the corruption 
and incompetence of the Ch’ing military. Certainly, because of the debasement of the 
military in the Ch’ing dynasty it was obvious that it could not satisfy the practical 
needs of the nineteenth century. 
 
 
The economic and fiscal situation 
 
China was an agricultural country; about four-fifths of its people lived on the land by 
means of using traditional ways such as animals, tools, sluiceways for irrigation and a 
great supply of labour. There were three characteristics of its economy: it was a 
relatively self-sufficient economic entity; institutionalized science and new 
technology had not yet been applied; and invisible restraints, through exorbitant levies 
or government monopolies, curbed the undertaking of profit-making 
entrepreneurship.21 Trading either domestic or foreign was negligible. Even though 
private pawnshops and a monetary system of copper coins and silver and gold taels 
was in evidence, such conditions as legal safeguards for commercial activities, large 
scale manufacturing, forms of joint-stock company, an investment market and a 
banking system were still lacking. Fiscal administration was also not efficient and 
                                                 
18 Idem. 
19 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), pp. 168-169. 
20 Idem. 
21 John. K. Fairbank & Edwin O, Reischauer. China: Tradition and Transformation. (Boston, 1989), pp. 
261-263. 
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unable to support the government in taking actions when needed. The actual amounts 
of government revenue were not fixed, since the revenues were not accounted for by a 
budgeting and auditing system but relied on a complex interplay of personal 
relationships,22 which meant the revenues could be determined by negotiation, not by 
an institutional system.  
   
Thus, in general, by the early stages of the nineteenth century the economics of the 
Ch’ing Empire were in bad shape and weakened by graft and institutionalized 
corruption in the administrative system, lack of an efficient fiscal administration, the 
inordinate military expenses of the campaigns against internal riots, the cost of 
importing opium and the like, and by those who depleted the nation’s treasury day 
after day. Furthermore, because the value of silver rose from a tael of silver 
exchanged for 700 cash copper coins in the eighteenth century to 1300 or 1400 cash 
coins in the nineteenth century,23 the people suffered from paying almost double to 
live.24 That was another reason why riots were frequent at this stage.   
  
 
Communication systems   
    
The empire had built up a public system for its communication and transportation by 
using state roads to connect all provinces and their major cities; by the network of 
post stations around the whole country for the official purpose of military surveillance, 
delivery of information and inter-governmental communications; and by the inner 
water transport system of the Great Canal for transporting food, clothing and other 
raw materials to the north. The main traffic tools were horses, horse powered sedans, 
palanquins and boats.  
  
In terms of media communications, publications were printed on a small scale in both 
central and local government.  
    
By any account, the means of communication were old fashioned and not efficient, 
especially within those boundary areas such as Mongolia, Manchuria, Sinkiang, Tibet 
and Chinghai. As a result, Ch’ing China was very slow to utilize modern technology 
for communications until the late nineteenth century.   
                                                 
22 Ibid., pp. 265-267. 
23 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), p. 169. 
24 Because in general, the common people used the copper coins for shopping but paid the tax in silver. 
The rising value of silver meant they had to pay more money for tax than before which impacted on 
their lives seriously. 
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Social, legal and educational situation  
 
Regarding the social structure, Ch’ing society consisted of the 20 per cent of the 
population belonging to the so-called ruling stratum, including scholars, gentry, 
officials, absentee landlords, militarists; and of the peasantry who were the remaining 
80 per cent of the population. Traditionally the rigid Confucian ideology, which 
respected the intellectual and extolled the cultivation of the land, but despised the 
parasitic manipulations of merchants, was rooted deeply in the upper class of the 
social elites, scholars and officials. Such ideology was a reason for China’s inertia in 
response to the challenge from the mercantilism and industrialism of the West.25
   
On the other hand China was a so-called gentry country as well since this class had a 
big influence on politics and economics in society as a whole. The gentry-status 
holders could obtain their qualifications in two ways: one, for about two-thirds of the 
gentry, was through the examination system; the other way, for the remaining third of 
the gentry, was by purchase.26 The gentry stratum was officially treated as a reservoir 
for appointment to office. Such a flexible system, which permitted the rich to buy a 
degree status and get into the ruling class, made society more feudal and more 
corrupt.        
   
In addition, Chinese society was based on the unit of the family, not the individual. 
The male and the female were not equally treated in society and the father in the 
family had authority over the other members. According to the moral code of 
Confucian ideology, women should be obedient to their husbands with no property 
rights and no economic independence. And, in general, girls had to have their feet 
bound for beauty in their youth, but this made them effectively cripples.27( Picture 1.) 
They were the victims of traditional society. Also the clan system had certain 
functions in society such as setting up regulations to control the behavior of its related 
lineages, processing rights, organizing self-guard and being involved in tribunals for 
disputes among relatives and the like.  
 
In addition, opium use became more popular and the habit of opium smoking spread 
throughout society to such people as government officials (Picture 2.),28 merchants, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
26 The total number of lower level gentry status holders was about a million people in 1800. See John K. 
Fairbank & Edwin O. Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation. (Boston, 1989), pp.   
259-260. 
27 J.A.G. Roberts, Modern China: An Illustrated History. (Phoenix Mill, 1998), pp. 14-15. 
28 Ibid., p. 26. 
 17
literati, women, soldiers and even monks, nuns and priests. The demand for the drug 
in China cost countless money to import from the West (Map 3: the opium trade in 
Ch’ing China).29 Besides the financial deficit from importing opium being serious, the 
opium-smoking habit also damaged the health and minds of the people.   
   
Above all, several fierce social rebellions, as well as natural disasters, occurred in the 
mid-nineteenth century, threatening the survival of the dynasty and dealing a serious 
blow to society. For instance, there were the Miao Rebellions (1795-1806),30 the 
White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804),31 and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), and the 
secret societies of the south launched riots throughout the whole period of the Ch’ing 
regime.32 Major natural calamities also happened in the 1840s and the 1850s, such as 
the severe draught in Honan (1847), the flooding in the four provinces along the 
Yangtze River and the famine in the Kwangsi province in 1849, and the flooding of 
the Yellow River in 1852, which all caused people to suffer greatly so that once the 
rebellions started they were easily persuaded to join them.33        
   
By any account, fundamentally, as some Marxist scholars describe, the nature of 
Chinese society was feudal and bureaucratic at this stage. Society showed the features 
of a feudal bureaucracy, a gentry-based elite and a so-called 'Oriental despotism'.34 
People suffered many privations under the feudal system of society. The society of the 
Ch’ing dynasty was obviously involved in unstable and stressful situations because 
the social insurgencies were linked with natural disasters and formed an unfortunate 
circle in the mid-nineteenth century.   
   
In its legal system, Ch’ing China lacked the legal institutions to handle conflicts and 
resolve disputes among the people or similarly with its neighbors. In many senses, 
with no independent judiciary ever developing, the empire relied on ethical norms 
rather than legal instruments even though it had penal codes for penalties and 
punishments that were mainly executed by the local governor and reviewed by the 
Hsing-Pu in the central government.35 Such legal operations in China were not 
capable of dealing with disputes between the Chinese and the West in the nineteenth 
century. One notes Fairbank’s comment that “There was also Western repugnance at 
the arbitrary arrest and torture of accused persons, as practiced under Chinese 
                                                 
29 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), p. 216. 
30 John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 10. (New York, 1978), pp. 132-133. 
31 Ibid., pp. 136-144. 
32 Ibid., pp. 134-136.  
33 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), p. 274. 
34 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
35 Gilbert Rozman, (New York, 1981), pp. 97-100. 
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criminal law. Antithetic assumptions concerning the rights and responsibilities of the 
individual underlay the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese legal tradition…”36 That is the 
reason why extraterritoriality was a requirement imposed by the Western powers in 
the unequal treaties after the Opium War.   
   
With regard to the educational situation, China’s literacy rate reached a high level in 
that about one-quarter to one-third of adult males had the ability to read simple texts, 
but the gap in literacy between male and female adults was large, and few women 
could read and write.37 As Rozman describes, “ The human resources of China 
increased substantially in quantity, but showed little dynamism in various measures of 
occupational diversity, literacy and technical skills.”38 In general, people learned 
calligraphy, literacy and simple mathematics in a village school supported by private 
means. They especially studied the so-called 'Eight-legged Essay'39 (pa-ku wen八股文). 
Through three levels of the examinations system, that is district, provincial and 
metropolitan, by using the eight-paragraphed essay candidates could acquire 
gentry-membership, as well as having the chance to become an officer in the 
government. 
   
However, I strongly agree with Hsu’s comment:  
 
The greatest shortcomings of the examination system were its narrow 
scope and impractical nature. Literary excellence and administrative 
ability were quite different matters… Conformity to the rigid pattern of 
the ‘Eight-legged Essay’ tended to stifle free expression and to encourage 
orthodoxy. What is perhaps most important, the examination system 
stressed the Confucian values only and rewarded literary and humanistic 
accomplishments at the expense of science, technology, commerce and 
industry.40  
   
Furthermore, owing to the frequent and serious literary inquisitions after the 
establishment of the Ch’ing Dynasty, very few scholars of 'statecraft' (ching-shih經世) 
schools, such as Wei Yuan (1794-1857) as Juan Yaun (1764-1849), dared to advocate 
applying their studies to solve the political and economic problems of the government; 
most literati and intellectual elites transferred their studies from 'statecraft' to 
                                                 
36 John. K. Fairbank & Edwin O, Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation. (Boston, 1989), p. 
276. 
37 Ibid., p. 154. 
38 Gilbert Rozman, (New York, 1981), p. 155. 
39 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, (New York, 1970), pp. 99-104. 
40 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
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antiquarian knowledge in order to avoid suffering political persecution.41 They 
gradually lost moral responsibility and did not play the role of innovators or leaders of 
their society at this stage.   
 
       ♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
In short, Ch’ing China was facing the downfall of its dynastic cycle in the nineteenth 
century. There were many reasons for China’s inability to react to the challenges from 
the West immediately and effectively. These were derived from such factors as its 
traditional worldviews; its comprising a huge population and huge territorial area 
under the tributary system; the political structure which included an alien dynasty, 
utilizing Manchu-Chinese diarchy in administration in order to keep a balance of 
power; the monarchial autocracy; and corruption and passiveness in the bureaucracy. 
Other factors were the decay of the armed forces that caused the military to move 
from centralization to decentralization; a lack of well-developed public 
communication and transportation; a backward legal system which could not meet the 
demand from the West; new technology not being applied to develop the economy, 
plus inefficient fiscal administration; and a feudal society deeply rooted in Confucian 
ideology and the like. Therefore it could be said that, in general, most legacies of 
tradition in China were too fixed, backward and passive to respond to the new 
potential threats from the West.     
 
 
2.3.2. Japan 
 
International relationships and the political situation 
 
Japan is a marine archipelago located along the Eastern Asian continent (Map 4)42 and 
generally comprised Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido (also called Ezochi 蝦
夷地in the Edo Period) at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (bakufu).  
 
Basically, during the Tokugawa/Edo Period (1603-1867), it had a national policy of 
exclusion, mostly only opening the port of Dejima near Nagasaki for trading with 
China and the Dutch. In 1837 the shogunate reinforced the Order of Expulsion 
(Ikokusen uchiharairei 異国船打払令) to expel foreign ships which tried to get closer 
                                                 
41 'Statecraft' was an academic school, which aimed at the application of scholarship to the problems of 
government administration as opposed to knowledge, speculative philosophy, and formalism. See John 
K. Fairbank & Edwin O. Reischauer. (Boston, 1989), pp. 267-269. 
42 Conrad Schirokauer, Modern China and Japan. (New York, 1982), p.108. 
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to the Japanese coast. However after the Opium War, when the news of China’s defeat 
spread to Japan, the shogunate was suddenly aware of the power of the West and 
changed its attitude from expulsion to compromise. By a new order (shinsui kyūyōrei 
薪水給与令), the local daimyō (clan lords) could supply food and water to those on 
foreign ships wrecked or sailing around Japan.43    
   
In 1853 the Commodore of the United States' East Indian Squad, Matthew Perry 
(1794-1858), led four ships to Uraga in Tokyo Bay and demanded the opening of the 
ports for trading, and the following year Japan signed the Kanagawa Treaty (Treaty of 
Peace and Amity between the U.S. and Japan). Subsequently the Ansei Commercial 
Treaties were concluded with five nations, namely the U.S.A., Holland, Russia, 
Britain and France (1858). In these unequal treaties Japan suffered humiliating 
conditions such as extraterritoriality, fixed tariffs and most-favored-nation treatment 
at the hands of  the Western powers.44 The shogunate had no capacity to deal with 
the potential threat from the Western powers, or even the possibility of colonization 
by one or more of them, and this incapacity was instrumental in the imminent 
downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan.  
   
Regarding the political situation, unlike China, Japan was not a dynastic country. The 
central government operated a dual system, with the emperor a symbolic ruler in the 
kuge seigen 公家政権 (emperor system) and the shogun the real ruler in the buge 
seigen 武家政権 (shogunate system). This type of political system was formed from 
the establishment of the Kamakura Bakufu (1192-1336) and continued through to the 
Tokugawa Bakufu (1603-1868). In addition, Japan was virtually racially 
homogeneous with about 33,000,000 people in 1872,45 unlike China, which was a 
heterogeneous state at this stage.  
   
Moreover, under the ruling system of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the government was 
largely based on the bakuhan taisei 幕藩体制 (shogunate and daimyō system which 
included three types of daimyō, in total around 266: Gosanke御三家 (the three branch 
families of the Tokugawa house, namely Owari 尾張 , Kii 紀伊  and Mito 水戸 
domains) and shinpan 親藩 23 (domains related to the Tokugawa family), fudai 譜代 
145 (daimyō in hereditary vassalage to the Tokugawa house), and tozama外様 98 
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(outside daimyō)46 (Map 5).47 In general the shogunate paid most attention to stability 
in politics, the economy and society; and in order to develop its prosperity it gave a 
certain degree of autonomous power to the daimyō to develop their domains, while 
strictly retaining overall control through a combination of rules and punishment. 
   
In addition, even though it might be an overstatement when Tanizawa Eichi says 
“Japan has no corruption and bribery in its tradition,” 48  it is obvious the 
administration in the shogunal government was relatively efficient, active and of 
reasonable integrity as well. Without doubt, under the regime of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate Japan had established a good foundation of economic growth and social 
stability for its modernization.49  
   
However, when the Western powers started coming to the East with their demands for 
opening the country, the shogunate was not capable of defending the nation and this 
gave those long-opposed outer domains the chance to oppose it more actively. For 
example, regional powers such as Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa grew to such an extent 
that they could have a big influence on issues such as whether the nation should adopt 
an opening or a confrontation policy to react to the West, and whether the successor of 
the 13th shogun (Tokugawa Iesada 1824-1858) should be Tokugawa Yoshitomi 
(1846-1866) or Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837-1913). The key characteristic at this stage 
was that outside daimyō had a big voice in their advocacy on national policy. Finally 
these outside domains, led by enlightened samurai, challenged and overthrew the 
shogunate and made possible the Meiji Restoration. Thus as Kenneth Henshall 
comments: “The inability of the shogun to deal effectively with the foreign ‘threat’, 
despite his supposed role as military protector of Japan, sounded the death knell for 
the shogunate.”50     
 
The military situation 
 
Shortly after its establishment, the Tokugawa Shogunate proclaimed bukeshohatto武家
諸法度 (Laws for the Military Houses)51 in 1615 and sankin kōtai参勤交代 (alternate 
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attendance)52 in 1635 in order to establish the shogun’s superior status as well as to 
control the daimyō. However, since there was no significant military campaign or 
political change except small-scale riots by peasants or townsmen, the military 
gradually decayed. Also the Tokugawa Shogunate wanted to rule Japan in peace, and 
it preferred to re-train warriors from the role of fighters to that of well-educated 
bureaucrats in the administration system through teaching them how to use writing 
brushes in place of swords. Thus:  
 
The samurai remained organized for the most part into military units and 
made a fetish of their two swords, but warfare had became a matter of 
theory, not practice. Schools were founded in the various domains to teach 
the military arts, but gunnery and the use of firearms, which had proved 
the decisive military techniques, were largely ignored…53  
 
The ‘traditional’ samurai values of bushidō 武士道 (‘Way of the Warrior') such as 
absolute loyalty to one’s master, strict fulfillment of obligations, deadly defence of 
one’s status and honor, were emphasized and codified after the shogunate secured 
stability of the regime.  
   
In the latter stages of the Tokugawa Period some samurai passionately transferred 
their personal loyalty from their daimyō, or the shogun, to the emperor as the supreme 
national symbol, and furthermore they strongly advocated reform of the governmental 
system to resist invasion from overseas (Sonnōjōi 尊王攘夷, literally ‘revere the 
Emperor and expel the barbarians’). Such strong motivation of elites in the warrior 
class had a decisive impact on Japanese modernization in the mid-nineteenth century.  
   
As a matter of fact, owing to the weakness of the shogunate while facing the threats 
from the West, powerful domains such as Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa ignored the 
Laws for the Military Houses, started to arm themselves strongly against the 
shogunate, and finally brought about rivalry among regional forces. This was one 
form of subversion to the Tokugawa system in the late stage of the shogunate. 
 
 
The economic and fiscal situation 
 
At the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate such natural disasters occurred as the Tenmei 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 405. ‘Alternate attendance’ was a rigid compulsory system, which required most daimyō to 
spend alternate years in Edo. And daimyō families were held as hostages in Edo too.  
53 Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. (Boston, 1989), pp. 410-411. 
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famine天明飢饉 (1782-1787) and the Tenbō famine天保飢饉 (1833-1839), plus severe 
cold weather in the Ōu region 奥羽地方in 1866, as well as man-made disturbances in 
the form of small-scale local insurgencies around the nation such as the Bōchōikki 防
長一揆 in 1831, the Mikawakamoikki 三河加茂一揆 and the Gunnaiikki 郡内一揆 in 
1836, and the Ōshioikki 大塩一揆and the Ikutayorozu Riot 生田万の乱in 1837.54 
However, in general economic development and social stability were well maintained. 
As Fairbank et al. point out: 
 
In any case, the rise of the Japanese economy above mere subsistence 
levels permitted the development of relatively high standards of literacy, 
economic institutions, and government services, and these high standards 
helped make possible Japan’s successful modernization in the nineteenth 
century.55
   
Without doubt, the system of ‘alternate attendance’ (whereby daimyō and their 
retinues spent alternate years in Edo) made a great contribution to commercialization 
and developed Japan as a single nation-wide market. It also brought about the rapid 
growth of cities and towns throughout the whole country (notably along processional 
routes). In general, these industries – including fishery, forestry, diversity of mines, 
winery, paper production, pottery and silk and cotton textiles – had developed well 
around the whole country. In addition, as the shogunate intended to control the 
circulation, quality and price of goods in trading, the organization of the kabunakama
株仲間 56 as well as so-called ryūtsūkikō 流通機構 57 (a kind of a national wide 
distribution system) had been promoted. The three biggest cities Edo, Osaka and 
Kyoto grew rapidly and all made a good foundation for modernization. A number of 
big business companies appeared such as Mitsui 三井, involved in sake brewing, 
pawn brokerage, money lending and acting as official banker; Kōnoike 鴻池, involved 
in sake brewing, money lending, shipping and later acting as financial agent; and 
Sumitomo 住友, involved in iron goods, drugs, and later becoming a major trader and 
refiner of copper. The Tokugawa Shogunate also issued a set of currency of gold, 
silver and copper coins as well as paper money to establish a monetary system for 
commercial needs. Apart from the shogunate’s endeavors, daimyō also made an effort 
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towards economic constructions in their domains in the mid-nineteenth century. For 
example, in the Satsuma domain Shimazu Nariakira (1809-1858) started to build a 
reverberator, a shipyard, and textile mills and introduced Western weapons; in the 
Hizen domain, Babeshima Naomasa (1814-1871) focused on pottery production and 
tried to import Western military industry to manufacture gunnery and the like.58 As 
well, many rich peasants and townsmen had shown the aggressive spirit of 
entrepreneurs and tried to carry out commercial expansion, and the surplus labor was 
forming a reservoir for the demands of subsequent industrialization in the pre-modern 
age. All were conducive to modernization. 
   
However, in the meantime, since the exchange rate between gold and silver was 1 = 5 
in Japan but 1 = 15 in the West, a great amount of gold was sent overseas. It forced 
the shogunate to adopt the policy in 1860 of reducing the weight of gold in coins 
called manen koban万延小判 in place of ansei koban 安政小判 (Graph 1).59 The 
former was obviously lighter than the latter. Also as exports increased rapidly and the 
suppliers could not keep up with the needs, in particular the price of rice, paper, silk, 
tea, and cotton rose sharply.60 Furthermore the shogunate tried to import gunnery and 
warships from the West in order to reinforce its military power, and this cost a great 
deal of money. All these things made people’s livelihood harder but gave them chance 
to explore the new future.   
   
Above all, the following comment from Henshall is highly appropriate in relation to 
the Tokugawa period: 
 
National stability in terms of peace and political structures provided a 
helpful environment. As a result of increased economic activity there was 
increased diversity and specialization (in terms of both region and worker), 
which boosted efficiency, commercialization, and monetarisation still 
further.61   
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Communication systems 
 
In the period of the Tokugawa shogunate, the national communications systems had 
been well developed both on land and by sea. On the land, main state roads such as 
the Tōkaidō 東海道, Nakasendō 中山道, Kōshūdōchū 甲州道中, Ōshūdōchū 奥中道中, 
Nikkōdōchū 日 光 道 中 , Sanindō 山 陰 道 , Sanyōdō 山 陽 道  on Honshu Island; 
Nagasakidō 長崎道 on Kyushu Island and subordinate roads surrounding Shikoku 
Island had been established as an inland network system for transportation (Map 6.).62 
Also since the sankinkōtai 参 勤 交 代  system was operating, the economic 
development was even more prosperous. Moreover to carry out the function of a 
modern post office, there were systems such as tsugibikyaku 継飛脚, daimyōbikyaku 
大名飛脚, and machibikyaku町飛脚 63 to deliver documents, letters and goods to the 
big cities along these state roads. At the same time there were such water systems as 
the nankairo 南海路 (sea voyage between Edo and Osaka), nishimawari kōro西廻り航
路 (sea voyage around the coastline of the Japan Sea, Pacific Ocean and Osaka in 
Western Japan), and the higashimawari kōro東廻り航路 (sea voyage around the 
coastline of the Japan Sea, the Pacific Ocean and Edo in Eastern Japan) for 
transportation.64 All of these fundamental infrastructures made it easier for Japan in its 
modernization.  
 
 
Social, Legal and Educational Situation: 
 
Social structure in Japan in the Tokugawa Period basically consisted of a clear 
hierarchy of four basic classes, which adopted the Confucian theory in a descending 
order. There were the warrior-bureaucrats that took the place of the 
scholar-bureaucrats of China; the peasants or primary producers; the artisans or 
secondary producers; and the merchants, whose contribution to society was in general 
least valued by mainstream thought. The highest classes at the warrior- bureaucrat 
level were the shogun, daimyō and their retainers. In total the group constituted about 
six percent of the whole population.65 In order to ensure political stability, the 
shogunate kept great social rigidity, by which the social mobility was strictly limited. 
The samurai class always had to keep a clear line away from commoners to show 
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their proud status in society. In the mid-nineteenth century, the shogunate changed its 
attitude to the merchant class and gave them a considerable degree of autonomy and 
they were relatively lightly taxed. Thus this new tendency gave those huge 
profit-making merchant houses such as Mitsui, Sumitomo a good opportunity to 
develop. The rise of the merchant at this stage was particularly important for Japan’s 
modernization in the future.66
   
Similarly to China, Japanese society treated the family as the basic unit rather than the 
individual, and women and children belonged to the men to be treated as their 
property. In addition, according to Confucianism, women were inferior to men and 
should have the virtue of so-called 'sanjū' 三従 (these were three obligations for 
women in a family: they had to obey their fathers as children, their husbands after 
marriage and their sons after their husband's death). But unlike China there was no 
habit of foot binding required of a female. As Reischauer and Craig comment, on 
Japanese society: 
  
The mixed feudal and Confucian values of the Tokugawa period thus left 
Japan a legacy of extraordinary formalism and rigidity on the one hand 
but also of strong inner discipline and personal drive on the other.67   
   
Regarding the legal situation, there were many laws such as kuge shohatto公家諸法度 
(regulations for Court nobility which comprised 17 items) for regulating matters in the 
emperor’s Court; buke shohatto武家諸法度 (codes for the samurai class comprising 19 
items in total after 1635) for regulating the conduct of daimyō and samurai; shoshūjiin 
hatto 諸宗寺院法度 (a code of nine items for Buddhists for conducting rites at 
Buddhist temples) and shosha neki kannushi hatto諸社禰宜神主法度 (a code of five 
items for Shinto shrines) and the like.68  
   
Similarly to Ch’ing China at this stage, basically the judiciary merged into 
administration, as there was no legislature and no modern law system in the 
government. All laws were executive orders and issued by administrative forms. The 
machi bugyō 町奉行 (the administrators in Edo) and kanjō bugyō 勘定奉行 (the 
administrators of the big cities around the shogunate’s territory) played the roles of 
administration, judicature and police. As well, in order to enforce national security, 
the shogunate exercised control by means of collective responsibility and 
accountability, which was enforced by inter-vigilance and harsh punishment.    
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Regarding the educational situation, because Japan had adopted the Chinese pattern in 
many aspects for over a thousand years (but not the examination system), Japanese 
culture showed a great deal of Chinese style such as Confucianism and the Buddhist 
religion. Literature, calligraphy, painting, sculpture, costume and the like were also 
strongly influenced by China. However, through its own way of replicating foreign 
elements, Japan was able to create a unique wafū 和風 culture (Japanese style). 
Therefore the consciousness of having borrowed from overseas in earlier times made 
it easier for Japan to justify doing so again from Western models in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  
   
In addition, Japan possibly had the highest literacy rate in the world at that time. This 
is estimated at almost 45 per cent for males and 15 per cent for females; in other 
words, on average, 30 per cent of its people could read and write.69 Private schools 
called terakoya寺子屋 (literally ‘temple-child building’) were scattered around the 
whole country and in them the commoners’ children could learn how to read, write 
and perform calculations.  
   
At the same time there were two popular academic schools developed for civilian 
education. One was the so-called rangaku 蘭学 (Dutch learning) which gave Japanese 
intellectuals a tremendous advantage because it opened a window to learning much 
new and useful knowledge about science and technology, such as medicine, 
cartography, botany and more modern gunnery as well as enabling them to receive 
more information about Occidental countries. These famous private schools included 
Shirandō 芝蘭堂, Tekijuku 適塾, Narutakijuku 鳴滝塾, Shōkasojuku 松下村塾 and the 
like.  
 
The other was the kokugaku 国 学  (national learning), which included famous 
scholars such as Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), and 
Hanawaho Kiichi (1746-1821). From a standpoint of criticizing and expelling the 
thoughts of Confucianism and Buddhism, they emphasized ancient Japanese virtues 
and the orthodoxy of the imperial line.70 In addition some Shinto priests aggressively 
asserted Japan’s national superiority as the land of the gods. And the Zen sect of 
Buddhism insistently inserted the self-conscious. All of these doctrines created a 
strong national consciousness in the samurai class and intellectuals as well. They set 
up the theory of sonnō尊王 (reverence for the Emperor) and made it subversive to the 
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Tokugawa system. 71  By any account most literati and intellectual elites were 
extremely active in playing the role of pioneer to explore Japan’s new future at the 
end of the shogunate and made possible the Meiji Restoration.   
   
  
                            ♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
In short, Japan in the middle of nineteenth century faced a turning point in its history. 
In the political situation, the Tokugawa Shogunate could not completely control the 
powerful outer daimyō and aggressive demands from the West. The centralized 
military power of the shogunate had declined seriously due to the long era of peace 
and the powerful daimyō were sufficiently armed to confront the shogunate. 
Meanwhile passionate samurai in both the shogunate and the domains also played a 
key role in Japanese modernization at the end of the Tokugawa Period and the 
beginning of Meiji Period as well. 
   
At the same time, the prosperous feudal economic environment no longer satisfied the 
needs of rich peasants and urban merchants since they already had an aggressive 
entrepreneurial spirit and wished to explore a more active role in the economic field. 
The intellectual elites not only focused on the heritages of Confucianism, and Dutch 
Learning but also cared about Western science, military technology, and current 
affairs in neighbouring countries.72  
   
Owing to the contemporary demands and its experiences of borrowing from 
foreigners traditionally, all of these above factors gave Japan a chance to establish 
new models based on Western powers as well as to replicate them in pursuit of its 
path to modernization.  
 
 
2.4. Comparison of legacies between China and Japan   
 
To compare the legacies of China and Japan handed down from their pre-modern 
periods, inevitably the similarities and differences will be subjectively judged as to 
whether they were of greater or lesser advantage to Western-style modernization. 
These factors will be analyzed item by item as below.   
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• Population and territorial integrity: The population and the size of the nation, 
without doubt would have a great influence on modernization. China had a 
population of 430 million and a vast territory compared with Japan with 33 
million in population and four main islands. China was a giant but Japan 
relatively a pigmy. However, during the successful modernization of those 
nations in the West such as Britain, France, German, and Italy they held their 
populations to about 30 million, and their territories were almost the same size 
as Japan when it started its modernization. Even though Russia and the United 
States had relatively bigger territories and population comparable to the giant 
Ch’ing China, they were both too small in population and their histories were 
too short. Thus it is clear both the huge population and a vast territory 
prevented Ch’ing China’s progression to modernization. On the contrary, 
Japan had no such obstacles. 
 
• International relations: In international relationships, both China in the Ch’ing 
Dynasty and Japan in the Tokugawa Period similarly adopted the policy of 
exclusion except for opening one port, Canton in China and Dejima in Japan, 
for trading. However Japan had a big shock and realized it had no power to 
face the threats of the West after it received the news of the Treaty of Nanjing, 
which ended the Opium War and opened five ports in China to Britain. Since 
that time the shogunate tactically undertook a policy of compromising to 
address the demands of the West without using the military. Thus in terms of 
the timing, Japan was the second so that it had more room to think over how to 
deal with the new challenge after China’s suffering at the hands of the West. 
Apart from the above, we should also note that the Western powers had more 
interest in China than Japan because of its huge market and materials; in other 
words China experienced heavier pressure from the West than Japan. Also 
since China had the traditional practice of a ‘tributary system', which gave its 
people an inborn sense of superiority to the outsiders, there was inertia and 
persistence against renovation; whereas Japan had no such disadvantage in its 
legacies. 
 
• Politics: Regarding the political situation, China was a heterogeneous nation 
ruled by an absolute monarchial autocracy of an alien minority, namely the 
Manchus, unlike Japan which was a homogeneous nation ruled by a 
dual-political system, the shogunate and the Imperial Court, by which Japan 
had greater flexibility to adjust its political system when it suffered 
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out-of-control situations. Particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, the Ch’ing 
Dynasty faced the downfall of the ‘dynastic cycle’ but the Tokugawa 
shogunate arguably did not face the downfall of the ‘shogunal cycle’. I 
strongly agree with Reischauer and Craig’s view that “ Japan in 1850 was still 
free of any serious external pressures. While social tensions had indeed 
developed… the samurai Confucian ethic still pervaded the nation, and the 
whole Tokugawa political structure still stood firm. If Japan had continued 
free of foreign encroachment, the Tokugawa system might well have 
continued for quite some time longer without major change”73. Moreover 
compared with the graft and corruption in the Ch’ing governmental 
administration, the administrators in Tokugawa Shogunate were more active, 
efficient and of higher integrity than those in China at the same time. Apart 
from the above, Japan had a heritage to show that it was capable of replicating 
and refining a model from the outside world, for instance the Taika (大化) 
Reforms (literally meaning ‘Great Change’, from 645 to 702) created the 
Taihō (大宝) Legal Codes (finished in 701 AD) in order to form Japan’s central 
government based on the Chinese model of centralized government.74 In the 
Nara period (710-784) and the Heian period (794-1192) Japan continually 
adopted Chinese political patterns.75 Thus, by comparing such political factors 
as the homogenous nation, the dual-political system, the timing of the 
so-called ‘dynastic circle’ and the activeness, efficiency, integrity in the 
government and the experience of replicating a foreign model, Japan was 
much more fitted than China for starting its modernization under such 
conditions in pre-modern times. 
  
• The military: The military in both countries was an old-fashioned feudal 
armed force and was so seriously worn down during a long period of peace 
that it became too weak to ether suppress internal insurgencies or confront the 
foreign threats during the mid-nineteenth century. Also the military power in 
both countries was transferred from centralization to decentralization. 
However the differences between them were that in the case of China, the 
elites of the Confucianism-rooted gentry, were mostly ‘conservative’, they 
respected tradition, tried to retain the feudal system and showed their loyalty 
to the Ch’ing court, gradually controlling the military power. But in Japan, the 
enlightening samurai were assertive or even ‘aggressive’; they transferred 
their loyalty from the shogunate and domains, were eager to learn new 
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knowledge and strongly expected renewal and renovation in the bakumatsu 
(the end-phase of the Tokugawa). Thus comparing the spirits of the 
conservative elites of the gentry in China and the assertive enlightened 
samurai in Japan, the latter were much more capable than the former to 
modernize since these elites controlled their nation’s destination in the coming 
future. 
 
• Economic and fiscal situation: In China, impacts such as the graft and 
institutionalized corruption in the administrative system, inefficient fiscal 
administration, the inordinate military expenses in campaigns against internal 
riots, the deficit caused by importing opium as well as a big gap in the 
silver-gold exchange rate in dealing with the West destroyed the national 
treasury and caused the economic base to deteriorate seriously day by day. In 
contrast to Ch’ing China, even though possessing imperfections and 
illogicalities in its social and political conditions, Japan generally maintained a 
high level of economic development in the Tokugawa period. Furthermore 
those elites among the samurai, urban merchants and rich peasants had been 
showing their actively entrepreneurial spirit from physiocracy to mercantilism. 
Thus it is believed that under its economic and fiscal situation Japan found it 
easier to boost commercialization and monetarisation in its modernization than 
China.   
       
• Communication systems: Although China had built up its public system of 
communications and transport by using both state roads and the Great Canal 
water system to connect all provinces and their major cities, on account of the 
huge continental territory, the communication systems in its inner regions such 
as Mongolia, Manchuria, Sinkiang, Yun-Guz Plateau, Tibet and Chinghai were 
very backward. By contrast in Japan, a marine nation, in the period of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the national communication system had been well 
developed both on land and by sea. Thus in comparing the convenience in 
transportation in general it was better developed in Japan than in China. 
 
• Social, legal and educational situation: Regarding the similarities in aspects of 
society, both China and Japan were influenced by the Confucian ideology; 
people regarded political, social and domestic ethics as important virtues. Both 
societies treated the family as the basic unit rather than the individual; women 
and children were inferior to men. Apart from the Japanese Shintoism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism were popular in China and in Japan. Both 
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societies consisted of a so-called hierarchy of four basic classes; the 
highest-status class, warrior-bureaucrats in Japan was substituted by the 
scholar-bureaucrats in China. Therefore it could be said that China was a 
gentry-oriented but Japan was a samurai-oriented country. In comparing the 
spirits of the social elites, the gentry class in China and the samurai class in 
Japan, the former was deeply rooted in rigid Confucian ideology which 
extolled the cultivation of the land and despised the merchant class which 
prevented people from developing mercantilism and industrialism, but the 
latter had eagerly shown the aggressive spirit of entrepreneurs and tried to 
learn new knowledge from the West. In addition there were no such bad 
practices as demanding foot binding for females and serious opium abuse in 
Japan. It should also be noted that the frequency and extent of internal 
rebellions and natural disasters made fatal calamities more serious in China 
than in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century.     
   
Regarding the legal system, the Japanese system was similar to that in Ch’ing 
China, basically the judiciary merged into administration. There was no 
legislature and no modern law systems in the government in the pre modern 
age. 
   
Concerning the educational situation, China and Japan both achieved a high 
literacy rate in the pre-modern age. However, by the nineteenth century, there 
was no such 'Dutch Learning' in China, which educated Japanese scholars able 
to read Dutch and enabled them to a significant extent to learn science and be 
knowledgeable about the West. Such Dutch Learning bestowed upon Japan a 
tremendous advantage in catching up technologically with the West once it 
made up its mind to do so. On the other hand, it is interesting that Japan did 
not introduce the ancient examination system from China even though it had 
existed for over a thousand years. As well, there was no 'Eight-Legged 
(/Paragraphed) Essay' in Japan to confine the intellectual’s thought in 
conformity to a rigid pattern. In addition, in order to avoid suffering political 
persecution, most literati and intellectual elites in China transferred their 
studies from 'statecraft' to antiquarian knowledge; they gradually lost moral 
responsibility and did not sponsor or lead innovation for their society. On the 
contrary, most literati and intellectual elites in the samurai class in Japan were 
passionate and extremely active in playing the role of pioneer to explore a new 
future at the end of the Tokugawa era. 
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♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
It is ironic when we perceive the fact that to a huge, long-civilized nation such as 
China, most of its legacies were not assets but handicaps to its 'modernization'. 
Through comparing and analyzing these elements of territorial integrity, population, 
and the political, military, economic, and social situations in both, it is obvious that 
the legacies handed down from the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan were more 
conducive than those in Ch’ing China to modernization along Western lines. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
Comparison and analysis of China and Japan in the formative phase 
 
After examining the important influence from the legacies, we should now look at 
how these two countries responded to the challenge from the West and as a result, 
what was learnt by China and Japan within their formative phases of 1839-1860 in 
China and 1853-1868 in Japan. These are important points, because the nation that 
can thoroughly understand the situation and respond properly, or alternatively quickly 
alter any mistaken policies initially adopted to deal with the West, will be the winner 
in the modernization competition. Accordingly through comparison and analysis, we 
can decide who was better able to make correct decisions for modernization in this 
phase, the Ch’ing dynasty in China or the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan. 
   
There are three points to consider: first, the way China and Japan responded to the 
challenge from the West under the pressure of domestic disorders; second, the lessons 
learnt from this; and finally, comparison and analysis within the formative phase. 
These points are considered in detail in this chapter.  
 
 
3.1. Comparison 
  
3.1.1. China 
 
During the period from 1839-1860, Ch’ing China faced the downfall of a dynastic 
cycle plagued by a dual threat, externally from the West and internally from the 
rebellions within the country. Thus in discussing the challenge from the West, we 
should be aware that at the same time rebellions seriously damaged the foundation of 
Ch’ing rule. The Taiping Rebellion nearly overthrew the imperial sovereignty by 
raging over sixteen provinces (out of eighteen in total) and more than 600 cities from 
1850 to 1864; the Nien Rebellion devastated eight provinces from 1851 to 1868; the 
Moslem Rebellion spread in the Yunnan province from 1855-1873; the Tungan 
Rebellion in the northwest spread over Kansu, Shensi, Ningsia and Sinkiang 
provinces from 1862-1873;1 and another Moslem insurgence occurred in Sinkiang 
between 1864-1877. All these brought major disasters and not a little humiliation to 
China, including its ruler and people.  
 
                                                 
1 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), p. 270.  
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The response to the West  
 
However, the Opium War from 1839 to 1842 occurred earlier than these domestic 
rebellions, which happened after 1850. Thus first we should review how Ch’ing China 
responded to the threat from the West. Basically we can perhaps divide this into two 
stages to consider, the first being the Opium War (the First Anglo-Chinese War of 
1839-1842)2 and the second the Arrow War (the Second Opium War or the War of 
Anglo-French Allies against China in 1856-1860). It was clear that China chose the 
policy of 'combat'3 to resist Western expansion in the formative phase. 
   
The Ch’ing court, political leaders in the government, and also scholars, could not 
imagine that China had any ability to confront the West. Some things were obvious to 
China, as Immanuel C.Y. Hsu says: 
 
... the incompatibility of the Chinese claim to universal overlordship with 
the Western idea of national sovereignty; the conflict between the Chinese 
system of tributary relationship and the Western system of diplomatic 
intercourse; and the confrontation between self-sufficient, agrarian China 
and expansive, industrial Britain ….The power generated from the 
industrial Revolution and the idea of progress through change propelled 
the West into overseas expansion.4  
 
Thus to China there was no way to stop the new trend. However, in order to retain the 
tributary system, the anti-opium policy and to exclude Western expansion, the Ch’ing 
court assigned the commissioner Lin Tse-Hsu (1785-1850) to Canton to take charge 
of the whole situation and deal with Britain. Unfortunately the Opium War finally 
broke out and China was inevitably defeated.  
 
As a result of the First Opium War, the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the 
Supplementary Treaty of Hu-men-chai ('The Bogue') were concluded between China 
and Britain. Apart from the indemnity of $21 million for military expenses and the 
cost of opium, opening five ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai), 
and the cession of Hong Kong, China conceded certain powers of sovereignty, mainly 
                                                 
2 The First Opium War (1839-1842) was a conflict between Britain and China. Britain fought over 
commercial rights, especially for opium selling in China, and China fought to terminate opium use. In 
the end the British were victorious. 
3 Generally, I agree with H.B. Morse’s opinion that China had shown three stages in dealing with the 
West: combat (1834-1860), submission (1861-1893), and subjection (1894-1911). See Rozman, Gilbert 
(Ed), The Modernization of China. (New York, 1981), p. 38. 
4 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), p. 240. 
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including the fixed tariff, extraterritoriality, and the most-favored-nation to Britain. In 
the years following the bitter experience of the Opium War, Ch’ing China was 
anxious to avoid new conflicts in order to retain its Manchu imperial sovereignty, so it 
satisfied the demands from other Western countries that followed the British. China 
passively signed the Treaty of Wanghsia with America in 1844 and the Treaty of 
Whampoa with the French in 1844, through diplomatic negotiation. This was the 
beginning of the 'unequal treaties' being introduced to China and bringing humiliation 
to the Chinese people for over a century.  
   
After the First Opium War, the Ch’ing court dispatched a commissioner, Ch’i-ying 
(the signer of China’s first treaties with the West), to deal with foreign affairs, by 
means of a “policy of friendship and personal diplomacy, and every effort was made 
to impress the foreign representatives of his sincerity, trustworthiness, and 
cooperation.”5 During his tenure of office from 1843 to 1848, he successfully 
maintained relative peace and order in China’s foreign relations.  
   
However, on account of the 'Canton City Question'6 and the death of Emperor Tao- 
Kuang (1782-1850, r. 1821-1850), his son Emperor Hsien-Feng (1831-1861) adopted 
a more uncompromising policy than had his father against the West. Also, under the 
1844 treaties with the Americans and the French, which included a revision after 
twelve years of the date of signing, the West made more aggressive demands, such as 
tariff revision, establishing diplomatic embassies in Peking, opening Tientsin port for 
trade, and bestowing on foreigners the right to buy land inland. Certainly the Court 
refused these demands which it thought unreasonable, but by taking advantage of the 
'Arrow Incident'7 in 1856, Britain launched the Arrow War (also called the Second 
Opium War). Meanwhile, owing to the murder of a missionary, Abbé Auguste 
Chapdelaine in Kwangsi province, the French government decided to dispatch an 
expedition to China, and thus the Anglo-French Alliance was formed and the French 
became involved in the war.  
   
                                                 
5 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), p. 244. 
6 Ibid., pp. 248-253. According to the Nanking Treaty, the British were given the right to enter the 
walled city area of the port of Canton, but the residents in the city resisted firmly and even caused 
confrontations. Thus the 'Canton city question' became a point of disruptive contention between China 
and Britain (from 1843-1856).   
7 Ibid., pp. 253-254. The Arrow War originally was a conflict between Britain and China caused by an 
incident when the Hong Kong-registered ship Arrow, flying the British Flag, was boarded near Canton, 
and a Chinese officer boarded and arrested most of the crew for piracy. Thus, to avenge this unfriendly 
act, British warships and troops attacked Canton. In the meantime, the murder of a French missionary 
Abbé Auguste Chapdelaine in Kwangsi province caused a French force to join the war with the British 
and soon the allied forces proceeded north, finally threatening Peking. This is also called the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860).  
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As a result of the Second Opium War, and the subsequent Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 
and the Convention of Peking in 1860 (with the British and French), China submitted 
to the 'Allied Forces' in promising to open ten new ports for trade (Map 7),8 foreign 
travel was permitted nationwide, inland transit dues were reduced to less than 2.5%, 
and freedom of movement for missionaries was allowed. What is more, the 
Supplementary Treaty of Peking was signed on November 14 1860, and China 
rewarded Russia for its help9 by conceding 300,000-400,000 square miles of territory, 
opening Urga (Ulan Bator, the Capital of the Mongolian People’s Republic today) and 
Kashgar (in Singkiang province) for trade, consulates and residence for Russians as 
well as the most-favored-nation treatment. The second treaty system changed China’s 
attitude from 'combat' to 'submission' to the West. China totally lost its national pride 
and suffered more seriously than before. As a result, the nation gradually woke up and 
recognized it had no ability to confront the West through its backward military power, 
and it had to use other means to conduct foreign relationships.  
 
 
Response to the domestic situation 
 
Secondly, we should re-examine how Ch’ing China responded to its serious domestic 
situation in this phase. As mentioned in Chapter Two, social upheaval was caused by 
natural disasters, population pressure, and social and economic problems. In addition, 
the Opium Wars damaged its economic structure and caused a financial deficit; 
political corruption made the administration inefficient and all these made China face 
the downfall of its dynasty. In particular, the central military could not meet the 
double challenge coming from internal rebellions and external threats because of its 
decay and weakness. The domestic situation became more and more serious and 
rebellions occurred across the whole nation such as the Taiping Rebellion, the Nien 
Rebellion, the Moslem Rebellion and the Tungan Rebellion in the northwest. Neither 
central nor local governments undertook any domestic reform, nor were they able to 
cope with these rebellions efficiently.  
  
In the mid-nineteenth century, the new militias called t’uan lien were established in 
                                                 
8 Ibid, p. 266. 
9 In the Second Opium War, the Anglo-French allied forces attacked Peking, and drove the emperor to 
seek a refuge in Jehol, Manchuria. In these critical days in 1860, the Russian ambassador Nikolai 
Ignatiev played an active role as mediator between the Anglo-French plenipotentiaries and Prince Kung, 
who was in charge of the peace settlement. And after the peace settlement the allied troops, urged by 
the Russian diplomat, left Peking; Russia demanded a reward for his mediation in new territorial 
concessions plus impressive commercial concessions. Moreover as a most-favored-nation, Russia also 
shared the benefits of the British and French share in the treaties. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 
1970), pp. 263-268.  
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the provinces to replace the role of the Banner Forces and the Green Standard as the 
national armed forces. Based on the t’uan lien regional forces, Tseng Kuo-Fan 
(1811-1872) established the Hunan Army in 1852, by which the Ch’ing could smash 
the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. As well, his main subordinates were active: Li 
Hung-Chang (1823-1901) later built up the Anhwei Army in 1862 (finally becoming 
the national force), and Tso Tsung-T’ang (1812-1885), who was the successor to 
Tseng Kou-Fan in leading the Hunan Army, subsequently subjugated the Western 
band of the Nien Rebellion in 1868, the Moslem Rebellion in 1873, and restored order 
to Singkiang in 1877. These figures were intellectual and gentry-type bureaucrats and, 
besides suppressing internal insurgencies, all played leading roles in the later 
Self-Strengthening Movement (this period of time also called 'T’ung-Chih 
Restoration'). 
   
Therefore we can detect here a historical turning point that was not only the beginning 
of the Chinese military system’s transfer from centrally-controlled bureaucratization 
to regionalism, but also has two other implications: one was the governmental power 
transferring from the Manchus to the Han Chinese; the other was in terms of the 
growing power of provincial officials who were involved in national affairs more and 
more deeply afterwards. Furthermore these leaders such as Tseng Kuo-Fan, Tso 
Tsung-T’ang, and Li Hung-Chang, in subjugating these domestic rebellions, became 
the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement, by which they enforced a series of 
reforms within the next operational phase (1860-1895) in China.   
  
 
3.1.2. Japan 
 
Concerning Japan, I defined the formative phase of its modernization from 1853, the 
year the U.S. East India Squadron commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry called 
at Uraga. The event was an important landmark in Japan’s pre-modern history and 
some scholars even consider it the starting point of Japan’s modernization. However, 
the news of China’s defeat in the Opium War and the Nanking Treaty with the British 
in 1842 shocked Japan deeply. From then on, the Tokugawa Shogunate and powerful 
daimyō launched a series of reforms. Thus to be precise, it might be argued that Japan 
started its formative modernization phase at approximately the same time as China or 
sooner, after the end of the First Opium War. In order to reflect on the historical facts 
during this period of time, we should consider what Japan did in response to the 
potential threat from the West from around 1840. 
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Response to the West 
 
Basically, the shogunate learned from the experience of the Opium War and perceived 
clearly that it was not capable of confronting the West by force, but must compromise 
with it. Thus in 1842 the shogunate issued the 'Order of Supplying Food and Water to 
the West' (shinsui kyūyorei 薪水給与令 to replace the 'Order of Expulsion' (ikokusen 
uchiharairei 異国船打払令). Soon, due to the signing in 1854 of the Kanagawa 
Treaty10 (Treaty of Peace and Amity between the U.S. and the Empire of Japan), 
Japan opened the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, gave the privileges of the 
most-favored-nation treatment, and permitted a consulate in Shimoda to the U.S. This 
was the first unequal treaty with the West and it destroyed the national policy of 
seclusion held until then. The other Western nations of Russia, Britain, and France 
followed in the steps of the U.S.A. and asked Japan to sign the ‘Treaties of Peace and 
Amity’ in the same year.  
   
Consequently, the U.S.A. and the other Western nations demanded the amending of 
the treaty and required more conditions such as the opening of Kanagawa, Nagasaki, 
Niigata, and Hyōgo; permitting free trading; permitting foreigner residence in Osaka 
and Edo; negotiating tariffs; conceding extraterritoriality, and the like. Meanwhile, 
although some outside daimyō from Chōshū, Satsuma, Tosa, Uwajima and Tokushima 
advocated an ‘expel the barbarian’ (jōi 攘夷) policy, a leader in the Tokugawa 
government, Ii Naosuke (1815-1860), insisted on compromise with the West in order 
to avoid war. As a result, the so-called Ansei Commercial Treaties were concluded 
with the same five nations in 1858.11  
   
However, those daimyō such as from Chōshū and Satsuma still persisted in their 
anti-foreign attitude to the West and, as a result, caused the war between Satsuma and 
Britain in 1863. In revenge for the 'Event of Namamugi' 生麦事件,12 in which four 
British were killed in 1862, seven British ships bombarded the port of Kagoshima in 
what was called the Satsuei sensō 薩英戦争 (the Anglo-Satsuma War) in 1863. Later, 
the 'Event of an Artillery Bombardment on Shimonoseki' (Shikokurengōkantai 
Shimonosekihōgeki 四国連合艦隊.下関砲撃) happened in 1864 when a combined fleet 
                                                 
10 Miyahara Takeo 宮原武夫eds., Nihon no rekishi 日本の歴史 (Japanese History), (Tokyo, 1989), 
p.134. 
11 Kawai, Atsushi河合 敦. Hayawakari Nihon kingendaishi早わかり 日本近現代史(Japanese 
Pre-modern and Modern History). (Tokyo, 2001) p. 21. 
12 The Event of Namamugi 生麦事件 happened in 1862, when four British riding in the hills behind 
Yokohama were attacked by samurai in the procession of the daimyō of Satsuma. See Reischauer, 
Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. Japan: Tradition & Transformation. (Sydney, 1979), pp. 121-122. 
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of seventeen British, French, Dutch, and American ships destroyed the forts at 
Shimonoseki.13 Both episodes made these powerful daimyō re-consider their policy 
towards the West and finally they perceived it was impossible to ‘expel the 
barbarians’ by means of the military. Gradually they formed an allied relationship 
called Sa-Chō rengō 薩長連合in order to topple the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1866.14
   
At the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate there were two streams of national policy 
towards the West. One was the compromise adopted by the shogunate, the other was 
the exclusion advocated by daimyō such as from Chōshū and Mito. The following 
numbers show how many daimyō changed their attitude towards the West in a decade 
from that of expelling to an opening policy:15  
 
 
Year Numbers agreeing with 
the opening policy 
 
Numbers agreeing with 
the ‘expel the 
barbarian’ policy 
Numbers having no 
views about this 
issue 
The Kanagawa Treaty 
in 1853 
16 34 4 
The Ansei Commercial 
Treaties in1858 
20 7 7 
 
 
According to this table, adopting an opening policy by the daimyō became the main 
stream.  
   
Moreover, from 1860 to 1867 the shogunate, despite its official policy stating it was 
illegal to send students overseas, dispatched in total 153 students to study abroad. 
They studied chiefly aspects of technology and science, including medicine, 
astronomy, navigation, gunnery, military skills and Western affairs.16  
 
  
                                                 
13 Ibid., p.129. 
14 We should note that at the very beginning, Chōshū was the leading domain in the advocacy of ‘revere 
the Emperor and expel the barbarians’, while by contrast, even though Satsuma advocated ‘expel the 
barbarians’, it still supported the policy of the union of the Imperial Court and the shogunate (also 
called kōbugattai 公武合体派): in other words it still supported the shogunate system but asked for 
some needed reforms. However, when both found that the shogunate had no ability to cope with the 
West, they then established an alliance union to confront the shogunate. See Ishii Susumu 石井 進, 
eds. 詳説日本史 Shōseitsu Nihonshi (A Detailed Japanese History). (Tokyo, 2000), pp. 231-235. 
15 Hamashima, Masaaki浜島 正昭 eds. Shinshō Nihonshizusetsu新詳日本史図説 New Vision of 
Japanese History). (Tokyo, 1998), p. 160. 
16 Ibid., p. 164. And also see Chapter Seven: The First Japanese Students Overseas 1862-1868 in 
Beasley, W.G. Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travelers in America and Europe. (U.S.A., 
1995), pp. 119-138.  
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Year The 
shogunate 
Daimyō In private Obscurity Total 
1860    1 1 
1862 15    15 
1863  5   5 
1864 1  1  2 
1865 8 19 1 1 29 
1866 16 11 3 1 31 
1867 27 21 1 2 51 
Obscurity 1 4 1 13 19 
Total 68 60 7 18 153 
 
   
Moreover, diplomatic interactions by the shogunate with the Western nations were 
frequent, such as missions to the U.S.A. twice in 1860,17 as well as the mission to 
Europe in1862.18 Shibata Takenaka was the Japanese envoy to the French in 1865,19 
and the Satsuma daimyō also sent a mission to Europe in 1865.20  
   
All these important practices show that Japan was proceeding on the way to 
modernization in this phase.  
 
 
Response to the domestic situation 
 
Before studying how Japan responded to the domestic situation, it is necessary to 
quickly review the history of the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Basically this 
timing could probably be divided into three stages.21  
 
The first one was from 1850 to 1860 when there was political strife between two 
factions in the government. One was the Nanki faction 南紀派 led by Ii Naosuke (a 
leader in the shogunate) and other fudai daimyō in support of Tokugawa Yoshitomi 
(1846-1866) as successor the 14th office of shogun. It also favoured an open national 
policy (kaikokuron 開国論). The opposed faction was the Hitotsubashi faction 一橋派, 
mainly endorsed by Mito, Satsuma, Uwashima, Tosa, and Etsumai daimyō in support 
of Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837-1913) as the next shogun. They advocated the 'revere 
                                                 
17 Beasley, W.G. Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travelers in America and Europe. (U.S.A., 
1995), Chapter Four: The Mission to America, 1860. pp. 56-70. 
18 Ibid., Chapter Five: The Mission to Europe, 1862. 
19 Ibid., Chapter Six: Envoys and Industry, 1865-1867. 
20 Idem. 
21 Kawai, Atsushi河合 敦, Hayawakari Nihon kingendaishi早わかり 日本近現代史 (Japanese 
Pre-modern and Modern History). (Tokyo, 2001), pp. 26-27. 
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the Emperor and expel the barbarians’ policy (Sonnō jōi 尊王攘夷).22 The Nanki 
faction won this confrontation and brought about the Ansei Punishment (Ansei no 
taigoku 安政の大獄 1858-1859),23 with the result that the leader of the shogunate, Ii 
Naosuke, was assassinated by Mito samurai at the Sakuradamongai (called the 
Incident of Sakurada mongai 桜田門外の変) in 1860. This showed that the shogunate’s 
power gradually faded away in this period.  
   
The second stage was from 1860 to 1864, namely the struggle between the two 
factions: kōbugattai 公武合体派 24 (in advocacy of the union of the shogunate and the 
imperial court, supported by the shogunate and fudai daimyō) and the opposed Sonnō 
jōi 尊王攘夷派 (mainly Chōshū men). During this time, the leader of the shogunate, 
Andō Nobumasa, was assassinated at Sakashitamongai (called the Incident of 
Sakashitamongai 坂下門外の変) in 1862.25 Later on several attempted coups d’état 
happened such as that of 18 October 1863 八月十八日の政変,26,the Incident of Ikedaya 
池田屋事件27and the Incident of Kinmon 禁門の変28 in 1864. As well, insurgencies such 
as Ikuno no hen 生野の変29 in 1863 and Tengutō no ran 天狗党の乱30 in 1864 occurred. 
These incidents revealed that the shogunate was struggling to retain its unstable 
regime.   
   
During the third stage, from 1865 to 1868, the shogunate was in its last struggle 
against the Sa-Chō Union (Satsuma and Chōshū were united in 1866). The Second 
Suppressing of the Chōshū Samurai in 1866 in particular showed that the shogunate 
was unable to give orders to daimyō, and moreover shogunal troops were defeated by 
the Chōshū. The shogunate was no longer able to carry out the role of central 
government. The last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu (the 15th shogun) perceived this 
situation clearly and made the most important decision of ‘Restoration of Power to the 
Emperor (taisei hōkan大政奉還)’ on the historic date of October 14 1867.31 Following 
this, inevitably a series of wars (called generally the Boshin War (Boshinsensō戊辰戦
                                                 
22 It is noticeable that the Satsuma daimyō, Shimazu Nariakira (1809-1858), preferred to support the 
opening policy because he knew Japan had to learn Western technology and science at the very 
beginning.  
23Ishii, Kanji石井 寛治, Daikei Nihon no rekishi: Kaikoku to ishin 大系日本の歴史： 開国と維新, 
Vol. 12 (Outline of Japanese History: Opening Nation and Restoration, v. 12). (Tokyo, 1993), pp.75-77. 
24 Ibid., pp. 64-67. 
25 Ibid., p. 108. 
26 Ibid., pp. 125-129. 
27 Ibid., pp. 143-145. 
28 Ibid., pp. 146-148. 
29 Ibid., pp. 140-142. 
30 Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
31 Kawai, Atsushi河合 敦. Hayawakari Nihon kingendaishi早わかり 日本近現代史 (Japanese 
Pre-modern and Modern History). (Tokyo, 2001), pp. 32-33. 
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争)32 occurred in 1868, but in order to avoid complete civil war and the nation falling 
into disintegration again, another great decision was made by the Shogun Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu to open the Gates of Edo without resistance (Edo muketsukaijō 江戸無血開
城) in April 1868. Thus the era of shogunate-style government, handed down over 
seven hundred years, was terminated and brought about the occurrence of the Meiji 
Restoration.   
   
I return now to the question of response. 
 
Although the whole nation was in an unstable situation at the end of the Tokugawa 
Period, the shogunate launched a series of reforms at this stage. For instance, the 
Tempō Reform 天保の改革 (1841-1843),33 initiated by Mizuno Tadakuni, aimed at 
stabilizing policy in finance, improving the commercial system, agricultural 
reconstructions, a new policy of maritime defence (such as issuing shinsui kyūyorei 
薪水給与令 and adopting western gunnery etc), exploring new enterprises and such 
like. The Ansei Reform 安政の改革  (1853-1857),34  initiated by Abe Masahiro, 
included reform in sharing the national power with the court and daimyō (such as 
restoring diplomatic power to the emperor and permitting the powerful daimyō to 
participate in making national policies), promoting talented people to the government 
and adopting new national defence policies (such as establishing the translation 
school ‘banshoshirabesho 番書調所’ for teaching Western knowledge and translating 
diplomatic documents and the military school ‘kōbusho講武所’ at Edo, the Naval 
school ‘kaigun denshūsho 海軍伝習所’ at Nagasaki, manufacturing Western gunnery, 
and lifting the ban on building large vessels.  
   
In the Bunkyū Reform文久の改革 (1862),35 the court demanded that the shogunate 
should amend some policies including some pertaining to the Tokugawa Shogunate 
itself, changing the sankin kōtai参勤交代 (alternate attendance) into something more 
flexible, adopting Western-style army organization, renaming banshoshirabesho 番書
調所 to Yōshoshirabesho 洋書調所 (1862, later called Kaiseisho 開成所 in 1863) and 
governmental dispatching of students and other individuals abroad (e.g. Enomoto 
Takeaki 1836-1908 榎本武揚 and Nishi Amane 1829-1897 西周 to Holland).  
                                                 
32 The Boshin War (Boshinsensō戊辰戦争) started from the War of Toba-Fushimi 鳥羽と伏見の戦い 
(in January 1868), then across the War of Shōgitai 彰義隊の戦い (in May 1868), the War of 
Nagaokajō 長岡城の戦い (from May to July 1868), the War of Aizu 会津の戦い (from Augest to 
September 1868), till the last War of Goryōkaku 五稜郭の戦いin Hokkaidō (in May 1869), the timing 
in total extending over one year. See Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明, eds. (Tokyo, 2001), p. 161. 
33 Hamashima, Mashiaki 浜島 正昭, (Tokyo, 1998), p. 152.  
34 Ibid., p.160. 
35 Ibid,, p.161. 
 44
   
As well, it should be acknowledged that the shogunate had made a great effort in 
education. In order to introduce Western knowledge of science, technology, medicine, 
and so forth, it established the Shutōkan 種痘館 (the Vaccination Institution) in 1858, 
later changed to Igakkō医学校 (Medicine School) in 1868, renovated the Kaiseisho 開
成 所  to Kaiseigakkō 開 成 学 校  (Kaisei School) in 1868; and established the 
Shōheigakkō昌平学校 (Shōhei School) in 1868. Finally these merged to form the so- 
called Daigakkō 大学校 (University) in 1869,36 which was the antecedent of Tokyo 
Imperial University (established by the Meiji government in 1877). 
   
In short it was clear that the Tokugawa Shogunate intended to carry out reforms in 
order to maintain its regime during this stage.                
   
At the same time, the regional daimyō also carried out political reforms in their 
domains and tried to make themselves more powerful. For instance, the reforms in the 
Tosa-dominated court led by Yamanouchi Toyoshige (1827-1872) included the 
importing of Western weapons and the reforming of internal affairs. In the 
Chōshū-dominated court led by Mōri Takachika (1819-1871) reforms included 
adopting Western learning and military buildup, and monopolies on the sale of paper 
and wax. In the Uwajima-dominated court led by Date Munenari (1818-1892) reforms 
included investing in new industries, promoting education, introducing Western 
weapons, and building steam warships.37  
   
Some daimyō emphasized their reforms through education in order to renew their 
military capability and introduce Western manufacturing skills, such as38 in the Akita 
domain where the lord Satake Yoshimasa established the Meitokukan 明徳館; in the 
Mito domain where the lord Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860) established the Kōdōkan 
弘道館in 1841; in the Satsuma domain where the lord Shimazu Nariakira (1809-1858) 
founded the Shūseikan 集成館 in 1852; and in the Higo domain where the lord 
Hosogawa Shigekata established the Jishūkan 時習館. All enlightened daimyō tried to 
learn new knowledge and technology and prepared to introduce Western 
manufacturing skills, military weapons and organization, education etc, to their 
domain, and in so doing facilitated Japan’s progress from the feudal system to 
modernization.   
   
Apart from the official schools, private village schools were set up, such as the 
                                                 
36 Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明, eds. (Tokyo, 2001), P. 155. 
37 Ibid., p.150. 
38 Idem. 
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Tekijuku適塾 founded by Ogata Kōan in 1838 (the famous student Fukuzawa Yukichi 
had attended in this school), and the Shōkasonjuku 松下村塾 founded by Yoshida 
Nagayoshi in 1842.39 Long-existing schools such as Shirandō 芝蘭堂 (set up in 1789) 
and Narutakijuku 鳴滝塾 (set up in 1824) also offered the opportunity to those 
samurai passionate to learn about Western knowledge and current news. The 
educational system played a big part in raising talented people for the future 
   
Furthermore, educated intelligentsia in the samurai class put a great deal of effort into 
teaching people the new thinking and current affairs in the West, and/or suggested 
ways of reforming the government in order to strengthen it in responding to the 
current situation. Famous examples included the distinguished samurai Fukuzawa 
Yukichi (1834-1901), who accompanied Katsu Kaishū (1823-1899) on board the 
vessel Kanrin Maru 咸臨丸 to the U.S.A. in 1860, and also participated in the 
Takenouchi (竹内保徳) Mission to Europe. After observing the West he compiled 
Current Events in the West (Seiyō jijō 西洋事情) in 1866 for teaching commoners, and 
established Keiō gijuku 慶応義塾 (the predecessor of the Keiō University) to educate 
talented people. Sakamoto Ryōma (1835-1867) and Kotō Shōjirō (1838-1897) offered 
the so-called 'Eight Suggestions' (senchū hassaku 船中八策 ) to the lord of the 
Tosa-dominated court, Yamanouchi Toyoshige, and asked him to transfer these 
opinions to the shogunate. They comprised eight items such as restoration of power to 
the emperor, establishing a parliamentary system, renovating the bureaucratic system, 
adopting a new diplomatic policy, codifying the law system, expanding the naval 
forces, establishing a guarding force for the emperor, and keeping the monetary 
system in good order. The elites in society were positively broadcasting the idea of 
modernization to the general public as well as to their fellow elites.            
   
All the above facts show that the whole national machine of Japan, including the 
central government of the shogunate, the powerful daimyō and the intelligentsia in the 
samurai class, had learnt that a new era was coming. They perceived that Japan should 
give up the policy of ‘expel the barbarians’ and learn from the West; otherwise they 
faced a colonized or an extinguished future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Hamashima, Mashiaki 浜島正昭, ed. (Tokyo, 1998), p. 156. 
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3.2. What had been learnt by both nations at this stage? 
 
3.2.1. China 
 
In general Ch’ing China did not learn anything from the first Opium War and refused 
to recognize its backwardness, especially in the political, military, industrial, and 
commercial fields, but thought 'defeat was only an accident'. Only a few, such as the 
Commissioner Lin Tse-Hsu, the scholar in the School of 'statecraft' (see Chapter Two), 
Wei-Yuan (also called Mo-Shen, 1794-1856) ,and the governor of Fukien province, 
Hsu Chi-Yu, had been able to realize Western dominance and that China needed to 
learn about the West.   
   
Comparatively, Lin probably understood the West more deeply than anyone at that 
time. Because he wanted more information about the enemy, the Western barbarians, 
under his sponsorship his subordinates collected Western geography, history, politics 
and laws and translated foreign newspapers from India, Singapore, and Macao. 
Furthermore, in order to teach the government, they compiled A Gazetteer of Four 
Countries (Su-chou chih 四洲志), which was an amalgated work translated partly 
from both the international law of Vattel and Murray’s Cyclopedia of Geography. 
Unfortunately Lin was dismissed soon after the outbreaking of the Opium War in 
September 1840 and could then do nothing in national affairs.  
   
Also, the scholar Wei-Yuan compiled a famous book entitled Illustrated Gazetteer of 
the Maritime Countries (Hai-kou t’u-chih 海國圖誌) in 1844 and the governor Hsu 
Chi-Yu compiled A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit (Ying-huan chih-lueh瀛環志略) 
in 1850, both trying to put a big effort into Western studies in China at that time.40 In 
particular, the former was an important documentary work which introduced in detail 
the history, geography and current political situation of the West; the manufacture and 
usage of foreign gunnery; shipbuilding, mining, and practical arts being developed in 
the West; and how to deal with the West. The core message in this book was to “learn 
the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians.”41 However, the 
government still had no such awareness and allowed the whole nation to waste nearly 
all the following two decades without carrying out any reforms.   
   
After defeat in the Second Opium War in 1860 the shock of two defeats gave a sharp 
wake-up to the court, officialdom and the intelligentsia. The famous scholar Feng 
                                                 
40 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), p. 241.  
41 Ibid., p. 335. 
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Kuei-Fen (1809-1874) issued Protest from the Chiao-Pin Studio (Chiao-pin-lu Kang-I 
校邠盧抗議) in 1860 to advocate promotion of the Self-Strengthening Movement for 
learning from the West. From 1861, China changed its tactics from combat against to 
submission to the West by establishing the Tsungli Yamen 總理衙門 to oversee 
diplomatic affairs.42  
           
 
3.2.2. Japan 
 
The defeat of Ch’ing China in the Opium War in 1842 greatly surprised Japan. 
Moreover, some powerful daimyō tried to use military tactics against the West and all 
were defeated: for example, the Anglo-Satsuma War in 1863 and the Incident of an 
Artillery Bombardment at Shimonoseki in Chōshū in 1864. This made the leaders, 
both in the shogunate and amongst the daimyō, have a clear view that any attempt to 
use the military to confront the threats from the West was in vain. Japan had learnt not 
only to compromise with its threateners, but it also had to learn Western science and 
technology; otherwise Japan would probably follow Ch’ing China and suffer defeats 
time after time by the West. 
   
Secondly, concerning Western learning, as mentioned earlier both the central 
government of the shogunate and the daimyō cared about education and started to 
establish or renovate these schools in order to introduce Western knowledge, science, 
technology, medicine and military. The shogunate established the Medicine School, 
and renovated the Kaisei School 開成 and the Shōhei School 昌平. Finally it merged 
these schools together to form the Daigakkō 大学校 (the University), which made a 
foundation for the Tokyo Imperial University. As well, it instituted a military academy 
and a naval academy and tried to introduce Western military thought, tactics and 
strategy, organization, and training techniques. Through daimyō the school of 
Kōdōkan was established in the Mito domain, the Shūseikan in the Satsuma domain, 
the Jishūkan in the Kumamoto domain and the Meitokukan in the Akita domain. As 
well, private village schools such as Tekijuku, Shōkasonjuku, Shirandō and 
Narutakijuku taught people Western knowledge and current affairs. It was obvious 
that the upper class of the ruling system were aware of the importance of education so 
they tried to nurture talented people for the future 
   
Thirdly both the shogunate and the daimyō had perceived that it was a short cut to 
                                                 
42  Kim, K.H. Japanese Perspectives on China’s Early Modernization: The Self-Strengthening 
Movement, 1860~1895, a Bibliographical Survey. (The University of Michigan, Center of Chinese 
Study, 1974), pp. 4-5. 
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send students overseas to learn science, technology and military skills from the West. 
How wise it was, a hundred and fifty years ago, for Japan to send students abroad to 
learn from the West. For one thing, those key figures among the overseas students 
could play important roles later in the Meiji Period. These included Itō Hirobumi (sent 
to Britain by Chōshū, 1841-1909), Inoue Kaoru (sent to Britain by Chōshū, 
1835-1915), Katsura Tarō (sent to Germany, 1847-1913), Godai Tomoatsu (sent to 
Britain by Satsuma 1835-1885), Enomoto Takeaki (sent to Holland by the shogunate, 
1836-1908), and Katsu Kaishū (sent to Holland by the shogunate, 1823-1899).  
   
Consequently, it was with some justification said that those leaders had the political 
wisdom to deal with the West by means of diplomatic negotiation. The central 
government, the shogunate and the local governments both had dispatched diplomatic 
missions time after time to the West. These practices had important implications: for 
instance, the shogunate intended to secure better access to relevant skills in France 
and sent Shibata Takenaka to Paris for trade concessions in 1865; soon in return, 
France agreed to send military advisers to train the shogun’s army as well as naval 
engineers to build a dockyard at Yokosuka. Satsuma sent a mission to Europe in 1862 
to develop the domain’s trade and industry, but also for the real purpose of importing 
ships and guns.43 Thus dispatching diplomatic missions to foreign countries could 
produce many benefits, including building formal relations, settling disputes and 
avoiding wars, promoting trade and industry, introducing Western science, technology 
and military skills, and sharing information with these Western powers.        
   
Finally we should be aware that competition among these powerful daimyō and the 
struggle between the shogunate and daimyō made them launch a certain degree of 
political and economic reforms in order to secure power over the others. However, 
nonetheless all these reforms by both the shogunate and the daimyō established a 
solid foundation for Japan’s modernization in the formative phase.     
    
 
3.3. Analysis: 
 
It was interesting that within the formative phase both China and Japan faced 
rebellions and natural calamities internally and threats from outside. However, after 
comparing them in this stage, it is possible to judge whether China or Japan undertook 
the best policies for survival in modernization. 
                                                 
43 Beasley, W.G., Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travelers in America and Europe. (U.S.A., 
1995), p. 95-96. 
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1. Concerning the timing, without doubt, China was the first to use its 
backward military power to resist the threats of the West, but the top leaders 
in the central government learned nothing until the end of the Second Opium 
War in 1860. By contrast, as the later one, Japan was different from China, 
as it had more time to observe and learn what was happening and where 
Japan’s future was. Japan realized that it had to take ‘the policy of 
compromise’ in place of ‘the policy of confrontation’ in order to earn more 
time for undertaking reforms.  
 
2. In comparing these leaders of central and local government within both 
nations, China only had a few people, such as the commissioner Lin Tse-Hsu, 
the governor of Fukien province, Hsu Chi-Yu, and the scholar Wei-Yuan 
who could recognize the contemporary situation, but were not 
policy-making figures. However the Ch’ing Court knew nothing about how 
to cope with the current issues. By contrast, in Japan those policy-making 
figures included the sponsors Abe Masahiro (1810-1857) and Ii Naosuke in 
the shogunate and feudal lords Tokugawa Nariaki in Mito, Yamanouchi 
Toyoshige in Tosa, Mōri Takachika in Chōshū, Shimazura Nariakira 
(1809-1858) in Satsuma and Date Munenari in Uwajima among the daimyō 
as well as a great number of talented samurai such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Sakamoto Ryōma (1835-1867), and the so-called 'Three Remarkable 
Figures' of Saigō Takamori (1827-1877), Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830-1878) 
and Kido Takayoshi (1833- 1877). They all played important roles in 
creating a solid foundation for Japan’s modernization. Thus to compare both 
leaders in the two governments at that time, those in Japan were much more 
sensitive and practical than those in China at perceiving that the new era was 
coming and preparing to respond to the new challenges. 
 
3. To compare responses to the West, as mentioned above China simply tried to 
use the military to confront the threats from outside but Japan was much 
wiser and had the sense to start dispatching missions and students overseas. 
This was because 'the best policy to settle problems is to understand the real 
situation'. Thus by means of dispatching missions and students, Japan was 
able to thoroughly learn the real West and receive advantages such as 
building formal diplomatic relations, settling disputes and avoiding wars, 
promoting trade and industry, introducing Western science, technology and 
military skills, and collecting information from the West.   
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4. Concerning responses to domestic troubles, until 1860 China did not 
undertake any reforms but merely subjugated the rebellions by using the 
military. But in Japan both the central and local governments launched a 
series of political and economic reforms, which included importing Western 
manufacturing and military skills, in order to secure dominant power over 
the other. This was able to stimulate the central and local governments to 
adopt new policies to meet the needs at that time. In particular, Japan was 
eager to set up new Western learning schools by the shogunate, daimyō and 
private individuals. Through educational methods, many talented people 
were well educated for the needs of the next historical and remarkable 
stage – the Meiji Restoration.   
 
                              ♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion:  
 
It is very clear that in the formative phase, in China the political figures both in the 
court and provinces knew little and did nothing to respond to threats coming from 
within and outside; however, Japan prepared itself to launch a series of actions to 
meet the challenges. The Tokugawa Shogunate, powerful daimyō and passionate 
samurai scattered around the whole country all had a deep sense of crisis, and they 
had precisely recognized the real contemporary situation – a new era was coming. 
Therefore they used a range of horizontally structured methods from diplomacy to 
internal affairs which included dispatching missions and students abroad for 
knowledge, technology and new information about the West; renewing education 
from traditional to the new Western learning; importing Western-style military 
organization, training, tactics and strategy, gunnery and the manufacturing skills; and 
other reforms of the economy and internal affairs. In Japan the whole national 
machine was ready to be involved in modernizing reforms while the last Shogun 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu announced the Restoration of Power to the Emperor (taisei 
hōkan 大政奉還) on October 14 1867 as well as making the wise decision to open the 
Gates of Edo without resistance (Edo muketsukaijō 江戸無血開城) in the April of 1868. 
From then on, Japan faced the most remarkable turning point in its history, when the 
Meiji Restoration made its debut on the historical stage.      
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Chapter Four: 
 
Comparison and analysis of China and Japan in the operative phase 
 
 
As indicated in Chapter Three, it is significant that China confronted the West 
primarily in military terms, whereas by contrast Japan not only learned to compromise 
but also had already launched a series of reforms nationwide during the formative 
phase and was readying itself for modernization. 
 
However, after 1860 and the defeat in the Second Opium War (the Anglo-French War, 
also called the Arrow War 1858-1860), China began to wake up and knew that it 
probably could not resist the West by force any more. Thus in order to conduct foreign 
relations with the West, a special institution, namely the Tsungli Yamen總理衙門, was 
established in the central government in 1861,1 and soon afterwards a kind of 
modernization, the so-called Self-Strengthening Movement (Tzu-ch’iang yun-tung 自
強運動) was launched in both central and provincial governments. In Japan, when the 
last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu announced the Restoration of Power to the Emperor 
(taisei hōkan大政奉還) on October 14 1867, a new era, heralded by the so-called Meiji 
Restoration, started the nation on its path to modernization.  
 
To compare the modernizing processes in China and Japan in this operative phase 
probably is a key observation point as well as the core issue in the thesis, because in 
terms of comparison and analysis it is possible to judge which one was the more fitted 
since both nations had undertaken policies for their modernization. In addition, both 
nations pursued the goal of 'rich nation and strong army' (fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵) at 
this stage.  
 
In this chapter my study will focus on the kinds of reforms that were adopted by these 
two nations and compare the merits and demerits of their modernization reforms.       
 
    
 
 
                                                 
1 Kim, K.H. Japanese Perspectives on China’s Early Modernization: The Self-Strengthening Movement, 
1860~1895, a Bibliographical Survey. (The University of Michigan, Center of Chinese Study, 1974), p. 
4. 
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4.1. How did these two nations set about their reforms at this stage? 
 
 
4.1.1.China 
 
China was under double pressure in this operative phase, both from within and 
without. Internally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there were nation-wide 
insurgencies such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Nien Rebellion 
(1851-1868), the Moslem Rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873), the Tungan Rebellion in 
the Northwest Region (1862-1873), and another Moslem insurgence in Sinkiang 
(1864-1877), insurgencies which nearly toppled the dynasty. Externally, there were 
the threats from the Powers (including Japan)2 such as: the Japanese invasion of 
Taiwan in 1874; the Japanese annexation of the Liu-ch’iu Islands (known as the 
Ryukyu Islands by the Japanese) in 1879; the British intention to enter the Yunnan 
region in 1875; the Russian occupation of the Illi in Sinkiang 1871-1881; the French 
attempt to control Annam (today’s Vietnam) and causing of the Sino-French War 
(1884-1885); and Japan’s invasion of Korea and causing of the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895).  
   
However, the emperor Hsien-Feng died in 1861 and named his 6 yr-old son 
Tsai-Ch’un as his heir, but a coup3 happened in the same year. As a result, the two 
dowagers – the Western Dowager Tz’u –Hsi (see Figure 1) and the Eastern Dowager 
Tz’u-An – plus Prince Kung (1833-1898, see Figure 2) secured supreme power; and 
from then the little boy named T’ung-Chih (r.1862-1874) was used as a puppet and 
the so-called ch’ui-lien t’ing-cheng垂簾聽政 ('listening and administering state affairs 
from behind a bamboo curtain')4 was under way. With the support of the two 
dowagers a new political leader, Prince Kung in the central government, clearly 
perceived that a new era had come. China had to adopt the new policy of 
accommodation to the West by means of diplomatic methods in order to bring about a 
more peaceful time, so that it could undertake some reforms to reinforce its military 
power and refine industrial manufacturing. His advocacy was strongly supported by 
the Manchu Grand Councillor, Wen-Hsiang (1818-1876, see Figure 3), Kwei-Liang, 
                                                 
2 Japan intended to invade the Korean Peninsula, Liu-ch’iu Islands and Taiwan: the former two were 
tributary states and the latter was a province of China. 
3 In the coup of 1861, the old retainers of the emperor Hsien-Feng were defeated; the new group 
secured power; Empresses Dowager Tz’u-An, and Tz’u-Hsi became co-regents and Prince Kung 
became the prince counsellor to the young T’ung-Chih Emperor in the central government. 
4 Ch’ui-lien t’ing-cheng垂簾聽政 means the two Dowagers who both sat behind a bamboo screen 
while administering state affairs and receiving ministerial reports, but most of the time the Western 
Dowager Tz’u-Hsi read memorials, asked questions and made decisions. See, Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., 
The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), p. 322. 
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and other staff in the central government and several powerful provincial governors, 
such as Tseng Kuo-Fan (see Figure 4), Tso Tsung-T’ang (see Figure 5), Li 
Hung-Chang (see Figure 6) and Shen Pao-Chen (1820-1891) in the local governments 
as well. In the meantime, the main Western powers, Britain and the U.S.A., had a 
better understanding of this new attitude of these Chinese leaders and they preferred 
to champion a 'co-operative policy'5 with China. Thus under this atmosphere of 
relative peace, harmony, and co-operation with the West, and with talented people in 
office in both the central and local governments, China could launch a major reform 
towards modernization, called the 'Self-Strengthening Movemen't. This lasted until 
the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 when China was defeated and produced 
another new reform of sentiment. (A simple and plain illustration of the 
Self-Strengthening Movement is shown on Map 8.)6   
   
The Self-Strengthening Movement in general could be divided into three stages7 with 
the first stage from 1861 to 1874. The contemporary mainstream thought was, as 
stated in Li Hung-Chang’s ministerial reports to Prince Kung, that: “In China, both 
political and military systems were superior to the West except for gunnery and 
gunboats.”8 Thus, the beginning of this reform focused on the introduction of Western 
science and technology and military manufacturing skills. The main points are as 
below.  
 
1861 Establishment of the Tsungli Yamen overseeing diplomatic affairs, the 
Maritime Customs Service, and the introduction of Western science, 
industry, and communication.                            
A new Superintendent of Trade (later called the High Commissioner for 
the Northern Ocean, Pei-yang ta-ch’en 北洋大臣) was established at 
Tientsin in charge of the trade affairs of three northern ports (Tientsin, 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 324,  'Cooperative Policy' contained four points that included supporting China to cooperate 
with Western powers; to cooperate with Chinese officials; to recognize China’s legitimate interests; and 
to enforce the treaty rights from China.     
6 Schirokauer, Modern China and Japan: A Brief History. (New York, 1982), p. 160. 
7 There are some scholars such as Li, Shou-Kong, Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., and Kim, K.H. who claim that 
the Self-Strengthening Movement could be divided into three stages, but their timing of the stages 
differs somewhat. The contents of the Self-Strengthening Movement in different stages in this thesis 
were abstracted from these scholars' works. See Kim, K.H. Introduction in Japanese Perspectives on 
China’s Early Modernization: The Self-Strengthening Movement, 1860~1895, a Bibliographical 
Survey.(The University of Michigan, Center of Chinese Study, 1974), pp. 3-12; Li, Shou-Kong 李守孔, 
Chapter Nine in Zhong-guo Jin-dai-shi中國近代史 (Chinese Modern History) (Taipei, 1986), pp. 
321-324; Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., Chapter Eleven in The Rise of Modern China. (New York, 1970), pp. 
342-347; and Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. East Asia: Tradition & 
Transformation, Revised Edition, Chapter Nineteen: China’s Response to the West. (Boston, 1989), pp. 
558-596. 
8 Li, Shou-Kong 李守孔 (Taipei, 1986), p. 321.  
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Newchwang, and Chefoo) plus another Superintendent of Trade (later 
called the High Commissioner for the Southern Ocean, Nan-yang ta-ch’en
南洋大臣) was already stationed at Shanghai in charge of the trade affairs of 
five ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ninpo and Shanghai).          
Feng Kuei-Fen issued Protest from the Chiao-Pin Studio (Chiao-pin-lu 
Kang-I 校邠盧抗議). 
1862 Under the superintendence of the Tsungli Yamen, the language school 
called the T’ung-wen kuan 同文館 was established for training diplomatic 
personnel, translation, and introducing Western knowledge, including 
science, politics, economics, and international law. T’ung-wen kuan was 
the predecessor of Beijing University (it was called Imperial University in 
1902).                                                      
Li Hung-Chang organized his new Anhwei Army; assigned his men to 
learn how to use cannon from British officers and rifles from German 
officers; and established three small arsenals in Shanghai. 
1863 Li Hung-Chang established the Shanghai T’ung-wen Kuan.              
Tseng Kuo-Fan dispatched Yung-Wing to purchase machines.        
The Lay-Osborn Flotilla arrived in China but was soon dismissed.9 Charles. 
G. Gordon assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army.  
1864 The Canton T’ung-wen Kuan was established.                                      
Li Hung-Chang proposed a new category of technology in the government 
examination. He created a small gun factory at Soochow.            
The translation of Henry Wheaton’s work, Elements of International Law, 
was submitted to the Tsungli Yamen; because with the introduction of 
International Law, China could apply it in combination with other 
measures of diplomatic modernization to maintain peaceful relations with 
the West for a period of time.   
1865 The first demotion of Prince Kung.10                                      
Tseng Kuo-Fan and Li Hung-Chang cooperatively established the 
Kiang-Nan Arsenal with a translation bureau attached in Shanghai.    
The inspectorate of the Imperial Maritime Customs was formally 
                                                 
9 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), pp. 335-336. 
10 Ibid., pp. 369-370. Prince Kung was a younger brother of the late emperor Hsien-Feng (ruled 
1851-1861). Through cooperation with the Empresses Dowager Tz'u-Hsi and Tz’u-An during the coup 
d’état of 1861, Prince Kung was promoted as the leader of the government. However, he was elated 
with success and drunk in the enjoyment of political power, his arrogance overrode his prudence, and 
even the Empresses Dowager found him overbearing during audiences. Thus the Dowagers decided to 
chastise him by removing him from all the posts in the government including the title of 'prince regent 
(I-cheng wang 議政王)'. After his sincere apologies, he regained some posts but not the title of 'prince 
regent' any more. Since then Prince Kung gradually lost his zeal in state affairs and became more 
restrained in conduct of state affairs.    
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established in Beijing under the Briton Robert Hart. He also assisted the 
Ch’ing government to develop mining, and in the construction of telegraph 
systems and railroads, and suggested sending diplomatic representatives 
abroad. 
1866 Tso Tsung-T’ang established the Foochow Navy Yard and attached a navy 
school, by which Ch’ing China organized the Southern Ocean Navy in 
Fukien Province.                                            
   An informal mission led by Pin-Ch’un left for Europe.            
1867 Li Haung-Chang established the Nanking Arsenal by moving the one from 
Soochow.                                             
Ch’ung-Hou established the Tientsin Arsenal.  
1868 Dispatch of the U.S.A.’s retired diplomat Anson Burlingame as China’s 
roving ambassador to the West to assist China’s two co-envoys.        
The Kiangnan Arsenal was expanded with another translation department.     
Young J Allen published the Church News (Chiao-hui Hsin-Pao 教會新報). 
Tso Tsung-T’ang was involved in the suppressing of the Moslem Rebellion 
in the Northwest and Sinkiang (1868-1880).  
1869 The second demotion of Prince Kung marked the decline of his influence 
in the central government.11                                       
Tso Tsung-T’ang established an arsenal at Sian.                   
Ying Kuei established an arsenal at Fukien. 
1870 Li Huang-Chang became the official-governor-general of Chihli and soon 
expanded the Teintsin Arsenal into four factories.                  
Wang T’ao began his journalism career in Hong Kong. 
1871 Tso Tsung-T’ang established an arsenal at Lanchow.            
Planning took place for a Western-style fort at Taku.                         
The second diplomatic apology mission was led by Ch’ung-Hou to 
France12 and also visited the United States on the way home.  
1872 Tseng Kuo-Fan died in this year. Li Huang-Chang became the central 
person of the Self-Strengthening Movement.                   
Dispatch of thirty adolescent students to the U.S.A. to study. (The first 
group of the 120 students to be dispatched cumulatively from 1872-1881.)     
                                                 
11 Ibid., p370. Tz'u-Hsi complained about Prince Kung because she believed that in order to avenge the 
first demotion, Prince Kung was involved in a conspiracy, in which her indulged eunuch, An Te-Hai 
was beheaded as a punishment for misbehaviour. Since then she hardly trusted him after 1869.  
12 Owing to the Tientsin Massacre in 1870, the event was that ten sisters, two priests in a French church, 
and two French officials were killed; and others including three Russian traders were killed by mistake; 
and four British and American churches were destroyed. Thus China sent the mission to France to 
apologise. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), pp. 359-363, and Fairbank, John King & 
Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. East Asia: Tradition & Transformation, Revised Edition. 
(Boston, 1989), pp.566-567. 
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Li Huang-Chang established the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation 
Company. As well, he proposed to open coal and iron mines, and sent 
officers to Germany to study.                                         
The Shun-Pao 申報, (the Shanghai News) was published in Shanghai. 
1873 The emperor T’ung-Chih officially received foreign diplomats in the court 
for the fist time. 
 
The second stage of the Self-Strengthening Movement was from 1874 to 1884. Since 
in the central government Prince Kung had been demoted twice and the Grand 
Councillor Wen-Hsiang died in 1876, the provincial governors such as Tseng Kuo-Fan 
died in 1872, and Tso Tsung-T’ang was involved in the suppressing of internal 
insurgencies, Li Hung-Chang, in his position as the provincial 
official-governor-general of Chihli, became the real leader of the movement. Over 90 
per cent of modernized infrastructures were under construction at this stage.            
Li thought that a rich nation was a prerequisite of a strong nation: as he said to his 
friend, “China’s weakness stemmed from its poverty, the Western countries’ wealth 
stemmed from the fact that they could obtain enough funds from developing mining, 
railroads, telegraph, communications, and with having sufficient population as well. 
Therefore China should develop these modern items as the West has.”13 Thus the new 
policies, besides military industries, were focused on how to ‘enrich the nation’, 
which included introducing communications systems, industries and enterprises from 
the West at this stage.  
   
1874 Jui-Lin established an arsenal at Canton.                          
Li Huang-Chang suggested that Western Learning could be made a subject 
in the government examination; he also called for the development of a 
mining and telegraph system. 
1875 Empresses Dowager Tz’u-An and Tz’u-Hsi became co-regents of the 
young emperor Kang-Hsü (1875-1908) once more after the death of 
Emperor T’ung-Chih in 1874.                                         
Li Huang-Chang planned to build ironclad warships.                
Shen Pao-Chen sent to France students of a naval academy attached to the 
Foochow Dockyard.                                           
Liu K’un-I (1824-1902) established the Canton Gunpowder Factory.            
Wang Wen-shao established the Hunan Arsenal.                   
Ting Pao-Chen established an arsenal in Shantung.                 
                                                 
13 Li, Shou-Kong 李守孔 (Taipei, 1986), p. 323. 
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Owing to the Margary Affair,14 China concluded the Chefoo Convention 
with Britain. 
1876 The Grand Councillor Wen-Hsiang died in this year.                                 
Li sent seven army officers to Germany for study.               
Dispatch of thirty students from the Foochow Navy Yard School to Britain 
and France.                                                    
Shen Pao-Chen opened the Keelung Coal Mine in Taiwan.            
The British constructed the Shanghai-Wusung railway.   
1877 Li Hung-Chang created the Bureau of the K’ai-P’ing Coal Mine at Tientsin.       
Ting Pao-Chen established a machine factory in Chengtu.           
According to the Chefoo Convention, Kuo Sung-Tao (1818-1891) was sent 
to London for an apology and established the first embassy of Ch’ing 
China in Great Britain. From then until 1880, China set up embassies in 
sequence in Paris, Berlin, Spain, Washington, Tokyo, and St. Petersburg 
and established full relationships with these nations.                             
Shen Pao-Chen, under the pressure of Chinese traditional thought of 
fengshui,15 purchased the Shanghai-Wusung railway from the British and 
destroyed it.                                                  
The Foochow Navy Yard School sent the first graduates to Europe for 
study. 
1878 Li Hung-Chang established the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill.          
Tso Tsung- T’ang established a textile factory in Kansu.                               
The Imperial Maritime Customs opened a post department.         
Hsueh Fu-Cheng proposed to construct a railway between Tientsin and 
Taku.  
1879 A telegraph line ran between Tientsin and Taku.                     
Ma Chen-Chung suggested constructing railways by means of foreign 
loans. 
1880 Li Hung-Chang established a naval academy and a telegraph school at 
Tientsin. He also requested permission to build railways originating from 
Beijing and planned to purchase foreign warships in order to organize a 
modern navy.                                                 
                                                 
14 Because the British adventurer, Augustus Margary was ambushed and killed while adventuring on 
the frontier of western China in 1875, the British government insisted that China should take 
responsibility for this accident and pay compensation to Margary’s family. Thus China sent a 
diplomatic mission to Britain to apologise and signed the Chefoo Convention. Concerning the Margary 
Affair and the Chefoo Convention, see Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. (New York, 1970), pp. 365-368.    
15 Traditionally, Chinese people believe that the direction and surroundings of a house or tomb have an 
influence on the fortune of a family and their offspring. Thus they thought the railway might destroy 
the fengshui of the surroundings and bring misfortune to them. 
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Chang Shu-Sheng initiated the School of Western Learning in Canton. 
Another scholar Cheng Kuan-Ying proclaimed his reform proposal in his 
work I-Yen 易言.  
1881 The Imperial Telegraph Administration was inaugurated and a telegraph 
line was laid between Tientsin and Shanghai.                      
The T’ang-Shan railway was completed six miles north of Tientsin.                      
Li Hung-Chang opened a copper mine in Jenol and opened a modern 
medical school at Tientsin. He also proposed to dispatch ten naval students 
overseas for study.                                           
Liu K’un-I established the Nanking Gunpowder Factory.              
Wu Ta-Ch’eng established the Kirin Arsenal in Manchuria.            
The Educational Mission was recalled from the United States. 
1882 Li Hung-Chang constructed a naval base and a shipyard at Port Arthur. 
Foochow Navy Yard School sent graduates to Europe for the second time. 
1883 The Beijing Field Force Arsenal was established.                       
A merchant-operated gold mine was run in Shantung, and a merchant 
-operated Yuan Chang Machine Factory was opened in Shanghai. 
1884 Prince Kung was removed from the Grand Council and the Tsungli 
Yamen.16                                                             
Li Hung-Chang sent more naval students to Europe for study.       
Ts’en Yu-Ying established the Yunnan Arsenal in Kunming. 
 
The third stage of the Self-Strengthening Movement was from 1885 to 1894. Apart 
from continuing to construct the army and naval forces, the Ch’ing government also 
paid attention to developing industries by using the new technology of the West, 
which mainly included the silk and cotton textile industries, mining, and paper 
production, in order to not only pursue the idea of a 'strong army' but also a 'rich 
nation'. In the meantime, because Prince Kung was sacked and The Grand Councillor 
Wen-Hsiang had died, Prince Ch’un (1840-1891, his wife was the younger sister of 
Dowager Tu’z-Hsi and his son Tasi-T’ien was selected to be the successor of Emperor 
Tung-Chih and became Emperor Kuang-Hsü in 1871) was appointed to the head 
position in the central government. As well, besides Li Hung-Chang, new governors 
appeared in the provinces such as Chang Chih-Tung (1837-1909), Liu K’un-I 
(1824-1902) and Liu Ming-Ch’uan, who played the leading roles and made 
considerable efforts in the Self-Strengthening Movement. The main points at this 
stage included the following:  
                                                 
16 Finally, due to China’s defeat in the Sino-French War, Prince Kung as the head of the government 
had to take responsibility so he was ruled out of the government. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 
1970), pp. 371. 
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1885 The Navy Yamen (the Headquarters of the Naval Force) was created and 
Prince Ch’un was assigned as the president and Li Hung-Chang as the vice 
president.                                                   
Li Hung-Chang established a military academy at Tientsin.           
Liu Ming-Ch’uan established the Taiwan Arsenal in Taipei.            
Liu Ping-Chang established the Hangchow Arsenal.  
1886 Chang Chih-Tung built a textile mill which was run by the government at 
Canton.                                                   
The Foochow Navy Yard School sent graduates to Europe for the third 
time.                                                      
The K’ai-P’ing Railway Company extended the T’ang-Shan Railway to 
Tientsin.                                                     
1887 Li Hung-Chang established a mint for producing coins at Tientsin and 
opened the Moho gold mine in Manchuria.                           
Chang Chih-Tung built up the mint and merged the ‘Kuang fang-yen kuan 
廣方言館’ (a translation school) into a combined military and naval 
academy at Canton.                                          
The Kunming Naval Academy was established in Beijing only for the 
bannermen.   
1888 Li Hung-Chang formally established the Pei-Yang Naval Fleet.       
The government constructed the Summer Palace for flattering the Empress 
Dowager Tz'u-Hsi by using the naval funds and decided not to purchase 
any more new ships.                                         
The Tientsin-Taku Railway was completed. 
1889 Chang Chih-Tung created a cotton textile mill and an iron factory at 
Canton. He also proposed to build a railway between Hankow and Beijing. 
1890 Chang Chih-Tung opened the P’ing-Hsiang Coal Mines, Ta-Yen Iron 
Mines and Han-Yang Ironworks and Han-Yang Arsenal.             
The Shanghai Textile Factory was established as a government enterprise.                 
Tseng Kuo-Chung and Liu Kun-I established the Nanyang Naval Academy 
in Nanking.                                                  
A scholar Ma Chien-Chung advocated his reform proposal in The Theory 
of Enriching the People (Fu-min shou 富民說). Another scholar T’ang 
Chen called for institutional reforms in his work Warning (Wei-yen 危言). 
1891 Li Hung-Chang built a paper mill at Shanghai.                    
The Kweichow Ironworks was established as a 'joint government and 
merchant undertaking'.                                       
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The Manchurian Railway construction projected was inaugurated. 
1892 The Taipei-Keelung Railway was completed in Taiwan.              
Li Hung Chang ran the Shanghai cotton textile factory.                  
Chang Chih-Tung established a mining and engineering college in 
Wuchang and Han-Yang Arsenal. 
1893 Li Hung Chang opened the Peiyang Medical College at Tientsin and 
created the General Office for Machine Textile Manufacturing in Shanghai. 
Chang Chih-Tung established the Self-Strengthening College in Hupeh 
province and created four cotton and textile plants at Wuchang.       
The scholar Cheng Kuan-ying published his work Warning to a 
Prosperous Age (Sheng-shih wei-yen 盛世危言) to spread his reform 
proposals. 
1894 Chang Chih Tung organized two match companies and opened a textile 
company in Hupeh.                                           
Lu Ch’uan-Lin established the Shensi Arsenal in Sian.               
The Beijing-Shanhaikuan Railway was completed. 
 
        
   ♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
In short, the conservative officialdom in the government and the Confucian gentry in 
society disagreed with, or were even hostile toward these kinds of innovations. As 
well, the key figure Empress Dowager Tz'u-Hsi realized the importance of the 
Western learning to China but she simply tried to play a game of power-balance by 
using the conservative faction to restrain the reforming faction in order to keep power 
firmly in her hands during the period of the Self-Strengthening Movement. By any 
account, the reformers in the movement had to overcome many difficulties to start the 
Western Learning.  
   
From the above, it is clear that the Self-Strengthening Movement in both the central 
and provincial governments of Ch’ing China achieved goals which included 
establishing arsenals to manufacture firearms and gunboats; creating new military 
academies or colleges to introduce Western military science, medicine, knowledge, 
science and technology; dispatching missions overseas and building up embassies in 
Western countries for formal diplomatic relationships; sending students overseas for 
further training in Western military matters, or to study science and technology; hiring 
talented Westerners to manage Ch’ing China’s Imperial Maritime Customs; building 
communication systems of the telegraph, railways and publishing enterprises; opening 
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up diverse mining; establishing light industries such as textiles, and some ironworks 
and machinery factories. 
   
However, all these efforts were merely superficial modernization, and as to the cores 
of Western-style modernization such as political and military institutions, capitalism 
including financial, banking and monetary systems, educational systems and even 
philosophy, culture, arts, and ways of thinking, then China did not simulate at all. And 
so, even after China had launched Western Learning from 1861, that is why, in the 
Sino-French War of 1884-1885 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, China had 
not enough strength to confront its foe, and finally was twice defeated by those 
nations. The merits and demerits of China’s modernization in this phase will be 
discussed more deeply after Japan’s modernization in the Meiji Restoration is 
reviewed.  
        
 
4.1.2. Japan 
 
In Peter Kornicki’s work Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 
1868-1912 (4 volumes), Meiji Japan is divided into four stages. These are the 
emergence of the Meiji state (from the U.S. Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan in 
1853 to the commencement of the Meiji Restoration in 1868); the growth of the Meiji 
state (the timing includes the two decades from the 1870s to 1880s); the mature Meiji 
state (from the promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889 and 
first Meiji Diet in 1890, across the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895 up to the 
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905); and the end of Meiji and early Taishō (after the 
Russo-Japanese War, across the annexation of Korea in 1910 roughly up to the end of 
the First World War in 1918).17   
   
However, to coincide with the comparison of modernization in Ch’ing China and 
Meiji Japan in the late nineteenth century, while I follow the same emergent / 
formative stage from 1853 to 1868, I prefer to divide Meiji proper into three stages. 
The first is from the beginning of the Meiji era in1868 till the occurrence of the first 
Cabinet in Japanese history on December 1885, led by Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909). The 
second stage runs from 1886 to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), which was an 
important observation point from which to perceive the merits and demerits of 
modernization in China and Japan. The third stage I put into the consequent stage 
                                                 
17 Kornicki, Peter F. ed., Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History, 1868~1912, 4 volumes. 
(London; New York, 1998): see the General introduction in Volume One.  
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(1896-1912) and this will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
So, first of all let us observe what Japan did in the first stage. The establishment of the 
Meiji government mainly depended upon the efforts of powerful daimyō and samurai, 
while the Meiji emperor himself (1852-1912, see Figure 7) was just a teenage boy of 
sixteen. Thus, the real leaders who were in charge of political power consisted of such 
talented people as Itō Hirobumi (Figure 8), Kido Takayoshi (1833-1877, Figure 9), 
and Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922, Figure 10) from the Chōshū domain; Ōkubo 
Toshimichi (1830-1878, Figure 11) and Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900) from the 
Satsuma domain; Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922, Figure 12) and Etō Shinbei 
(1834-1874) from the Hizen domain; and Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919) from the Tosa 
domain, in combination with officers of the court such as Sanjō Sanetomi (1837-1891) 
and Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883) and long-serving officers in the shogunate such as 
Katsu Kaishū (1823-1899).  
   
Although the Seinan西南戦争civil war (also called the Satsuma Rebellion) happened in 
1877 and although some insurgencies occurred including the Nakano sōdō 中野騒動 
in 1870, Chōheireihantai ikki 徴兵令反対一揆in 1873, Saga no ran 佐賀の乱in 1874, 
Keishintō no ran 敬神の乱, Akizuki no ran 秋月の乱 and Hagi no ran 萩の乱 in 1876, 
and Chisokaiseihantai ikki 地租改正反対一揆in 1878,18 these new leaders in the Meiji 
government firmly undertook reforms19 that mainly included the following in the first 
stage (1868-1885) 
 
1868 Restoration of Imperial Rule (Ōsei fukko王政復古); Meiji Restoration 
(Meiji ishin 明治維新).                                       
The promulgation of the Five-Article Charter Oath (gokajō no goseibun 五
箇条の誓文).20                                            
Proclamation of the Outline of Commercial Law. 
1869 Formal return of domainal registers to the Emperor Meiji (hanseki hōkan 
                                                 
18 Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明. eds. Nihonshi sōran 日本史総覧 (The Conspectus of Japanese 
History). (Tokyo, 2001), p. 172. 
19 The contents of the reforms in the Meiji Period are mainly abstracted from books such as Henshall, 
Kenneth G., Chapter Four 'Building a Modern Nation: the Meiji Period (1868-1912)' in A History of 
Japan: from Stone Age to Superpower (New York: 2004); Suzuki Hushiko 鈴木節子ed., Eigo de yomu 
Nihonshi 英語で読む日本史 (Japanese History, 11 Experts Reflect on the past) (Tokyo, 1996); 
Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明. eds. Nihonshi sōran 日本史総覧  (The Conspectus of Japanese 
History) (Tokyo, 2001); Hamashima, Mashiaki浜島 正昭, eds. Shishō Nihonshizusetsu 新詳日本史
図説 New Vision of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 1998); Miyahara Takeo 宮原武夫ed. Nihon no rekishi 
日本の歴史 (Japan’s History) (Tokyo, 1989); and Jansen, Marius B. & Rozman, Gilbert, ed. Japan in 
Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, 1986). 
20 The text of the Five-Article Charter Oath refers to Jansen, Marius B. & Rozman, Gilbert, ed., Japan 
in Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, 1986), p. 76. 
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版籍奉還).21                                                                  
Removal of the Capital from Kyoto to Tokyo.                                       
Renewal of the bureaucracy in the central government.            
Ezochi 蝦夷地 was renamed Hokkaidō.                          
The establishment of the Mint Bureau and Opening the Tokyo Foreign 
Exchange Company.                                         
The telegraph line between Tokyo and Yokohama was completed. 
1870 The military system (adopting of a French-style army and a British-style 
navy) was unified.                                                           
The establishment of Osaka Arsenal.                                             
Permission for the commoners to choose their own names was granted.            
Iwasaki Yatarō opened the Tsukumo Commercial Association (九十九商社,
the antecedent of the Mitsubishi Joint-Stock Company).                  
The government-operated Maebashi Silk Textile Mill was established. 
Nakamara Masanao published Saikokurisshihen 西国立志編  (Tales of 
Self-Made Westerners) to introduce Western 'model individuals'.                        
Self-help ideology grew strong during the 1870s-1880s.                
Ideas of 'freedom and human rights' became popular from the 
1870s-1880s. 
 
                                                
1871 Proclamation of the Family Register Law.                
Establishment of the Administrational Prefecture System (haihan chiken廃
藩置県).22                                               
Dispatch of the Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883) diplomatic mission to 
Europe and the U.S. in order to cancel the unequal treaties with the West.                
The postal service between Tokyo and Osaka was established.            
The Ordinance of New Currency Policy included the gold standard, the 
yen unit and the denary scale.                                  
The proclamation of the Ordinance of Liberation (kaihōrei 解放令)23 to 
abolish the feudal classes, the so-called shi-nō-kō-shō (士農江商), in society.               
Cancellation of the limitations of marriage among the people.     
Establishment of the Educational Department in the government. 
1872 Proclamation of the Law of the National Bank.                          
 
21 Ibid. Hansekihōkan means the daimyō in the Tokugawa Period returned their registers to the Meiji 
government. See pp 76-79.   
22 The policy of haihan chiken was to terminate the domains in the Tokugawa Period, transferring 
daimyō to officials in the regional governments, executed by the Meiji government. See Jansen, Marius 
B. & Rozman, Gilbert, ed., Japan in Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, 1986), pp. 
106-107.   
23 The Ordinance of Liberation advocated equalization of all people in Japan (which meant cancellation 
of hierarchy in society). See Ishii Susumu 石井進, eds. 詳説日本史 Shōsetsu Nihonshi (A Detailed 
Japanese History) (Tokyo, 2000), p. 241. 
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Proclamation of the Law of Education.                                             
Completion of the compilation of a nationwide family register (jinshin 
koseki 壬申戸籍).                                              
Establishment of the Tomioka Silk Textile Mill.                   
The railroad between Shinbashi and Yokohama completed.                  
The telegraph line between Osaka and Kyoto completed.              
The promulgation of the Education Ordinance.                        
Tokyo Formal University was founded.                                   
Fukuzawa Yukichi published the book Gakumon no susume 学問の進め 
(Encouragement of Learning) to educate people to be enlightened.                       
Commencement of the establishment of the formal territory of the Ryukyu 
Islands (1872-1879).  
1873 Serious debate about dispatching an expedition to Korea occurred in the 
Meiji government. As a result the supporters of this action such as Saigō, 
Itagaki, Gotō, and Etō were defeated and ruled out of the government.                    
The Conscription Ordinance (chōheirei 徴兵令) was enacted.          
The Ordinance of Land Tax Reform. (chisokaisei jōrei 地租改正条例) was 
issued.                                                     
The Gregorian calendar was adopted on 1st January 1873 in place of the 
traditional lunar calendar.                                          
Declaration of the Law of Transferring Stipends to Bonds. (chitsuroku 
hōakn 秩禄奉還).24                                            
The Establishment of Meirokusha 明六社 (an academic and political 
association) by Mori Arinori (18471889), Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nishi 
Amane (1829-1897) to spread modernized thought.                                   
Abolition of the limitations on broadcasting Christianity. 
1874 The establishment of the Tokyo Police Station.                   
Dispatch of a punitive expedition to Taiwan in order to establish a claim on 
the jurisdiction of the Ryukyu Islands.                            
The proclamation of the Bylaw of the Japanese Imperial Telegraph. 
Establishment of the tondenhei seido 屯田兵制度 (the system of colonial 
militia) in Hokkaidō.                                         
The Yomiuri Shinbun made its first appearance.  
1875 The proclamation of the Constitutional System of Government 
(rikkenseitaijuritsu no shō 立憲政体樹立の詔).                      
The proclamation of the Regulation of Newspapers, and the revision of the 
Publication Regulation.                                         
                                                 
24 Ibid., pp. 79-82. 
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The establishment of the Mitsubishi Steamboat Company.        
Creation of the Tokyo Meteorological Observatory.            
Fukuzawa Yukichi published his Introduction of Civilization Theory 
(bunmeiron no gairyaku 文明論之概略).  
1876 Treaty of Kanghwa signed with Korea.                          
The promulgation prohibiting the wearing of swords, in order to 
disestablish the samurai class in society.                                       
The private Mitsui Bank started operating.                        
The revision of the Law of the National Bank was promulgated.           
The start of a draft of the National Constitution.                          
Sapporo Agriculture School and attached Industrial Department founded.              
An art school was founded.                                      
Formal occupation of the Ogasawara islets.  
1877 The occurrence of the Satsuma Rebellion and the defeated leader of the 
rebellion Saigō Takamori (1827-1877) committed suicide.                             
The Imperial Tokyo University was founded.               
Participation in the Universal Postal Union Treaty (bankokuyūbinrengō 
jōyaku 万国郵便連合条約).                                           
The first domestic exhibition of encouragement of industry.        
Opening of the government-run Shinmachi Refined Silk Textile Mill.     
The establishment of Hakuaisha 博愛社 (The predecessor of the present 
Red Cross Association). 
1878 The proclamation of the Three New Laws including the Law of Organizing 
Local Governments (Kun-Ku-Chō-Son 郡区町村), the Law of Organizing 
Prefectures and the Local Revenue Code.                         
The Establishment of the General Staff Office that regulated the military 
power was independent from the administration and controlled directly by 
the Emperor.                                                 
The Tokyo and Osaka Stock Markets were opened.                                   
The Imperial Industry University and the Komaba Agriculture School were 
founded in Tokyo.  
1879 Establishment of Ryukyu Prefecture.                             
The Ordinance of Education was issued.                          
The first publication of the Asahi Newspaper and the Tokyo Economic 
Magazine.                                                 
Ueki Emori (1857-1892) issued the Theory of People’s Freedom.                       
1880 Formation of the League for establishing a National Assembly.    
Promulgation of the Regulation of Factories’ Disposal.            
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Establishment of the National Institution of Accounting Investigation 
(kaikeishinsain 会計審査院).                                                     
Promulgation of the Regulations of Assembly.                        
The Criminal and Penal Code was promulgated.               
Opening of the Mitsubishi Exchange Company (the predecessor of the 
Mitsubishi Bank).                                                       
The Senshū Gakkō (the predecessor of Senshū University), Hōgakusha 
(the predecessor of Hōsei University) and Meiji Hōritsu Gakkō (the 
predecessor of Meiji University) were founded. 
1881 Imperial Rescript promised the promulgation of a constitution and the 
convening of a national assembly.                         
Establishment of the Agricultural and Commercial Department in the 
government.                                                
The Liberal Party (Jiyūtō 自由党) was formed.                            
Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924) was appointed as the Finance Minister 
and carried out a series of financial reforms that mainly included 
retrenching financial expenses in the government except for expanding the 
military, and regulating the paper money system.         
   The Japan Railway Company was founded.                         
      The Tokyo Professional and Industrial was created (the predecessor of     
   Tokyo Industrial University).                                         
   The national anthem Kimigayo (君が代) was composed.   
1882 Imperial Rescript to the Military issued.                           
The mission led by Itō Hirobumi went to Europe to study constitutions.                   
The Constitutional Progress Party (Rikkenkaishintō 立憲改進党) was 
formed by Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922). As well, the Eastern Ocean 
Social Party (tōyō shakaitō 東洋社会党) was formed.                   
Promulgation of the Law of Japanese Banks.                          
The railway between Shinbashi and Nihonbashi was completed.          
The electric lighting in Ginza was completed.                          
Creation of the Ueno Zoo and Tokyo Imperial Museum.               
Tokyo Senmongakkō (the predecessor of Waseda University) was founded. 
Nakae Chōmin translated The Theory of Social Contract (minyakuyakukai 
民約訳解) and Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916) published The New Theory of 
Human Rights (jinkenshinsetsu 人権新説). 
1883 Completion of the Rokumeikan 鹿鳴館 (a hospitality hall for invited 
foreign VIPs while visiting Japan).                              
An Official Gazette was published.                              
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The establishment of the Osaka Textile Company.                          
The establishment of the Tokyo Commercial and Industrial Association.                  
Promulgation of the revision of the Conscription Ordinance, the Law of 
the National Bank, and the Regulation of Newspapers. 
1884 Promulgation of the Ordinance of the Nobility (kazokurei 華族令).       
The railway between Ueno and Takasaki completed.           
Dismissal of the Liberal Party.  
1885 The first Cabinet led by Itō Hirobumi occurred, and the Cabinet system of 
the Japanese government was confirmed from then on.                    
Issuing of the Exchange Bank Draft (the silver standard currency). 
Establishment of the first postal boat in Japan.                      
Fukuzawa Yukichi published Leaving Asia (datsua ron 脱亜論).                         
Ozaki Kōyō(1867-1903) formed the Kenyū Association (Kenyūsha 硯友社), 
a literary group who advocated using realism in writing novels.. 
Meanwhile Japanese literary circles advocated the unification of the 
written and spoken language (genbunitchi 言文一致). 
 
From this sequence, it was clear that the Meiji government had moved through its 
hardship period in the embryonic stage to the development period of the next 
stage (1886-1895). On the political front, the government adopted the Cabinet 
system on December 1885, in which the government was transferred from a 
political-elite group to a constitutional style; the Prime Minister was in charge of 
the government; the minister of each department was a member of the Cabinet and 
directly bore the full responsibility of its jurisdiction for the emperor. With regard 
to the military, Japan started to create modern-western-style divisions to replace 
the old-fashioned so-called chindai 鎮台 (garrisons). In other words Japan had the 
ability to create a military strategic unit for dispatching overseas and operating an 
independent campaign. On the industrial front, Japan put all its efforts into 
developing its industries. It could be said that the economic development in Japan 
entered into the so-called first phase of the industrial revolution (daiichiji 
sangyōkakumei 第 一 次 産 業 革 命 ) from the phase of enhancing industry 
(shokusankōgyō seisaku 殖産興業 政策).25  
 
Developments in the next stage are shown below. 
                                                 
25 In general the history of economic development in Meiji Japan could be divided four stages, the 
stage of enhancing industry 1868-1885 (shokusankōgyō seisaku 殖産興業 政策), the first stage of the 
industrial revolution 1886-1905 (daiichiji sangyōkakumei第一次産業革命), the second stage of the 
industrial revolution (dainiji sangyōkakumei第二次産業革命), and the forming of zaibatsu 財閥 
industries after 1905-1945 (financial combine groups). Refer to Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明 eds. 
Nihonshi sōran 日本史総覧 (The Conspectus of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 2001), p 185. 
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1886 Establishment of the Hokkaido Board (Hokkaidōshō 北海道庁).    
Promulgation of the Ordinance of Imperial Universities (teikokudaigakurei 
帝国大学令) and the Ordinance for Primary Schools (shōgakkōrei 小学校
令)26. 
1887 Itō Hirobumi drew up the Constitution of the Empire of Japan. 
Proclamation of the Public Security Regulations.             
Proclamation of the Income Tax Law.                           
The railway between Ueno and Sendai was completed.                                
Establishment of the System of Bureaucrats’ Advanced Examination 
(bunkankōtōshiken seido 文官高等試験制度).                      
The Professional Art School and the Professional Music School were 
founded.     
1888 The first session of the Imperial Diet was convened.                        
The Organization Law for Cities, Counties and Villages was proclaimed.       
The regional administration system adopted 1 Dō 3 Fu and 43 Prefectures.   
Alteration of the military unit from chindan 鎮団 (garrison groups) to 
division (shidan 師団).                                
Establishment of the Privy Council (Sūmitsuin 枢密院).              
Creation of the Sanyō Railway Company.                     
Proclamation of the Patent, Trademark and Creation Regulations.                       
The establishment of Tokyo Astronomical Observatory.                           
1889 Promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Imperial 
Household Law, the Law of Election for the House of Representatives, and 
the Law of the House of Lords.                                        
The whole Tōkaidō Railway (tōkaidō honsen 東海道本線) was completed.  
1890 Convention of the first session of the Imperial Diet.                     
Distribution of the Imperial Rescript on Education to all schools.         
Promulgation of the Organization Law of Prefectures and Rural Districts, 
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Commercial Law Act, the Criminal 
Procedure Act, and a part of the Civil Code.                        
The first election of members of the House of Representatives.        
The telephone line between Tokyo and Yokohama was completed.      
Heavy industrial development; Japan becomes a processing nation from 
the 1890s onward. 
1891 The Tokyo and Osaka Commercial Conventions were formed respectively.    
                                                 
26 In the Ordinance for Primary Schools, the government enacted four years compulsory education in 
primary schools that each citizen should accept. See Yoshiaki金箱芳明 eds. Nihonshi sōran 日本史総
覧 (The Conspectus of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 2001), p 168.  
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The Code of Weights and Measures was promulgated and the Metric 
System adopted.                                                    
The railway between Ueno and Aomori was completed. 
1892 The Second General Election of the House of Representatives.                         
Establishment of the Epidemic Research Institute.             
Establishment of the Imperial Correspondence Agency.              
Publishing of the Yorozuchō News (Yorozuchō hō 万朝報). 
1893 The Naval Command Department (kaigungunreibu 海軍軍令部) was 
formed.                                                
Promulgation of the Codes of Civil Service Appointment.         
Promulgation of the Law of the Imperial Headquarters in War (senji 
daihonei jōrei. 戦時大本営条例). 
1894 The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 was signed and 
extraterritoriality terminated.                                          
Declaration of the Sino-Japanese War.                             
Promulgation of the Ordinance for High Schools.                
Proclamation of the Public Bond Code for the Military.             
The railway to Hiroshima was completed.                     
Promulgation of the Codes of Examining Newspapers before Publishing.   
1895 The Treaty of Shimonoseki27 was signed and the Tripartite (Russia, 
German and France) Intervention occurred.28                                        
The electrical trains ran in Kyoto.                            
Opening of the Sumitomo Bank, Shanghai textile factory, and Japan 
Refined Sugar Company.                                        
Promulgation of the Ordinance for Girls’ High Schools.             
Installation of a meteorological observatory at the summit of Mt. Fuji. 
Japanese branches of the Salvation Army and Archaeology Association 
were set up.  
 
 
                                                 
27 According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan obtained from China 1.) Recognition of Korean 
independence and the termination of tribute to China; 2.) An indemnity of 200 million taels; 3.) 
Cession of Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung peninsula; 4.) The opening of Chungking, 
Soochow, Hangchow and Shasi to trade; and 5.) Japanese nationals have the right to open factories  
and engage in industries and manufacturing in China. See Fairbank, John King & Liu, Kwang-Ching 
eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800~1911, Part 2 (Cambridge, 1980), p. 
108. 
28 The cession of the Liaotung peninsula caused Russia to worry that the Japanese presence on the 
Asiatic mainland would threaten its interests in the ice-free ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. In order to 
prevent Japan’s ambition, Russia combined with France and Germany to submit an ultimatum to Japan, 
in which the three nations demanded that Japan should give up the cession of the Liaotung peninsula. 
This event was termed the ‘Tripartite Intervention’. Ibid., pp. 109-110.  
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♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
In short, during the Meiji Restoration from 1868 to 1895 there were great 
achievements in modernization. In the diplomatic field, Japan dispatched missions 
twice overseas: one was led by Iwakura Tomomi to negotiate the cancellation of 
unequal treaties with the West in 1871, and even though it did not achieve success it 
did give a good chance to these important political figures in the central government 
to observe the real situations of Western countries. The other was led by Itō Hirobumi 
to study Western political systems and constiutions in 1882. These actions showed 
that Japan had learnt very well how to deal with and gain what it needed from the 
West through diplomatic methods. Also, during this period Japan cumulatively sent 
586 students overseas to study,29 and later these figures played very important roles in 
their professional fields. In politics, Japan abolished the shogunate-and-domains 
system and established centralized government, with local autonomy including the 
prefectures and city-county-village local administrational system, as well as 
instituting a bureaucracy. It finally promulgated the Meiji Imperial Constitution in 
1889. In the economy and finance, the government executed monetary, banking, stock 
market and land tax reforms to collect capital and support economic development. As 
well as this, the government undertook the infrastructure of telegraph systems, 
railways, mining, and manufacturing industries and also encouraged private enterprise, 
which boomed in this period with the number of diverse factories surprisingly 
increasing to 3,054.30 In internal affairs, the compilation of the family register 
nationwide was completed and the national police system was installed to ensure 
social security. In the military, Japan created a modernized army and navy that 
included organization, training, tactics and strategy, purchasing equipment, and 
introduced military manufacturing technology. In the legal system, the Penal Code, 
the Imperial Constitution, the Law of the Royal House, the Commercial Law Act, the 
Criminal Procedure Act, and a part of the Civil Code were compiled with the intent to 
build up a country under the rule of law. In education, the Ordinance of Education 
was issued and a series of codes to regulate operations from primary school to 
university were promulgated, and many schools and universities were established. 
Regarding cultural enlightenment, different kinds of academic associations were set 
up, and newspapers, magazines, and journals were published so that contemporary 
thought and knowledge were scattered widely. Arts, literature, painting, sculpture, and 
architecture boomed.  
   
                                                 
29 Leu Li-Chou呂理州, minchihweishin明治維新 (Meiji Restoration) (Taipei, 1994), p. 240. 
30 Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明 eds. Nihonshi sōran 日本史総覧(The Conspectus of Japanese 
History).(Tokyo, 2001), p. 185. 
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All of the above showed that Japan undertook modernization from a wide range of 
aspects within the nation, moreover promptly and decisively, and achieved great 
success. This could be proved by the Sino-Japanese War, which Japan won against the 
vast nation of Ch’ing China.             
                                     
 
4.2. Comparison of the merits and demerits of the Self-Strengthening Movement 
in Ch’ing China and the Meiji Restoration in Japan 
 
In terms of the above chronological lists detailing modernization reforms in the period 
of the Self-Strengthening Movement in Ch’ing China and of the Meiji Restoration in 
Japan in this important operative phase, we can easily perceive that both China and 
Japan’s responses to the West were positive, practical and industrious. However, what 
were the whys and wherefores of succeeding and failing in their modernizations that 
meant that Japan could overcome China in the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895? I think 
these are key issues in this thesis, and so through comparison and analysis the main 
merits and demerits in the modernization of both are narrated as follows.     
 
 
4.2.1. Similarity 
 
Both China and Japan had the same slogan of 'rich nation and strong army' (fukoku 
kyōhei 富国強兵) at this stage. In the pursuit of this national goal they had made an 
effort in these fields. For instance both dispatched missions and sent students overseas, 
set up an institution to take charge of diplomatic affairs internally and an embassy 
system externally to keep good relations with the West in the diplomatic field. For the 
military, they installed military academies to train officers in the army and navy, 
purchased weapons and gunboats, introduced military manufacturing technology to 
create arsenals and shipyards and borrowed advisors from the West for help in 
training new types of troops. In commerce and industry, they established the lighter 
industries (cotton, wool and silk manufacturing) to stimulate economic development, 
opened up diverse mining, and established infrastructures for railways, telegraph and 
telephone coomunications, and electric light and paper and match factories. Because 
both nations paid attention to Western-style education, new types of schools were 
founded, well-educated Westerners were invited to teach students in these modernized 
schools, and informative small-scale newspapers and magazines were published. 
Without doubt, both nations achieved their national goals to a certain degree. 
However, even though in these fields above China and Japan carried out their 
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modernization similarly, the range and depth of these reforms still had a big gap 
between them that needs to be discussed in more detail.  
    
 
4.2.2. Dissimilarity 
 
The following items show the differences in modernization between China and Japan 
in this phase. 
  
1. Comparing the type of reforms: China’s Self-Strengthening Movement 
belongs to the Establishment but the Meiji Restoration belongs to a revolution.               
Strictly speaking, the Self-Strengthening Movement in China was under the 
Establishment and political figures undertook the reforms, based upon a kind 
of ethnic diarchy within a political monarchy and absolutism. The goal of the 
movement was merely to restore the traditional order of the empire by using 
Western diplomatic practices and the military and technology to cope with the 
dual threats from the internal insurgencies and the external challenge of the 
West. Because the Self-Strengthening Movement had these limitations the full 
range of the reforms could not be applied to the whole nation. As a result, 
China could obtain a certain degree of success in modernization but not as 
far-reaching and wide-ranging as Japan’s.  
The Meiji Restoration in Japan could be said to be a kind of revolution against 
the Establishment – the Shogunate. State powers were returned to the emperor 
from the shogun and the feudal lords. However, as a matter of fact, the new 
practical ruling power was controlled by the hands of political elites within the 
court, the former shogunate and the domains after 1868. They had more room 
and flexibility to execute a full range of reforms without many restrictions 
from the old Establishment. In particular, the main reason for the collapse of 
the shogunate system came from the threats by the West, thus in pursuing the 
goal of rich nation and strong army, these talented people in the government 
were all ambitious to make fundamental and large scale reforms in terms of 
replicating the West. Without doubt, under their efforts, they made a good 
foundation for developing Japan’s modernization during this period. 
2. Comparison of the visions and minds of the major political figures who were 
in charge of reforms in both nations: It is believed that the key factor in 
bringing a nation from decline to revival depends upon policy-making figures 
who can make decisive reforms in the nation and change the nation’s fate. 
Reviewing the leadership in Ch’ing China, the real ruler of the Ch’ing Empire 
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was the Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi during that time. In order to consolidate 
her power she particularly cared about the dynastic revival and the power 
balance of Manchu and Han bureaucrats in the government. Under the dual 
pressures of internal rebellions and external invasions, she passively permitted 
central and local governments to initiate the Self-Strengthening Movement by 
adopting Western diplomatic practices and military reforms and technology in 
order to restore the traditional order in the empire.                                       
At the same time, there were men of excellent calibre who were in charge of 
the Self-Strengthening Movement, such as in the Grand Council there was the 
Manchurian Prince Kung, Wen-Hsiang, and Kwei-Liang, and in the provinces 
several powerful governors of the Han people such as Tseng Kuo-Fan, Tso 
Tsung- T’ang, and Shen Pao-Chen in the early part, Li Hung-Chang (the really 
main figure who was in charge of the movement from beginning to the end), 
Chang Chih-Tung, and Liu K’un-I in the later part of this stage. All of them 
came from the Royal House or Manchurian nobility, or had obtained gentry 
status through the Examination System or other means, but they had no 
experience of studying aboard or being dispatched as a commissioner to the 
West, except Li Hung-Chang.31 Thus they all had limited vision and could not 
clearly perceive the colonial tide from the West, which was propelled by the 
forces of rising nationalism, capitalism, and rapid industrialization.               
Under these circumstances of lack of knowledge of the West, it was hard for 
these political figures to imagine how to execute modernization. Thus 
incredible things happened: for example the Englishman Halliday Macartney, 
a medical doctor, was hired to construct the Nanking Arsenal; and two 
Frenchmen, Giquel and d’Aiguebelle, without any experience of building a 
ship, supervised the construction of the Foochow Shipyard. 32               
However the core idea of the movement simply came from Wei Yuan’s theory 
of "learn the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians”.33 
Thus the main reforms in the movement focused on military modernization 
though utilizing Western warships, gunnery, arsenals, the new military schools 
and the new type of navy, as well as opening mines, developing railways, 
communications and light industry. However, regarding the core elements of 
                                                 
31 Of these figures, only Li Hung Chang was dispatched to Japan to conclude the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese War and at the age of seventy-four was designated the imperial 
commissioner to Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., 
(New York, 1970), p. 414. 
32 Ibid., p.343. 
33 In Wei Yuan’s work Hai-kuo T’u-chih (An illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries), he 
advocated that to China the most important method of dealing with the West is “learn the superior 
techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians”. Ibid., pp. 334-335. 
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the West such as Western institutions, legal systems, philosophy, arts, culture 
and ways of thinking, the movement did not touch them at all.               
In short, these reformers had no whole picture how to create a new 
modernized China, but merely intended to utilize the movement to resist the 
external threats, suppress the internal rebellions and secure or stabilize their 
political power in the government. 
By contrast, in Japan, the emperor Meiji, who was a teenager of around 
sixteen years of age when he became the successor of the emperor Kōmei, was 
merely the representative of the government and rarely conducted political 
operations. The real power was in the hands of so-called hanbatsu seifu 藩閥政
府 (clan government), and those political elites who were in charge of the 
reforms came from powerful daimyō/samurai, the shogunate and the court, 
such as Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830-1878), Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838-1922), 
Yamagata Aritomo(1838-1922), Katsu Kaishū ( 1823-1899), Kito 
Takayoshi(1833-1877), Itō Hirobumi, Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900) and 
Sanjō Sanetomi (1837-1891), Iwakura Tomomi(1825-1883). Saigō Takamori 
(1827-1877), Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915), Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924), 
Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), Etō Shibei (1834-1874), Iwasaki Yatarō 
(1834-1885), and Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931) etc.                                     
These figures in the main stream of the Meiji Restoration generally had 
experience in dealing with the West and had a good sense of realism. In 
particular, Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru had studied in Britain, Katsu Kaishū 
went to Holland to study the navy and Iwakura Tomomi, Kito Takayoshi, 
Ōkubo Toshimichi joined the diplomatic mission to Europe. Yamagata 
Aritomo had investigated military systems for nearly one year in Europe too. 
These giants of the Meiji Restoration in their roles of policy making 
recognized thoroughly that Japan should undertake a full range of fundamental 
reforms and assimilate into the Western civilization; otherwise it was 
impossible to resist the external threats. Thus it could be said Japan’s 
modernization during this period was unlimited. Once the reforms were 
decided on they were enacted without hesitation.                            
In a nutshell, Japanese leaders demonstrated statesmanship: the Chinese 
leaders did not. 
3. Comparison of the continuity of leadership in both nations: In China most of 
the figures in charge of the movement did not continue from the beginning to 
the end except for Li Hung-Chang. During this period, Prince Kung was 
disgraced twice and finally sacked after the Sino-French War (1885). Of the 
other two key figures Tseng Kuo-Fan died in 1872, and Wen-Hsiang died in 
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1876. General Tso Tsung-T’ang was assigned to take charge of the suppression 
of the Moslem Rebellion in the Northwest from 1868 and had no scope to 
worry about the reforms. Chang Chih-Tung and Liu K’un-I not only appeared 
late in this stage, but also were merely provincial governors without any 
power of policy making. Thus only Li and the Empress Dowager Tz'u-Hsi 
took part in the whole procedure of the movement. The reforms were not 
enacted smoothly and continuously.                                         
 In Japan, many talented people served for a long period in the government 
while learning from the West. For example: Itō Hirobumi four times, and 
Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi and Ōkuma Shigenobu twice had 
been the Prime Minister of the government and all of them participated in 
most of the whole procedure of the Meiji Restoration. In addition the other 
political key figures, such as Inoue Kaoru, Itagaki Taisuke, Kotō Shōjirō, etc., 
all played important roles at this time. Therefore compared with China, 
Japan’s modernization in this stage was more of a continual process and the 
number of the talented people who served in the government was greater than 
in China.     
4. Comparison of the integrity, efficiency and cooperation in officialdom of both 
nations: In China, corruption in the government was common, and even Li 
Hung-Chang, who was the key member in charge of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement, was not noted for high morals and unsullied integrity. According 
to reports he bequeathed an estate of 40 million taels after his death that was 
nearly worth half the state’s annual income.34 Without doubt, his subordinates 
squeezed huge amounts of money from the national treasury into their private 
pockets either in their official career or through running government-owned 
factories and enterprises. Moreover, the most scandalous of all was the transfer 
of the 30 million taels of naval funds to build the Summer Palace (I-ho-Yuan 
頤和園) for the sixtieth birthday of the Empress Dowager Tz’u –Hsi.35               
At the same time, the lack of cooperation in officialdom was clear and the 
rivalry among the factions was serious. It can be proved that the Peiyang and 
Nanyang fleets refused to reinforce the Fukien fleet in the Sino-French War in 
1884 and the Nanyang fleet declared 'neutrality' when the Peiyang fleet was 
defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. Even the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War 
was treated as only a particularised failure by Li hung-Chang and the Peiyang 
                                                 
34 In the early 1890s, the estimates of Ch’ing government revenues roughly reached 89 million taels 
according to Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. East Asia: Tradition & 
Transformation, Revised Edition (Boston, 1989), p. 568. Also see Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 
1970), p 350. 
35 Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. East Asia: Tradition & 
Transformation, Revised Edition (Boston, 1989), pp. 622-623. 
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military forces. It is hard to imagine the national forces of Peiyang as not 
belonging to the state but to the governor. As Immanuel Hsu points out “The 
provincial promoters of Self-Strengthening rivaled rather than cooperated with 
each other and regarded their achievements as the foundation of personal 
power. Their sense of regionalism and their eagerness for self-preservation 
persisted very strongly.”36 And it needs to be emphasized that bureaucratic 
inefficiency, nepotism, and corruption in officialdom and in government 
industries and in government-supervised merchant enterprises were obvious.               
As contrast between these two nations, in Japan, the integrity, efficiency and 
cooperation in officialdom were much better than in China. Although the 
Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu decided to support a fund of 25,000 yen 
annually and accumulatively transfer the property of thirty government-owned 
ships to Mitsubishi Kaisha without payment in 1875.37 Nonetheless he was 
merely committed to the national interest, and was not self-interested.       
Another matter was the so-called Disposal of State Assets Affair (kaitakushi 
kanyūbutsu haraisage jiken 開拓史官有物払い下げ事件) of 1881, in which the 
governor of Hokkaido, Kuroda Kiyotaka, was prosecuted for disposing of the 
state-owned property of factories and mines to his relations (these included the 
Kansai Bōekishōkai 関西貿易商会 [Kansai Regional Trading and Commercial 
Association] directed by Godai Tomoatsu, and the Hokkaisha 北海社 [North 
Sea Association] shared by Kuroda Kiyotaka’s subordinate officers). This 
caused the so-called Political Change of 1881 (Meiji jūyonnen no seihen 明治
十四年の政変). As a result, the sponsors of this event, Kuroda Kiyotaka and 
Ōkuma Shigenobu, were sacked from the government.38 These examples 
demonstrate that integrity in Meiji Japan was better than in Ch’ing China. In 
particular, the Japanese political system did not permit institutional corruption 
to exist in their bureaucracy.                                                      
Even though disputations between factions happened in the Meiji government, 
generally speaking, they preferred to devote their efforts to the state rather 
than to their private interests. It could be said that the spirit of teamwork, 
cooperation and coordination in the bureaucracy was highly commendable.     
5. Comparison of the content of reforms in both breadth and depth: If we observe 
the procedure of absorbing Western civilization in detail, basically it could be 
                                                 
 
36 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., (New York, 1970), p. 348. 
37 Ishii, Kanji石井寛治 Taikei Nihon no reikishi: Kaikoku to ishin 大系日本の歴史： 開国と維新, 
Vol. 12th (Outline of Japanese History: Opening the Nation and Restoration, volume 12th) (Tokyo, 
1993), pp. 361-363. 
38 Banno, Jyunji坂野潤治 Taikei Nihon no reikishi: Kindai Nihon no shuppatsu大系日本の歴史: 近
代日本の出発, Vol. 13th (Outline of Japanese History: The Start Point of Modern Japan, Volume 13th) 
(Tokyo, 1993), pp. 90-95. 
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divided into three categories: military and manufacturing technologies as the 
surface layer; political establishments and legal systems in the middle; and 
philosophy, culture and ways of thinking in the deep layer, as shown below:   
   
Surface layer Manufacturing technology including the military and light 
and heavier industries. 
Middle layer Western political structures and legal systems. 
Deep layer Western-style philosophy, culture and ways of thinking. 
 
Without doubt, both China and Japan started their modernization reforms by      
learning how to produce weapons and replicate manufacturing technology, such 
as constructing Western gunboats, building arsenals, opening mines, building 
railways, and developing light industry which mainly included cotton, silk and 
wool textile mills.                                                              
As to the items in the middle and deep layers, even though the intellectual 
Wang-T’ao advocated that China needed to establish an institutional state, and 
Ho Chi and Hu Ri-Huan suggested renovating the bureaucratic system, because 
they were merely common people the government neglected their suggestions.  
Thus China did not enact these, but Japan did.                                  
In Japan, in the matter of political structure, a modernized central government 
system was created, especially promulgating the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan in order to set up the constitutional monarchy system. The local autonomy 
systems of prefectures and local governments (Kun-Ku-Chō-Son 郡区町村) were 
established. Though within certain constraints, organizing of parties and 
associations was permitted, and people had the right of assembly. Moreover 
Japan established the System of Bureaucrats’ Advanced Examination to adopt 
and promote the civil service that built up the foundation of administration.              
In the economic and financial field, Japan finished the compilation of the 
nationwide family register, established a financial base by means of the 
Ordinance of Land Tax Reform, and set up the Monetary Currency System 
based on the silver standard, and the national banking system, and the National 
Institution of Accounting Investigation. In developing the economy, Japan was 
more active and thorough than China in opening mines, constructing railways, a 
telegraph and post system, marine transportation, and encouraging private 
enterprises.                                                          
In education, Japan started its compulsory education of four years of primary 
education, and the diffusion of compulsory education for males reached around 
78% and for females nearly 50% in 1895.39 The divisions of university based on 
                                                 
39 Hamashima, Mashiaki浜島正昭eds. Shinshō Nihonshizusetsu新詳日本史図説 New Vision of 
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the educational system were promulgated and national universities and 
professional schools were established nationwide.                                        
In the legal system, Japan compiled a series of laws to build up a law-abiding 
society, such as the Penal Code, the Criminal Law, the Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan, the Imperial Household Law of the Royal House, the Law of 
Election for the House of Representatives, the Law of the House of Lords, the 
Organization Law of Prefectures and Rural Districts, the Code of Civil 
Procedure, the Commercial Law Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, and a part of 
the Civil Code.                                                    
In the military and police system, Japan created a modern navy called 
rengōkandai 聯合艦隊 and a modern army based on the strategy unit of division. 
Moreover it promulgated the Ordinance of Conscription so that every male 
citizen should be enlisted to reinforce the army. For the convenience of 
conducting the war, Japan created the organization of the Headquarters of 
General Staff and issued the Law of the Imperial Headquarters in War (senji 
daihonei jōrei. 戦時大本営条例). Apart from the above, Japan established an 
efficient police system nationwide as well. The Minister of the Internal Affairs 
Department controlled the powers of the police system in order to keep the 
social security.                                               
Regarding those items in the deep layer such as philosophy, culture and ways of 
thinking, even though in China a few scholars such as Yen Fu translated 
considerable Western knowledge including the thoughts of Thomas Henry 
Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and Charles R. Darwin into Chinese, unfortunately 
these had little influence on Chinese officialdom, the gentry class and the 
common people except for a few progressive intellectuals.                                  
However in Japan philosophy, science, literature, journalism, magazines, 
performances, painting, sculpture, and architecture developed either by the 
introduction of Western practice, or by keeping the Japanese traditional style or 
by combining both. Thus Meiji Japan also paid attention to the deep layer of 
Western civilization and some Japanese scholars gave a special term 'bunmei 
kakai' 文 明 開 化  (civilization and enlightenment) to this developmental 
phenomenon.              
6. Comparison of the social and psychological foundations of the 
Self-Strengthening Movement in China and the Meiji Restoration in Japan: In 
essence, the atmosphere in Chinese society and officialdom was conservative 
and passive. Because of lack of support at a fundamental level, in general, the 
great majority of the officials, scholars, gentry and even the common people 
                                                                                                                                            
Japanese History) (Tokyo, 1998); p. 173. 
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disregarded foreign affairs and political renovation. The type of leadership in the 
movement operated from the top down and only a few leaders in the central 
government and several provincial governors and a few scholars concerned 
thmselves with or supported the reforms.                                              
As Li hung-Chang pointed out in a letter to his friend: “The gentry class forbids 
the local people to use Western methods and machines, so that eventually the 
people will not be able to do anything… Scholars and men of letters always 
criticize me for honoring strange knowledge and for being queer and unusual. It 
is really difficult to understand the minds of some Chinese.”40 In addition, after 
the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, some Western observers clearly described 
the war as one between Li Hung-Chang and Japan, since only the Peiyang Fleet 
and the Huai Army led by Li joined the war against the Japanese troops, while 
the rest of China was not affected at all. Thus it was obvious that the Western 
reforms were hardly supported by the people or the state and that these officials 
belonged to different entities.                                        
By contrast, the supporters of the restoration in Meiji Japan were from the 
bottom to the top even though the direction of the reforms was in the grasp of 
the government. Thus although the endeavors came from the political figuresat 
the top the influences of compulsory education and the conscription system were 
able to teach common people the general idea of modernization. In particular, 
the well-educated elites in the samurai class introduced and diffused 
contemporary Western knowledge to the citizens through newspapers such as 
the Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun (1870), Yomiuri Shinbun (1874), Asahi Shinbun 
(1874), Jiji Shinbun (1882), Jiyū Shinbun (1882), Kokumin Shinbun (1890), and 
the Yorozu Chōhō (1892), and magazines such as the Meiroku Zasshi (1874) 
issued by Meirokusha 明六社,41 Jogaku Zasshi (1885) and Kokumin no Tomo 
(1887) issued by Minyūsha 民友社,42 Nihonjin (1888) issued by Seikyōsha 政教
社,43 Taiyō (1895)44 and Shōnen Sekai (1895). By their efforts, they caused the 
                                                 
40 These statements are cited in the letter that Li Hung-Chang sent to one of his friends Kuo Sung-Tao, 
the first Ch’ing ambassador to Britain 1876-1878.See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. (New York, 1970), pp. 
350-351.  
41 The association of Meirokusha consisted of the famous scholars Mori Arinori, Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Nishimura Shigeki and Katō Hiroyuki; they tried to introduce contemporary Western thought of 
liberalism and utilitarianism to the public. See Hamashima, Mashiaki 浜 島 正 昭  eds. Shinshō 
Nihonshizusetsu新詳日本史図説 New Vision of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 1998), p. 172.   
42 The association of Minyūsha consisted of Miyake Setsurei, Shiga Shigetaka, and Sugiura Jūkō. They 
published the magazine to advocate conservative nationalism and comment on the contemporary issues 
of politics, society, the economy and literature. Ibid., p.190. 
43 The association of Seikyōsha was founded by Tokutomi Sohō. He advocated the Occidentalization of 
the common people. Ibid.  
44 The Taiyō magazine was founded by Takayama Chogyū, Inoue Tetsujirō. They insisted on Japanese 
nationalism (nihonshugi 日本主義).   
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people and the government to be united as a whole, consolidated by a 
nationalistic consciousness. As Mita points out “The Meji regime erected a 
value system with a dual function, at once liberating the vast, latent energy 
within the pre-modern community order, and channeling it into the sphere of 
loyalty, to provide motive energy for ‘a prosperous country and a strong 
army’”.45                                                         
In a nutshell, the whole of Japanese society revealed a kind of aggressiveness in 
pursuit of the new knowledge that was quite different from Ch’ing China, which 
was characterised by social and psychological inertia.  
 
                               
        
        ♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
Both nations pursued the goal of 'rich nation and strong army' as the way to 
modernization through the Self-Strengthening Movement in China and the Meiji 
Restoration in Japan. The remarkable landmark of this competition between them was 
the Sino-Japanese War during 1894-1895. As a result, Japan won a victory over China. 
In comparing and analyzing this historical process of modernization it can readily be 
seen that the following key factors influenced the result of the war. This s despite the 
fact that both nations started their first step towards modernization through the means 
of dispatching missions and students overseas, inviting Western experts to teach, 
imitating the manufacture of Western gunships and arsenals and ammunition, opening 
mines, constructing railways, establishing telegraph and postal and banking systems, 
and developing light industries.  
   
However, the main differences between the Self-Strengthening Movement and the 
Meiji Restoration seem to be:  
      
• Goal: In China, the Self-Strengthening Movement’s goal aimed at restoring 
the order of the empire, in which the regime ruled under the ethnic diarchy 
within the Manchurian autocratic monarchy. In Japan, the goal of the Meiji 
Restoration was aimed at establishing a modern state and catching up to (and 
possibly even overtaking) the West. 
                                                 
45 Mita, M., Social Psychology of Modern Japan (tr. Suloway, S) (London, 1992), p. 244. 
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• Type: The reforms of the movement in China were still governed by the 
dynastic Establishment. However the Restoration in Japan was a kind of 
revolution in which the shogunate system was terminated and the regime 
restored to the emperor. 
• Leadership: In China there was no efficient and discerning central leadership: 
absolute imperial power was in the hands of the Empress Dowager T’zu Hsi 
and she merely indulged herself in political power without any sense of 
modernization or of building a modern state. However, the Japanese regime 
was in the hands of well-educated elites who came from the court, shogunate 
and domains. Emperor Meiji was the representative of the government and he 
was keen to establish Japan as a modern state, so he not only accepted reform 
suggestions from the political elites, he also joined with them to make the 
national policies.  
• The number and visions of political figures: China lacked talented people in 
both central and local governments. In addition, their visions were narrow and 
limited, and most of them had no experience of contact with Western 
civilization. By contrast, Japan had plenty of able and intelligent figures in key 
government positions. Most of them either had a Western education 
background or were involved in foreign affairs so that they had more open 
minds and vision to undertake Japan’s modernization. Many of them could be 
termed ‘statesmen’. 
• The efficiency and unsullied integrity of administration in the bureaucracy: 
Obviously, Japan was relatively much better than China at this time.   
• The breadth and depth of the reforms: Most of the reforms in the 
Self-Strengthening Movement belonged to the surface layer of modernization 
which included manufacturing technology of military and light and heavier 
industries, and certain infrastructures. However the reforms in the Meiji 
Restoration not only replicated the material manufacturing technology, but 
also touched the inner and deeper parts of Western civilization that included 
political structures and legal systems, and Western types of philosophy, culture 
and ways of thinking.  
• The atmosphere and psychology of society: In general, Chinese people were 
comparatively conservative and passive, and resisted change. Government 
officers and the gentry class were still proud of their traditional superiority 
derived from an ancient civilization, and society was overwhelmed by a kind 
of psychological inertia. By contrast, Japanese people were relatively active 
and assertive, particularly those who were not just ordinary people but also the 
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masterless samurai class called rōnin 浪人46 (later, after disestablishment of 
the samurai class, also shizoku 士族), who urgently impelled the society 
forwards to renovation. As well as compulsory education, the conscription 
system and teaching via the media also played important roles in enlightening 
people and eventually involved the whole nation in the modernization 
movement that made Japan the first modern state in Asia. 
 
In short, the comparison and analysis of this period of history in both nations, as 
detailed above, shows why Japan was able to succeed over China in modernizing at 
this stage and win victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.    
          
 
   
 
 
                                                 
46 The samurai class in the Tokugawa period had stipends and received a good education, and in 
general they had knowledge and some skills. But they became rōnin 浪人 when the new Meiji 
government extinguished their masters the daimyō. Without support from their masters they would 
struggle to live so they participated in the movement of modernization eagerly in order to obtain a 
chance for survival. It could be said that they indirectly impelled the society forwards to modernization.    
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Chapter Five: 
 
Comparison and analysis of China and Japan 
in the consequent phase 
 
 
The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was a remarkable landmark in history since it 
had a huge influence on both Ch’ing China and Meiji Japan in the consequent phase(s) 
of their modernization.  
 
China’s defeat in the war proved that the old Manchurian Dynasty was incapable of 
coping with the challenge of the time, and that the Self-Strengthening Movement was 
merely a superficial modernization. From then on (1896-1911), Ch’ing China faced 
the more serious 'threats of partition' (see Map 9, Foreign encroachment on China, c. 
1900)1 from the expansion of the Imperial Powers, which included the Asian neighbor 
newly modernized Japan. Although the so-called 'Hundred Day Reform, led by K’ang 
Yu-Wei (1858-1927) and Liang Ch’I-Ch’ao (1873-1929) and supported by the 
Emperor Kuang-Hsu (1875-1908), occurred in 1898, owing to opposition from the 
Empress Dowager Tz'u-Hsi and the conservative faction this radical reform failed. 
Soon afterwards, the Boxer Uprising (I-ho ch’üan 義和拳)2 in 1900 induced the Allied 
Army of Eight Nations, numbering 18,000, to invade Peking for revenge. As a result, 
the unequal Boxer Protocol3 was signed in 1901 and China completely submitted to 
the West. Moreover, owing to the oppression of native industries by the West and 
political and social dissatisfaction, there were demands for China to undertake more 
radical reforms in every aspect, from the most fundamental level. Even though the 
Ch’ing Court executed some reforms from 1901-1905 in order to renovate the existing 
governmental institutions, administrative procedures, educational system, military 
                                                 
1 Robert, J.A.G. Modern China: An Illustrated History. (Great Britain, 1998), p. 90. 
2 The I-ho ch’üan 義和拳 related to the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists. The 'Boxers' used 
the slogan 'Support the Ch’ing, wipe out the foreigners' by late 1899 and exaggerated their ability to 
protect the nation by their Chinese martial arts and a mysterious power from the gods of heaven.  
Under the patronage of the Ch’ing Court, the Boxers were utilized by the central and provincial 
governments to oppose the foreign invasion; they received tacit consent to assault the foreign 
embassies in 1900 and caused the Allied Army to take revenge by occupying Peking. See Fairbank, 
John King & Liu, Kwang-Ching eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 
1800~1911, Part 2 (London, 1980), pp. 118-125, and Fairbank, John K. The Great Chinese Revolution: 
1800-1985 (New York, 1986), pp. 137-138. 
3 The main contents of the Boxers Protocol included 1.) Punishment of the guilty. 2.) An indemnity of 
₤67.5 million, or 450 million taels. 3.) Other important stipulations included the dispatch of apology 
missions to Germany and Japan, allowing a permanent legation guard, stationing foreign troops in key 
points from Peking to the sea …etc. Ibid., pp. 126-127.   
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organization, and economic and financial systems, once these reforms touched upon 
the Dowager’s tremendous authority or threatened the Manchurian nobility’s benefits, 
inevitably it became impossible for them to achieve any great success. Therefore after 
Tz’u Hsi’s death in 1908, although some reforms continued superficially they did not 
change the real situation, and later on, the Revolution of 1911, which was led by 
Western-trained Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), toppled the Manchurian Dynasty. As a 
result, a long existing imperially dynastic Establishment over two thousand years in 
Chinese history was terminated and the first republican state was established in 1911. 
From then on China faced a new era and kept on its way towards modernization. 
   
By contrast, after Japan won the Sino-Japanese War against China, the government 
and its people felt humiliated by the Tripartite Invention of 1895. In particular, Japan 
hated the fact that Russia intended to colonize the Liaotung Peninsula and take 
advantage of constructing railways and opening mines in Manchuria. In preparing for 
a seemingly inevitable war against Russia, Japan undertook the policy of 
gashinshōtan 臥薪嘗胆 (a policy of sustaining determination and perseverance in 
order to obtain enough force to fight against misfortune) and more than half its 
national budget was allotted to military expenditure from 1897.4 As well, the heavy 
industries including iron, steel and shipbuilding industries were also developed 
strongly towards the latter part of the Meiji Period (from the mid-1890s), partly in line 
with Japan’s military campaigns.5 Eventually the Russo-Japanese War occurred in 
1904-1905, and Japan once more won the war. The victory was the first-ever victory 
over a Western nation by a non-Western nation and demonstrated that Japan had 
achieved its national aim of ‘rich nation and strong army’, and had not only caught up 
but also was taken seriously by the Western powers. Japan had learned very well 
indeed how to play the game of becoming a coloniser in Eastern Asia, and in 1910 it 
annexed Korea without any international opposition, and treaties signed with the 
Western powers fully regained the right of tariff autonomy in 1911. An era came to an 
end when the Emperor Mutsuhito (Meiji) died of diabetes on 30 July 1912.6  
Afterwards, Japan gradually continued towards imperialism and militarism, until 
defeat in the Pacific War arena of the Second World War in 1945. 
 
 
 
 
5.1. The reforms accomplished by both nations in this phase 
                                                 
4 Henshall, Kenneth G.. A History of Japan: from Stone Age to Superpower (New York, 2004), p. 94. 
5 Ibid., p. 100. 
6 Idem. 
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5.1.1. China 
 
From 1896 to 1911, within the consequent phase, China’s modernization could be 
divided into two parts: one being the 'Hundred Day Reform of 1898' and the other  
the 'Reform and Constitutional Movement at the end of the Ch’ing Dynasty from 
1901-1911'. 
 
 
The Hundred Day Reform of 1898 
 
The Hundred Day Reform should be discussed first during this period. The defeat in 
the Sino-Japanese War surprised and stimulated the Ch’ing Court and in the meantime, 
the Empress Dowager Tz’u Hsi superficially restored ruling power to the Emperor 
Kuang-Hsu, but in fact, she herself still kept a firm grasp on power.7 Li Hung-Chang, 
who was in charge of the Self-Strengthening Movement, lost the Empress Dowager’s 
confidence and was demoted in disgrace to a provincial governor-general at Canton. 
   
At that time the reform movement was mainly divided into two factions. One 
consisted of the conservative reformers such as the imperial tutor, Weng T’ung-Ho 
(1830-1904), and a provincial governor-general, Chang Chih-Tung. Chang especially 
advocated “Chinese studies for the framework of values, Western studies for practical 
purposes.”8 He wanted to rescue China through a renaissance of Confucianism, in 
other words by means of education and industry, and by adopting Western science and 
technology. In the other faction were the radical reformers such as K’ang Yu-Wei and 
Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao; these came from the scholar-gentry class and had obtained the 
status of chu-jen舉人 degree through the provincial examination, and their advice 
about state policy finally attracted the Emperor’s attention. Their suggestions 
basically replicated the reforms of the Meiji Restoration of Japan and the Emperor 
Kuang-Hsu adopted their proposals and launched a series of so-called Hundred Day 
Reforms (wu-hsu pien-fa, 戊戌變法).  
   
Between June 11 and September 21 1898, the emperor issued forty or more reform 
                                                 
7 Tz’u-Hsi controlled the power through three methods: one was assigning her henchman Jung-Lu who 
was a Manchurian noble to take charge of the Peiyang Army which was stationed the vicinity of Peking, 
the second was organising her confidants in the Grand Council to make routine reports about all policy 
decisions and the third asking the eunuchs to watch the Emperor’s movements. See Hsu, Immanuel 
C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), p. 455. 
8 Ibid., 427-430 and Fairbank, John K. The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985. (New York, 1986), p. 
136.  
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edicts to deal with almost every conceivable subject, which mainly included abolition 
of sinecures and unnecessary offices; appointment of progressives in the government; 
improvement of administrative efficiency by a new, simplified administrative 
procedure; encouragement of suggestions from the common people; setting up diverse 
modern schools and revising the examination system with essays on current affairs to 
replace the 'Eight-legged' essay and the initiation of a special examination in political 
economy; publication of an official newspaper; revising laws as a preliminary to 
getting rid of extraterritoriality; promoting railway construction, agriculture, medicine, 
mining, commerce, inventions, and study abroad; and modernizing the army, navy, 
police, and postal systems.9  
   
However, the set of reforms came to a halt in the power struggle between the Emperor 
and the Empress Dowager, the conflict between the conservative factions and the 
progressive factions, and racial strife between the Manchus and Han officers. Without 
the support of the main power controller, Tz’u Hsi, the reform inevitably failed. As 
Immanuel Hsu points out: 
 
The principal causes for the failure of the reform were the inexperience of 
the reformers and their ill-considered strategy, the reluctance of the 
Empress Dowager to give up power, and powerful conservative 
opposition.10
   
Finally, on September 21 1898, with the help of the top Manchurian military 
commander Jung-Lu, Empress Dowager Tz'u-Hsi, fearing a coup d’état by the radical 
reformers, seized Emperor Kuang-Hsu and put him under detention in a small island 
in the Imperial Garden, while she started her third regency. Six of the second tier of 
reformers, namely T’an Su-T’ung, Yang Jui, Yang Shen-Hsiu, Liu Kuang-Ti, Lin Hsu 
and K’ang Kuang-Jen, known as the “Six Gentlemen” (liu chun-tzu 六君子), were 
executed and the primary-tier reformers K'ang and Liang escaped to Japan.11 This was 
the first bloodshed for modernization in China and the radical reforms were declared 
at an end in just 103 days. Strictly speaking, most of the policies in the Hundred Day 
Reform led by the Emperor were merely paperwork and were not seriously put into 
practice.  
   
                                                 
9 Concerning the content of the Hundred Day Reforms, see Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern 
China (New York, 1970), pp. 443-447, and Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. China: 
Tradition and Transformatio. (revised edition) (U.S.A., 1989), pp. 374-376. 
10 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), p. 454. 
11 Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. China: Tradition and Transformation (revised edition). 
(U.S.A., 1989) p. 376. 
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However, as Fairbank points out:  
 
The reform movement must not be counted a complete failure. Underlying 
it from the beginning was an intellectual groundswell. As the political 
effort unfolded after 1895, the feeling and attention it aroused fed back to 
deepen and broaden this groundswell. Eventually, while the reform 
movement failed to achieve its political goal, the intellectual changes it 
induced had a long-range nationwide impact on the society and culture of 
China.12  
 
Chinese gentry-literati started to absorb a large-scale influx of contemporary Western 
thought and were actively involved in the tide of modernization. In addition, new 
types of schools began to be established and the old-existing academies reconstructed 
by these gentry-literati, and new curricula including mathematics, science, world 
geography, history, Western languages and foreign current affairs were introduced into 
the educational system. Moreover, voluntary associations such as study societies were 
formed rapidly. From 1895 to 1898, seventy-six study societies had been founded, not 
only in the large coastal cities but also in inland areas to spread new values and 
knowledge from the West to many youngsters.13 And newspapers and magazines 
emerged very quickly during this time: twelve existed before 1895 and they increased 
by another sixty from 1895-1898 nationwide.14 All these publications played the role 
of 'vehicles for nationalism' to spread a strong political consciousness. 
   
Through the influence of newspapers and magazines, study societies and new-type 
schools, a new social group of Chinese intelligentsia was formed. They were different 
from the traditional gentry-literati and could learn Western knowledge and expand 
their vision from tradition, then transformation and to modernization. As a result, they 
played an important role in promoting China’s modernization at the end period of the 
Ch’ing dynasty and afterwards.        
  
 
 
 
 
The Reform and Constitutional Movement at the end of the Ch’ing dynasty from 
                                                 
12 Fairbank, John King & Liu, Kwang-Ching eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11: Late 
Ch’ing, 1800~1911, Part 2 (London, 1980), p. 329. 
13 Ibid., pp. 330-332. 
14 Ibid., p. 333. 
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1901 to 1911 
 
The reform from 1901 to 1905 
 
As mentioned above, after the failure of the Hundred Day Reform, the Boxer Uprising 
occurred in 1900 and interrupted the process of China’s modernization for nearly 
three years. During this period (from 15 August 1900 to 7 January 1902) when the 
Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi and the puppet emperor Kuang Hsu escaped from the 
capital city Peking to the refuge of Xian, she admitted her policy of using the Boxers 
to resist the West was misled and thereby brought catastrophe to the nation. Thus she 
promised in public to reform the existing government institutions, administrative 
procedures, the education system, the military institutions, and the financial system 
and improve people’s livelihood, still based on the Ch’ing Establishment.  
   
In the meantime, a group consisting of Prince Ch’ing, Jung-Lu, and Li Hung-Chang in 
the central government and the Yangtze governors-general Chang Chih-Tung and Liu 
K’un-I took charge of the reforms. These mainly contained the abolition of useless 
offices; the creation of new offices in the political system; setting up the Commission 
for Army Reorganization (lien-ping ch’u 練兵處) to recruit and train the New Army, in 
which there were thirty-six divisions newly created throughout the empire, and the 
establishment of a system of military schools to train the officers of the New Army in 
the military reforms.15 In the educational field, in 1904 a set of regulations was put 
out for school administration modeled on the Japanese example; many new schools 
were created and study abroad encouraged; the 'Eight-legged' essays in the 
examination system were abolished in 1901; the Education Department was 
established in the central government to take charge of educational administration in 
1905 and decided to abolish the old civil-service examinations system after 1906.16 
On the compilation of new legal codes, the Ch’ing government decided to start 
preparations from 1902 for revision of the laws and judicial administration and 
amendment of the current Code of the Ch’ing dynasty (Ta-Ch’ing Lii-Li 大清律令). 
Social reforms included permission for marriages between Manchu and Han, 
liberation of women from foot binding, and prohibition of opium. Concerning other 
reforms, these covered adopting a policy of currency unification and establishing the 
International Exchange Bureau in 1903; revision of the regulations on tribute rice; 
promotion of railway construction; promulgation of provincial taxes on tobacco and 
liquor; drafting of a commercial law; establishment of refugee camps to collect 
                                                 
15 Ibid., pp. 383-385. 
16 Ibid., pp. 376-378. 
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vagrants and the unemployed; and reduction of the expenses in the Royal House.17  
   
However, the Dowager had no real intention of undertaking complete Westernization. 
Also, she discriminated against capable Han officers and gave important 
appointments to inept Manchurian officers. Moreover after the key figures Li Hung 
Chang died in 1901 and Liu K’un-I in 1902, successful modernization in China 
became more and more unlikely. The three concrete achievements under the Dowager 
were merely the abolition of the 'Eight-legged' essays and the old civil-service 
examinations system, the establishment of modernized schools, and the dispatching of 
students overseas.18  
  
 
The Constitutional Movement from 1905 to 1911 
 
Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 could be felt to symbolize the fact 
that because “Japan’s constitutional monarchy defeated Russia’s Tsarist autocracy, 
constitutionalism seemed to have proved itself as a basis for unity between rulers and 
ruled in a national effort,”19 and this stimulated constitutionalism in China. In the 
meantime, in the political situation in China, the central government actively 
undertook a dual reform that included administrative modernization and 
constitutionalism. Non-officially there were two main streams of political movement 
rooted overseas but which broadcast their thought to inland commoners. One was 
conservative and called Bo-uhung-dang 保皇黨 (the Royalist Party), led by K’ang 
Yu-Wei and Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao, and which insisted on keeping loyal to the emperor by 
means of constitutionalism. The other was aggressive/progressive, called 
Ger-min-dang 革命黨 (the Revolutionary Party), led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and which 
advocated toppling the Ch’ing Court by means of revolution and creating a new 
Republican government. 
   
Under the urgent domestic cause of constitutionalism, while other administrative 
reforms were undertaken, the court dispatched two official missions overseas in 1906 
to study the constitutions in Western countries. One visited Germany and the U.S.A., 
and the other visited Japan. England, and France. As a result, the Empress Dowager 
promised a 'constitutional polity' and proclaimed a set of principles to guide a 
                                                 
17 For the detailed content of the suggestions see Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New 
York, 1970), pp. 490-492. 
18 Ibid., p. 492. 
19 Fairbank, John King & Reischauer, Edwin O. China: Tradition and Transformation. (revised edition) 
(U.S.A., 1989), p. 400. 
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nine-year programme to prepare for a constitutional self-government.20 However, the 
Empress Dowager, a figure with tremendous influence, died on November 15 1908, 
and the Emperor Kung-Hsu, at the age of thirty-seven, mysteriously died one day 
before her death.  
   
Owing to the emperor’s death, China lost its best chance to transfer to a constitutional 
monarchy, and the advocacy of a benevolent, enlightened monarchical institution by 
the conservative faction lost popularity too. The regime was left in the hands of 
ignorant but vainglorious Manchu princes. The three-year-old Pu-Yi, the Empress 
Dowager’s grand-nephew, succeeded to the throne and reigned as the Emperor 
Hsüan-Tung (1909-1911), with his father, the second Prince Ch’un, as the regent. At 
this time, the reforms in China were too slow and too grudging to solve the 
contemporary problems. In particular, the central government needed coordination to 
dominate administration by establishing a cabinet, which consisted of a prime 
minister and eleven departments. Eventually, with anti-Han Chinese sentiments, the 
regent Prince Ch’un organized a so-called ‘Royal Cabinet' and assigned eight 
Manchus (with five imperial relatives), one Mongol bannerman, and only four Han 
people as ministers in the cabinet. The incredible ineptitude of the appointments 
generated disillusion and disappointment and the majority of Han Chinese were 
firmly convinced that real constitutionalism under Manchu leadership was impossible 
to achieve. Later on, the Revolution of 1911 (also called Double Tenth Revolution) 
led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, overthrew the Ch’ing Dynasty into the dust and ashes of 
history and established the Chinese Republic at Nanking on January 1 1912. From 
then on, China faced another stage in its modernization. 
 
 
 
 
♣♣♣♣♣                  
 
In short, in this consequent phase from 1895 to 1911, the path to modernization was 
winding and tortuous, even though China had the Hundred Day Reforms in 1898, and 
the Reform and Constitutional Movement from 1901 to1911. However, these reforms 
proved that under the Ch’ing court, which was an alien dynasty wherein the rulers 
always placed Manchu interest over the country and its people, it was impossible for 
China to achieve success in its modernization.  
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 401. In the programme of constitutional polity, the court prepared to convene the 
consultative provincial assemblies in 1909 and the constitutional national assembly in 1910 and within 
nine years to set up a constitutional government.   
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Because of lack of support from the ignorant, conservative and selfish key figure, the 
Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi, 21  and ineffective imperial leadership, the central 
government was merely passive and merely undertook superficially some piecemeal 
improvements, not full-scale reforms. Especially after the Boxer Uprising, the 
confrontations between constitutionalism, nationalism (revolutionist) and 
provincialism became more serious. When people witnessed the hopelessness of the 
Manchu leadership and transferred their sympathy and support from constitutionalist 
to revolutionist, the ultimate downfall of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911 was inevitable.  
 
 
5.1.2. Japan 
 
The reforms in the consequent phase in Japan could be divided into two stages for 
which the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) marked a major divider and milestone. 
 
 
Reforms executed in the decade between the Sino-Japanese War and the 
Russo-Japanese War (1895-1905)  
 
As mentioned above, after the Sino-Japanese War, Japan felt threatened by Russia as 
the Tripartite Intervention prevented the Japanese from colonizing the Liaotung 
Peninsula and obtaining benefits in Manchuria. Russia, nearing completion of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, intended to secure permanent control of Manchuria and 
northern Korea. Under this international situation, Japan focused on preparation for 
war against Russia but still firmly undertook the reforms below. 
   
In the diplomatic field, in 1899 Japan successfully removed extraterritorial rights and 
the most-favored-nation clause. It actively participated in international affairs such as 
dispatching an expedition to China to suppress the Boxer Uprising in 1900 and was 
                                                 
21 People might wonder as to why the Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi could play such an important role 
and for so long at the end of the Ch’ing dynasty (1861-1908). As Immanuel Hsu points out “The 
question naturally arises as to how a single woman could wield such supreme power and remain at the 
pinnacle for so long, in contravention of dynastic laws and practices. The answer may partially be 
found in her consummate skill in political manipulation.”  Her success can be attributed to three 
stratagems. First she governed the royal members with the imperial family law, and mercilessly sent 
offenders to the Imperial clan Court for punishment and treated them with severity and terror to 
demand their submission. Secondly, to the Chinese officials she stressed the Confucian concepts of the 
proper relationship between the ruler and the subjects and the importance of filial piety. Thirdly she 
played a game of power balance between the Manchu and Han officers in order to secure and wield the 
supreme power in the central government. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New 
York, 1970), pp. 368-374.  
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rewarded with certain benefits in the Treaty of Boxer Protocol in 1901. Out of mutual 
interest, Japan made an ally of Britain and signed the historic Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1902, partly in order to confront Russia with greater confidence. In 
1903-1904 Japan launched a series of negotiations with Russia and obtained a fairly 
free hand in Korea, in return offering to recognize Russian rights only in the zones 
along the new railway in Manchuria. And during the war against Russia that followed 
in 1904-1905, it secretly asked President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States to 
mediate, putting Japan in a position of strength to win benefits after the war.22 These 
actions proved that Japan thoroughly understood how to secure national interests by 
means of diplomacy – a kind of Western way. 
   
In the political situation, after the ruling party Kenseitō (憲政党) had divided into two 
parts in 1898, party politics in Japan gradually formed. The leader of the 
Rikkenseiyūkai (立憲政友会), Katsura Tarō (1847-1913), was in charge of forming the 
Cabinet from June 1901 to 1907, and the political situation became relatively calm 
and stable. Even though there was anti-war thought led by Kōtoku Shūsui 
(1871-1911), Sakai Toshihiko (1870-1933), and the Christian Uchimura Kanzō 
(1861-1930) around 1903, owing to the victory in the Sino-Japanese War nationalism, 
in which scholars advocated Japan's national interests and and strongly supported 
expansion into the Asian Continent, became the mainstream thought and greatly 
influenced both intellectuals and common people nationwide.23 This ideology played 
an important role in promoting Japan’s future militarism and imperialism.  
   
Concerning the legal system, during this stage Japan promulgated part of the Civil 
Code (the Property Code), the Tax Law on Brewing Win,e and the Law on Monopoly 
of the Sale of Tobacco in 1896; proclaimed the Monetary System which was based on 
the Gold Standard in 1897 and another part of the Civil Code (the Family Code) in 
1898; revised the Commercial Law and the Law of Appointment and Dismissal of 
Civil Servants (bunkanninyōrei 文官任用令) in 1899; created the Law of Military 
Ministers on Active Service in the Military Department (gunbudaijin genekibukansei 
軍部大臣現役武官制) and the Law of Security Police in 1900; revised the Conscription 
Ordinance to postpone the draft age in 1904; and proclaimed martial law in 1905.  
 
In the military, because of preparation(s) for what was seen by Japan as an inevitable 
                                                 
22 Henshall, Kenneth G.. A History of Japan: from Stone Age to Superpower (New York, 2004), p. 94. 
23 There were two streams of thought in Japan in 1873, one was the theory of human right, and the 
other was the theory of national right. Later on these contemporary thoughts including Europeanism, 
democratization, modern nationalism and Japanese nationalism merged into so-called nationalism 
around 1904-5. See Hamashima, Mashiaki浜島正昭. eds. Shinshō Nihonshizusetsu(新詳日本史図説 
New Vision of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 1998), p. 197. 
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war with Russia, over half of the annual income from 1897 went on military 
expenditure to produce ammunition, weapons and other logistic materials; the naval 
fleet was expanded to 'six by six' (six battleships and six heavy cruisers, 
rokurokukantai六六艦隊), and the United Fleet (rengōkantai 連合艦隊) was organized 
in 1903.24  
   
In industry, light industry boomed after the Sino-Japanese War. In particular, in the 
preparations for the unpreventable Russo-Japanese War, in order to enlarge munitions 
the government invested in the Yahata Steel Factory (八幡製鉄所) in 1902 and quickly 
developed steel and chemical industries, which made a good foundation for the 
development of heavy industry afterwards. The increase in the numbers of factories in 
different industries from 1876 till 1902 is shown below.25
 
 Before 
1876 
  
1877-85 
  
1886-94 
A.) 
1895-1902
B.) 
Numbers of 
factories 
A.) ⁄ B.) 
   
  % 
Silk mills    82    304    796   1,296   2,478  52.3 
Spinning 
mills  
   1    22    59   125   207  60.4 
Match 
production  
   6    21    70   115   212  54.2 
Textile mills    123    94    454   959   1,630  58.8 
Vessels and 
vehicles 
factories 
  
   18 
        
 
   10    
 
   15 
   
  30 
 
  73 
 41.1 
Tobacco 
industry 
   77 
       
   23    79   184   363  50.7 
Pottery 
industry 
   116    59    104   156   435  35.9 
Publishing 
industry 
   12     44    70   88   214  41.1 
Brewing 
industry 
   208     21    59   76   364  20.9 
Mechanical 
production 
industry 
        
    8   
    
   17  
    
   51 
 
  60 
   
  136 
 44.1 
Paper 
production 
industry 
   
    5 
 
   4 
 
   22 
 
  51 
 
  82 
 62.2 
Total    656    619   1,779   3,140   6,194  50.7 
 
   
                                                 
24 Kanabako, Yoshiaki金箱芳明, eds. Nihonshi sōran 日本史総覧 (The Conspectus of Japanese 
History) (Tokyo, 2001), p. 253. 
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In the educational field, Japan established the Imperial University of Kyoto in 1897, 
the National Art Institution in 1898, and the Women's University in 1901. As well, it 
promulgated the Orders for Professional Schools, High Schools, and Private Schools. 
Japan also established the National Textbooks System in 1903 and adopted designated 
textbooks for education in schools. 
   
In another aspects, the Association of Japanese Painting was formed in 1896, and the 
Association of Studying Social Problems and the Labor Union in 1897. The magazine 
Chūōkōron ( 中 央 公 論 ) was published in 1899 and the Friends of Music 
(Ongakunotomo 音楽之友) in 1901. As well, modern forms of literature started to 
spread rapidly from this time. 
    
 
Reforms from the Russo-Japanese War to the death of Emperor Meiji 
(1905-1912)      
 
From the Russo-Japanese War, through the mediation of the President of the United 
States, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Treaty of Portsmouth signed on September 5 
1905, Japan obtained a number of benefits, including recognition of Japan’s 
‘paramount interest’ in Korea; the Russian lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and the 
Russian-built South Manchurian Railway as far north as Chanchun; the southern half 
of Sakhalin island and several small attached islets; fishery rights around the Sea of 
Okhotsk and the Kamchaka Peninsula; and restoration at least in theory of China’s 
sovereignty and administration in Manchuria.26 However, it was the failure to demand 
an indemnity from Russia that disappointed the public in Japan, eventually causing 
the so-called Riot of Hibiya (Hibiya yakiuchi jiken 日比谷 焼き打ち 事件)27 in 1905. 
   
Encouraged by defeating two vast nations, China and Russia, within a decade, Japan 
therefore not only had become a modern nation but also learned from the West how to 
join the Imperialist Powers. In order to control the political situation in Korea, Japan 
established a superintendency (tōkanfu 統監府), firstly led by Itō Hirobumi from 1906 
to 1910, but soon he was assassinated by a Korean nationalist An Jū-Kon (1879-1910) 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Ibid., p. 185. 
26 Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. Japan: Tradition & Transformation. (Sydney, 1979), p. 
188, and Ishii Susumu 石井進. eds. 詳説日本史 Shōsetsu Nihonshi (A Detailed Japanese History) 
(Tokyo, 2000), p. 271. 
27 Due to the failure to win an indemnity from Russia, the rioters gathered together around the National 
Assembly Building and caused violence. See Ishii Susumu石井進 . eds. 詳説日本史  Shōsetsu 
Nihonshi (A Detailed Japanese History), pp. 271-272.   
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in 1909.28 However, Japan annexed Korea in August 1910 without any protest from 
the Western Powers. The great Emperor Meiji died in 1912, Emperor Taishō (r. 
1912-1926) came to the throne and from then on, Japan became a real militarist and 
imperialist nation, with important colonies in Taiwan, South Manchuria, Korea, and 
soon after World War I broke out occupying the former German colonies in 
Micronesia, China, Kiaochow Bay and the port of Tsingtao on the south coast of 
Shantung. The policy of aggression towards its neighboring countries was carried out 
till the end of World War II in 1945.  
   
Principal achievements during 1906-1912 were that the relationship with Britain 
became closer after the war and treaties were signed with the Western Powers that 
fully restored tariff autonomy to Japan in 1911. According to the expanding policy of 
imperial national defence, Japan intended to expand from 17 to 25 divisions in the 
army and an 'eight by eight' fleet in the navy from 1907.29 The Law of State-owned 
Railways and the Medical Act were promulgated in 1906 and the Factory Code and 
the Electrical Industry Code in 1911. In industry, without doubt the light industries 
continued to boom in this stage. At the same time, owing to the demand for 
armaments iron, steel, and chemical heavy industries were rapidly developed. In 
particular, the Japan Steel Factory was set up by private enterprise to facilitate the 
quality and quantity of steel products; the technique of shipbuilding had reached first 
class around the world; and electric light in the big cities became popular because 
many electric plants were constructed. In education, six years compulsory primary 
education was enacted; the Imperial Northeast University (tōhoku daigaku 東北帝国大
学) and the Nara Higher Women’s Normal School were established in 1907 and 1908 
respectively. In other aspects, the Tōyō Reclamation Company was formed in 1908, 
the Labor Union Centre in 1909, and the Association of National Athletes in 1911.  
   
However, concerning social movements, the High Treason Incident (Taigyaku jiken 
大逆事件) happened in 1910. In this incident hundreds of left-wing sympathizers were 
under suspicion in connection with a plot to assassinate the Emperor. As a result, 
twenty-four were sentenced to death, of which twelve were executed in 1911 and the 
remaining twelve had their sentences commuted.30 After that, a so-called ‘thought 
police’, a Special Higher Police Force, was established to supervise people’s thoughts. 
It can be said that Japan increasingly lacked real democracy after the incident.31
                                                 
28 Miyahara Takeo 宮原武夫. ed. Nihon no rekishi 日本の歴史 (Japan’s History), (Tokyo, 1989), p. 
182-183. 
29 The so-called Eight by Eight Fleet consisted of eight battleships and eight heavy cruisers to form a 
fleet; see Ishii 石井進. eds. 詳説日本史 Shōsetsu Nihonshi (A Detailed Japanese History), p. 294. 
30 Henshall, Kenneth G.. A History of Japan: from Stone Age to Superpower (New York, 2004), p. 96. 
31 Idem. 
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♣♣♣♣♣ 
 
In a nutshell, within the consequent phase from 1895 to 1912, Japan’s modernization 
was underway, and in particular the Russo-Japanese War was an indication that Japan 
was able to play the game of imperialism side by side with the Western powers. 
During this time, party politics were gradually substituted for the oligarchy that was in 
charge of the practical ruling power at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration. Sound 
legal systems were established step by step and the modernized army and navy were 
capable of accomplishing the national goals when needed. Educational systems had 
been established and the government actively constructed many schools; the 
educational diffusion among commoners reached a high standard internationally. In 
the industries, light industry boomed after the Sino-Japanese War and heavy industry 
including iron, steel, shipbuilding and chemicals also provided a good foundation for 
development in the future. 
   
However, because Japan won victories twice against China and Russia within a 
decade, an ideology of nationalism prevailed in society. In addition, the government 
suppressed the left-wing party, the Japan Social Party, and created the Special Higher 
Police Force to supervise people’s thoughts. The progress of democracy in Japan was 
hindered. As well, the military ministers expanded their power rapidly and the 
colonies of Taiwan, Korea and South Manchuria were governed under a military 
governor-general (Taiwan sōtofu 台 湾 総 都 府 , Chōsen sōtofu 朝 鮮 総 都 府 , Kantō 
totokufu 関東都督府). Therefore it was obvious that Japan headed toward militarism 
and imperialism after achieving its national goal, 'rich nation and strong army'.   
 
 
5.2. Comparison and analysis 
 
When comparing the differences in modernization in China and Japan in this 
consequent phases, we note the features below. 
 
1. The transformation of national strength: As mentioned above, the result of the 
Sino-Japanese War was a watershed of modernization for both nations. After 
the war, their respective statuses in international society were quite different: 
for China it became weaker and weaker day by day and China faced the threat 
of the acceleration of imperialism to partition off parts of the nation; but for 
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Japan, it not only freed itself from extraterritoriality after 1894 and regained 
the right of tariff autonomy after 1911, but it also joined the imperialist group 
in invading its neighboring countries. Thus it could be said Japan that 
achieved its national goal of 'rich nation and strong army' but China did not. 
2. Talented and capable political figures: Even though in China people had 
known that Westernization was an important policy for survival and wanted to 
follow Japan’s steps in reconstructing the nation, the hindrances which came 
from the Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi and the Manchurian nobility in 
safeguarding their private interests prevented the progress of China’s 
modernization. It could not be expected that modernization in China would be 
accomplished under the Manchu Dynasty. In particular, those key figures who 
advocated modernization faded away from their positions including Li 
Hung-Chang who died in 1901, Liu K’un-I in 1902; K’ang Yu-Wei and Liang 
Ch’i-Ch’ao escaped to Japan after the Hundred Day Reforms; the Emperor 
Kung-Hsu mysteriously died in 1908, and Chang Chih-Tung in 1909. There 
were no talented people any more in the government who could take over 
responsibilty for the reforms. Furthermore, it was ridiculous that the court still 
wanted a puppet regime with the appointment of the three-year-old Pu-Yi to 
succeed to the throne and a ‘Royal Cabinet’ to respond to the contemporary 
crisis. Inevitably, the Revolution of 1911 occurred and replaced the Ch’ing 
Establishment in China and from then on modernization continued to be 
carried out by those new revolutionary rulers.                                          
In Japan, although the ruling power was generally transferred from the 
oligarchy to party politics in this phase, many enlightened and talented elder 
statesmen (genrōseijika 元老政治家) still served in the government including 
the long-established figures Itō Hirobumi, Matsukata Masayoshi, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, Itagaki Taisuke, andYamagata Aritomo who were still making 
efforts either covertly or overtly. Also the new Prime Ministers of the Cabinet 
from 1901 to 1912, Katsura Tarō (1847-1913) and Saionji Kinmochi 
(1849-1940), were experienced in Westernization. Thus probably it could be 
said that one of the key factors aiding successful modernization for Japan was 
an abundance of far-sighted statesmen in public service. 
3. Discontinuity and failures showed in China’s modernization but continuity and 
successes in Japan’s in this phase: Even though in the central government, 
China had The Hundred Day Reforms in 1898 and the Reform and 
Constitutional Movement from 1901 to 1911, the former failed and the latter 
consisted of piecemeal improvements within the Establishment that could not 
achieve a successful full-range of modernization. However, two victories in 
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the Sino-Chinese War and the Russo-Japanese War proved Japan’s great 
achievement in the fuller context of modernization, while reforms were 
executed continually and consistently from the beginning to the end of the 
Meiji Restoration and the national strength had grown rapidly. 
4. Comparing the contents of reforms in both nations: As Fairbank points out, in 
this phase China had thoroughly perceived that “It was emphasized that in 
learning the techniques of government and law from foreign countries, one 
should learn the whole rather than pay attention to small details. The 
administration explained that ‘in order to achieve wealth and power for the 
nation, it is certainly necessary to learn politics and law from foreign 
countries'.”32 However, because of obstacles in the form of the Empress 
Dowager and the Manchu nobility who were pursuing private interests, as well 
as the regionalism of provincial governors in general among the Han officers, 
modernization in these days merely achieved several piecemeal improvements 
but not the full-range of institutional reforms of Westernization. In particular 
the Ch’ing court was unwilling to establish a constitutional monarchy in China. 
In the 'Outline of a Constitution' (hsien-fa-ta-kang 憲法大綱) the governing 
power of the executive, legislative and judiciary was still actually in the 
emperor’s hand. Thus the outline was merely an instrument, by which the 
court intended to continue Manchu rule and consolidate their power but which 
seriously disappointed the people day after day till the Revolution of 1911.              
As to Japan, the Meiji government continued to carry out a full range of 
reforms towards modernization with decisiveness. In diplomatic affairs, it had 
shaken free from extraterritoriality and the most-favored-nation situation and 
regained the right of tariff autonomy. In politics, based on the constitutional 
monarchy, party politics were formed along with a Cabinet system to execute 
administrative responsibility. In the legal system, Japan had promulgated a 
sound legal system, which mainly included the Constitution, Civil Code, the 
Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Act, Commercial Code and the Code 
of Civil Procedure. In the military, a modern navy and army had been set up. 
And in industry, light industry was well developed and made a good 
foundation for developing heavy industry. Without doubt, Japan had carried 
out successful modernization and attained the goal of 'rich nation and strong 
army' within the Meiji Period, underscored by victories in the Sino-Japanese 
War and the Russo-Japanese War. 
5. The indemnity from the war was a huge debt to China but an asset to Japan. 
                                                 
32 Fairbank, John King & Liu, Kwang-Ching eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11: Late 
Ch’ing, 1800~1911, Part 2 (London, 1980), p. 381. 
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Ch’ing China had an annual revenue of 89 million taels around that time, but 
according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it had to pay an amount of 200 
million taels for indemnity and later an extra 30 million taels for the cost of 
restoring the Liaotung Peninsula, for which China had to borrow a lot of 
money and pay interest of about 4-5% to those creditor countries after 1895.33 
In addition, in the Boxer Protocol, China had to pay an indemnity of 450 
million taels (equal to 67.5 million pounds) and with 4% annual interest to the 
allied nations, which included Japan with 34,793,100 taels of it.34 These huge 
amounts of indemnity made a heavy financial burden and prevented China’s 
progress towards modernization in almost every aspect. Thus China was the 
victim and on the contrary Japan was a beneficiary from wars. And Japan 
could continue to develop its modernization and presently expand its territory 
to colonize Taiwan, annex Korea, receive benefits in Manchuria from Russia 
and occupy Germany’s former colonies in Shantung and elsewhere.   
6. The trend of modernization development: Slow and inefficient modernization 
brought China failures, degradation and disintegration time after time from 
1839 to 1911. Under the alien regime of the Ch’ing dynasty, the despairing 
people of China transferred their support from renewal in the Establishment to 
a revolution. The new revolutionary leader Sun Yat-Sen, who advocated using 
the so-called “Three Principles of the People”,35 finally overthrew the Manchu 
imperial Establishment by the Double Tenth Revolution in 1911.  
After that, China faced a new era in its modernization.                                   
By contrast, Japan's rapid and successful modernization brought the nation 
pride, respect, upgrading, and integration. Japanese nationalism especially 
overwhelmed the nation after the victories in the wars against China and 
Russia. After that, Japan marched forward to militarism and imperialism until 
the end of World War II in 1945.  
7. China started to learn modernization in this phase: Japan had continually 
borrowed from Chinese civilization for over a thousand years thus far, 
however, owing to its successful modernization in the Meiji Period, many 
Chinese students now studied in Japan from 1901, and in the peak year of 
1906, the number of students reached from six to twenty thousand. Using 
                                                 
33 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), pp. 407-408. 
34 Ibid., p. 481. 
35  'The three principles of the people (san-min- chu-i 三 民 主 義 ) ' (min-zu-chu-i 民 族 主 義 , 
min-zhu-chu--i民主主義, min-seng-chu-i 民生主義) means to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and 
imperial institution by a nationalistic revolution, to establish a republic and popular sovereignty by a 
democratic revolution, and to equalize the land rights and prevent the defects of capitalism. Ibid., p. 
540. 
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conservative contemporary estimates the numbers are shown below36: 
 
                      Chinese Students in Japan: 
 
1901 280 
1903 1,000 
1904 1,300 
1905 8,000 
1906 8,000 
1907 7,000 
1908 4,000 
1909 4,000 
1912 1,400 
    
   
At the same time, according to statistics compiled by a Chinese scholar, 
Tsuen-Hsuin Tsien, “during the period 1880 to 1940, in total nearly 2,204 works 
were translated from Japanese… A study of trends in translation shows that in 
overall influence Japanese translations formed only 15.1 per cent of the total 
from 1850 to 1889, and 18.2 per cent from 1912 to 1940, but that they came to 
60.2 percent from 1902 to 1904."37 It was obvious that Chinese intellectuals 
started to study Western culture and knowledge through Japan during this stage. 
Even most reform policies within the Hundred Day Reforms and the Reform 
and Constitutional Movement at the end of the Ch’ing dynasty from 1901 to 
1911 within this phase were replicated from the modernized Japanese-style 
institution and system.  
In short, all these facts clearly showed that China started to learn modernization 
after Japan’s progress in the consequent phase. Without doubt, the way forward 
to modernization in Japan had been faster and more efficient than in China. 
                                        
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
In the 'competition of modernization' of both nations, it was obvious that Japan had 
achieved a successful modernization within the time of one generation from 1868 to 
1912. Japan’s modernization had shown features of continuity, integrity, and 
accumulation and acceleration. Many far-sighted statesmen who put their best efforts 
                                                 
36 Fairbank, John King & Liu, Kwang-Ching eds., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11: Late 
Ch’ing, 1800~1911, Part 2 (London, 1980), p. 350. 
37 Ibid., p. 362. 
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into pushing Japan towards the national goal of 'rich nation and strong army' served in 
the government and took charge of the reforms in every aspect. And most policies 
they adopted were suitable for contemporary situations. Moreover, the vitality of the 
common people was also a perfect match in the pursuit of modernization in the fields 
of industry and business, education, social movement, literature, culture and arts, and 
other aspects. However, it seems regrettable that Japan chose the path towards 
imperialism and militarism. This was largely because Japan was so proud of its 
victories in two wars and started to suppress the social movement in order to prevent 
democracy.  
   
The Japanese scholar Kuwabara Takeo points out that “there are six prerequisites for 
successful modernization”:38
 
• Democracy should be rooted in politics. 
• Capitalism should be cultivated in the economy. 
• Industrialization should facilitate manufacturing industries.  
• Compulsory education of the people should be sought. 
• National forces should be established in the military. 
• Liberation from community (basically meaning individualism and putting 
tradition out of the way when necessary) should be deep-seated in people’s minds.  
   
In reviewing modernization in the Meiji period, we can see that Japan almost realized 
all prerequisites except full democracy. By any account, it could be said Japan did not 
realize democracy in its politics until after World War II in 1945. 
   
However, Ch’ing China made a strong contrast with Japan. Even though it had the 
Hundred Day Reforms and the Reform and Constitutional Movement at the End of 
the Ch’ing Dynasty from 1901 to 1911, its path to modernization was winding and 
frustrated, mainly because of the ineffective imperial leadership in the central 
government, namely the Ch’ing court, especially the key figure Empress Dowager 
Tz'u-Hsi who was conservative, unenlightened, and selfish and controlled the 
supreme ruling power for over half a century. Thus to a large extent she must bear 
responsibility for the failure of modernization. As well, owing to lack of far-sighted 
statesmanship in the central bureaucracy and the reforms being adopted without a 
centrally-controlled, full-scale blueprint, the reforms for modernization showed 
merely piece-meal improvements, discontinuity, and inefficiency. Also the ethnic 
                                                 
38 Kuwabara Takeo桑原武夫. ed. Meiji ishin to kindaika 明治維新と近代化(Meiji Restoration and 
Modernization ) (Tokyo, 1984), pp. 208-209 
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antipathy and power-struggling between Manchu and Han officers damaged 
cooperation in officialdom and hindered modernization too.  
   
At the same time the external threats became more serious day by day, and especially 
after the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War the scramble for concessions became more 
crucial. The Boxer Uprising gave rise to the occupation of Peking by the 
Eight-Nations Allied Troops with a resultant great amount of indemnity compensation 
and the granting of other rights to these nations, and also causing Russia to occupy 
Manchuria, which finally brought about the Russo-Japanese War. All these matters 
revealed that the Ch’ing government had little ability to respond to repeated 
contemporary challenges internally and externally. Thus it could be said that it seems 
the Ch’ing government did not achieve a successful modernization. The main power 
was transferred from government to non-government after the Revolution of 1911. It 
was from then on that China faced a new era, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen advocated the so-called 
'Three Principles of the People' and led the Chinese people to march forward along 
the path to modernization of a new China, namely the Republic of China.  
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Chapter Six: 
 
Lessons from history 
 
 
This chapter aims to search for the whys and wherefores of success and failure as well 
as to establish the key factors in Japan’s 'catching up' and China’s 'slowing down' on 
their paths to modernization from around 1840 to 1912. Moreover, in theory, a set of 
criteria could be established to examine the best principles to be followed when 
attempting to assimilate oneself with others during a transformation procedure from 
traditional practice to modernization. These principles could be learnt from history 
and be applied to under-developed countries around the world today.   
 
 
6.1. An examination of the whys and wherefores of success and failure in 
modernization related to the 'catching up' in Meiji Japan and the 'slowing down' 
in late Ch’ing China  
 
I have carried out a comparison of the modernization of China and Japan through the 
influence derived from their legacies and the three phases of 'formative', 'operative' 
and 'consequent’, and have discussed the advantages and disadvantages in the 
conclusion of each chapter relating to these phases.  
   
However, before I made my own humble contribution, many great scholars had 
already published their own views about modernization in Ch’ing China and Meiji 
Japan, and discussed the merits and demerits during the process either individually or 
comparatively. However, different scholars might have either the same or different 
opinions on this issue depending on their various observations from their various 
perspectives. Their comments from several books are given here below. 
    
 
6.1.1. Scholars' comments on the reforms of Meiji Japan 
 
A Japanese scholar, Kuwabara Takeo, thinks that the eleven most important 
conditions, which could be treated as prerequisites, and which made Japan’s 
modernization successful, are as follows.1  
                                                 
1 Kuwabara, Takeo桑原武夫, ed. Meiji ishi to kindaika 明治維新と近代化 (Meiji Restoration and 
Modernization ) (Tokyo, 1984), pp. 210-211. 
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1. Having good geographical conditions. 
2. Being an independent state, as Japan was in the Tokugawa Period. 
3. Being a racially homogeneous nation as well as a secluded and safe society. 
4. Having had a well established feudal society. 
5. Having had peace lasting over 250 years. 
6. Having a high rate of educational diffusion.  
7. Having a high degree of national unity and almost all people in the nation 
using the Japanese language. 
8. Having had no prior philosophy because Japanese people disfavored abstract 
theories. 
9. Being adaptable. 
10. Having relative powerlessness among religions. 
11. Abolishing the status system in society.  
 
A Western scholar, Professor Kenneth Henshall, summarized the key practices in the 
Meiji Period, as partially abstracted below.2
 
1. Incorporation of the strengths of a potential threat. 
2. Ability to mix old and new, native and foreign. 
3. ‘Japanisation’ of many foreign elements. 
4. Pragmatism. 
5. ‘Freedom within limits’. 
6. Willingness to learn. 
7. Determination to succeed. 
8. Single-mindedness of purpose. 
9. Confucianism (Japanese-style). 
10. Strengthening nationalism. 
11. Revival of reverence for the emperor. 
12. Economic astuteness. 
13. A widespread tendency to be guided by authority. 
14. Control of the worldview through propaganda and education. 
 
 
6.1.2. Scholars' comments on the reforms of late Ch’ing China 
 
The Chinese scholar Immanuel Hsu takes cognizance of the following key factors as 
bringing about China's slow-down on the way to modernization. 
                                                 
2 Henshall, Kenneth G.. A History of Japan: from Stone Age to Superpower (New York, 2004), p. 105. 
  105 
 
 
Limitations of the Self-Strengthening Movement mainly comprised:3
 
1. Lack of coordination. 
2. Limited vision of the advocates. 
3. Shortage of capital. 
4. Foreign imperialism. 
5. Technical backwardness and moral degradation. 
6. Social and psychological inertia. 
 
Causes of the failure of the Hundred Day Reform mainly comprised:4
 
1. The reformers’ inexperience. 
2. The power of the Empress Dowager Tz’u-Hsi who opposed the fundamental 
reform. 
3. The conservative opposition. 
 
Finally, he concluded that the obvious reasons for China’s hampered modernization 
and restricted absorption of new ideas from abroad in the late Ch’ing dynasty 
included:5  
 
1. The vast territorial jurisdiction. 
2. Poor communications. 
3. A self-sufficient economy. 
4. An almost total lack of any tradition of borrowing from aboard. 
5. The conservative intellectual posture. 
6. Feeble leadership (lack of far-sighted statesmanship) and faulty institutions. 
7. Manchu suspicion of the Chinese (Han officers) in officialdom. 
8. Ignorance of the nature of the Western challenge. 
9. National and international turmoil, and insufficient capital. 
10. The impact of the foreign role. (The West did not allow China to modernize 
successfully or to gather the strength to expel them out of the Far East.)  
  
An American scholar, John K. Fairbank, analyzes the following reasons which 
possibly made China’s modernization slow down.6
                                                 
3 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), pp. 347-352. 
4 Ibid., pp. 454-457. 
5 Ibid., pp. 530-536. 
6 See Fairbank et al.China: Tradition and Transformation. (rev. edition) (U.S.A., 1989), pp. 386-390. 
  106 
 
 
1. The Western powers seemed seldom to have any interest in great changes in 
China; rather they preferred to prop up the old order of the Ch’ing dynasty 
in order to secure their own interests in the country. 
2. The mid-nineteenth century rebels, in particular the Taiping rebels who 
could be said to constitute a kind of reform group and who advocated an 
anti-Manchu policy, were potentially nationalistic but lacked modern ideas 
and showed little ability to push China’s modernization ahead. 
3. The Self-Strengthening Movement thereafter was more defensive than 
creative, a conservative compromise avoiding radical modernization. 
4. The Hundred Day Reformers though their adoption of reforms were 
potentially revolutionary, but saw themselves as loyal ministers of the 
dynasty within in the Establishment. 
5. The empire’s bankruptcy of leadership demonstrated that the unenlightened 
Manchu nobles had little ability to face up to the contemporary crisis and 
made merely vain efforts in the last decade (1900-1911) of the Ch’ing 
dynasty. 
6. Talent was simply not devoted on any large scale to purposes of real 
revolution or reform before 1900: in other words, there was a lack of 
talented people with modern ideas to serve in government.  
7. The overall cohesion and structural ponderousness of Chinese civilization 
basically inhibited the country from making a rapid response to the Western 
menace.  
8. China’s remarkable imperviousness to foreign stimuli resulted from the 
following factors. 
• China was not equipped with the same conditions as Japan, which 
already had the essential ingredients of modern nationalism in a 
people ready to strive together for national goals within this period. 
• The self-sufficient economy in China prevented it from borrowing 
industrialization from the West. 
• The situation was that, unlike in the coastal cities, most elites in the 
dense populations of inland regions such as the Hunan and 
Szechwan provinces were relatively conservative; they still 
maintained traditional attitudes and talents from their training in the 
Classics, and were beyond the influence of the West. As a result, 
most of them did not participate in the process of modernization.  
• China’s institutions were well balanced and kept equilibrium among 
three strata: the monarch and officers, the landlord-scholar-gentry 
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class, and the illiterate farming populace. This was different from 
Japan, under the Tokugawa Shogunate feudal system, which already 
had such creative people as loyal domain administrators, merchant 
capitalists, scholars of Dutch learning and patriotic individual 
samurai who were together capable of creating a modern nation. In 
short, Chinese people were in the grip of their glorious past, unlike 
Japanese people who were eager to create a new modernized nation.  
• China was under the spell of her own great historical traditions such 
as the Confucian Classics, old customs, and the regulations 
established by the dynastic founder which could not be violated by 
the present ruler. All hindered its reforms. 
• There were two major characteristics in Chinese leaders: first, they 
had been trained to concentrate on internal affairs but were willfully 
ignorant and correspondingly contemptuous of external things. 
Second, China’s leaders were immune to nationalism because they 
were supporters of the idea of a universal state. In short, the 
bureaucrats in the government were trained to be loyal to the ruler 
and the past, thus they lacked a nationalistic spirit and a common 
sense of national purpose, thereby obstructing the formation of 
strong central leadership necessary for modernization.  
 
 
 
6.1.3. Scholars' comparative comments on the modernization(s) of both China 
and Japan  
 
An American scholar, Edwin O. Reischauer, feels that “Japan responded to the 
challenge of the West with much greater speed and far more success than China,”7 and 
sums up his comments in the final analysis as below.8
 
1. Under exposure to the superior guns of the West, the Japanese leaders rapidly 
realized the situation in that they should give up resistance and open the 
country to more foreign contact, in particular after the British defeated China 
in the Opium War of 1839-1842. 
2. No wars were fought, no smuggling trade developed, no territory was lost by 
Japan which was much more fortunate than China. In other words, Japan had a 
                                                 
7 Reischauer, Edwin O. & Craig, Albert M. Japan: Tradition & Transformation. (Sydney, 1979), p. 122. 
8 Ibid., Chapter Four, Japan’s Response to the West and Chapter Five, Modernization in Meiji Japan: in 
particular, see pp. 122-124. 
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relatively peaceful environment for its modernization. 
3. China was a unique land of civilization with a sense of superiority; it could not 
accept the multi-state international concepts of Europe, it did not believe that 
there was much of value to be learned from 'barbarians', and could not really 
see the seriousness of the challenge from the West. However, Japan did not 
have such a sublime sense of cultural superiority as China, but rather a 
nagging fear of inferiority, and they could readily see that there was much of 
great importance to be learned from the West.  
4. Most Japanese leaders, having an extreme sense of nationalism in the face of 
the foreign menace, seem to have placed national interests ahead of old feudal 
loyalties, but the officers and the landlord-scholar-gentry class in China were 
still restrained by the Confucian Classics and obsessed with their loyalty to the 
emperor rather than to the nation.   
5. The very decentralization and diversity of the Japanese political and social 
system also permitted a greater variety of responses than appeared in China. 
For example, the samurai class, scattered in more than 260 autonomous feudal 
regimes, showed a much keener appreciation of the superior military power of 
the West than did the Chinese civil bureaucracy. Moreover the samurai class, 
constituting around six per cent of the total population, made efforts in the 
economy, the military, and administration, and produced a much wider 
spectrum of responses to the Western menace than did the relatively narrow 
higher bureaucracy and the elite of gentry degree-holders in China. 
6. Japan’s advantage was its extraordinary cultural homogeneity and economic 
and intellectual centralization. Because of Japan’s geographic isolation and 
much smaller size of terrain and population than China, unlike China, where 
inland areas were always unaware of the foreign threat, all parts of Japan 
responded immediately. With the relatively large size of the ruling class and 
high levels of political administration and economic integration, Japan had far 
more ability than China to carry out a unified, effective response to the West, 
once one had been decided upon. 
7. In China, under the dynastic institution, the basic political, social, intellectual, 
and even economic system had remained extraordinarily stable for a 
millennium. It was hard for China to adopt any other system from outside. But 
in Japan the very erosion of the foundation of the Tokugawa system provided 
an opportunity for the Japanese because the feudal social and political 
structure of the early seventeenth century was out-of-date and needed to be 
renewed. Thus once a new strength pushed forwards from outside it could set 
Japan in motion in a way much faster than in China. 
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8. The new leaders were a remarkable young group of men of far-sighted 
statesmanship who made accurate and adequate reforms for modernization 
which included establishing new political institutions, consolidating the new 
regime, developing the economy, business and industrialization, retrenching 
finance and carrying out tax reforms. As well, the leaders had realized from 
the start that social and intellectual modernization was the prerequisite to 
successful innovation in line with Westernization. Thus they carried out legal 
reforms, sought new knowledge by importing foreign experts from overseas, 
and made an effort in educational improvements. After their endeavours over 
two decades, the victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese 
War proved that Japan had reached its national goal of 'rich nation and strong 
army'. 
       
A Chinese scholar, Li En-Han, made a comparison between the Self-Strengthening 
Movement in China and the Meiji Restoration in Japan and he thought that, based on 
the following reasons, Japan was faster than China in its modernization.9  
 
1. Japan was an island country and communication and traffic were convenient, 
but China was a continental country with a vast territory and a huge 
population. Under these conditions, Japan would be more easily made ready 
for modernization than China. 
2. Japan was not a self-sufficient economic system [sic: this assertion is surely 
questionable], thus it needed to promptly introduce Western technologies and 
knowledge to improve its production.  
3. There was no smuggling of opium along the coastal region around Japan but 
China did have serious problems with this.        
4. There were no such things for Japan as war-indemnity or loss of territory and 
Japan experienced much better treatment from the West than China. 
5. Japan had learnt it was impossible to repel the West (the so-called 'barbarians') 
with its weak military so that it rapidly changed its attitude to compromise and 
started to learn from them. But China, until 1860, learnt almost nothing about 
the West and just indulged in its traditions and past.  
6. Japan had the experience of borrowing Chinese civilization and Dutch 
learning also had some significance in Japanese society, but China had fewer 
such experiences. 
7. Japan could undertake a full range of reforms for modernization, but China 
                                                 
9 See Chapter One in Li, En-Han 李恩涵, A Collectios of Studies on Chinese Modern History 
(chin-dai-shih-shi yen-chiu lun-chi 近代中國史事研究論集) (Taiwan, 1982), pp. 1-26. 
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only undertook reforms under the dynastic Establishment in order to retain the 
regime, and did not carry out a real political reform from the West. 
8. There was a big difference between the samurai class with its goal-oriented 
concept in Japan and the scholar-gentry class with a status-oriented concept in 
China. With the goal-oriented concept, the samurai in Japan put most of their 
efforts into the fulfillment of tasks but the status-oriented scholar-gentry class 
in China put their efforts into promotion in officialdom. 
9. It could be seen that there was nationalism in Japan but absolutely none in 
China.  
10. Through the influence of the traditional Confucian Classics, Chinese people 
were inclined to notice moral aspects but neglect material aspects; were aware 
of the existence of the family rather than that of the nation; took notice of the 
meaning of life but disregarded the development of business and industry. But 
compared with China, Japan was practical and, relatively speaking, had no 
such burden from its traditions. Thus it was easier for Japan than China to 
accept Westernization. 
11. Japan had a consolidated, centralized, and capable leadership to take charge of 
reforms but China did not. 
12. Japan had many far-sighted leaders with statesmanship who served in the 
government but relatively speaking, China did not.  
13. The national goal of 'rich nation and strong army' was firmly instituted in the 
hands of political elites and adopted policies had continually and constantly 
been executed in Japan, but this was not the case in China.     
    
 
6.2. A set of criteria to review the best principles for modernization 
 
John K. Fairbank says:10
 
Each generation’s historians have the task of presenting the past’s 
relevance to our present concerns. Human rights and legal procedure 
have become great issues in the United States. If we take them as 
criteria of modernity and find China even more imperfect than 
ourselves, we may well feel déjà vu. We have been here before, sitting 
in judgment on a largely unknown country from a great distance. 
 
According to this ideology and accompanied by the final conclusions within each 
                                                 
10 Fairbank, John K. The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985 (New York, 1986), p. 368. 
  111 
 
chapter (from Two to Five) in this thesis, plus the views of those scholars mentioned 
above in this chapter, I intend to set up theoretically a set of 'criteria' to examine what 
is the ideal 'model' to undertake for modernization or any kind of reform in a state 
today. Merely based on a comparison of two nations’ modernization, these criteria 
might not be enough to show the whole picture of exactly the right way to modernise. 
Bu they are worth referring to because “We have been here before, sitting in judgment 
on a large unknown country from a great distance.”  
   
1. Definitely, most important for modernization is that a consolidating central 
leadership has to be established. It needs a group of political elites, whether it 
is called an 'oligarchy' or what the renowned British historian Toynbee called 
'a creative minority', who are able to take charge of reforms and can play key 
positions in the central government on a large scale and for a long period of 
time. They should always put the national interest ahead of private interest; 
have a strong, willing and unyielding spirit to carry out the reforms, and be 
far-sighted statesmen. As well, they have to consider the following more 
carefully before initiating reforms: 
 
• The domestic situation, which includes the legacies from tradition 
involved in reforms, as well as the current political, economic, military, 
and social situations, which should be reexamined and evaluated. 
Moreover, they have to persuade the great majority to accept their 
advocacy of modernization with confidence. 
• External threats have to be precisely perceived in the early stage 
because threats could be considered as stimulation and initiate a new 
strength to develop a state for modernization. There are several better 
ways to understand the real external situations which mainly consist of: 
establishing a formal diplomatic relationship with foreign countries; 
dispatching diplomatic missions overseas; sending students aboard; 
bringing foreign experts to the country; and translating foreign 
knowledge, science, technology, philosophy and current events. 
• With a smart strategy to address oppositions from conservative and 
privileges-in-hand holders, the reformers could use communication and 
persuasion, negotiation and compromise but under acceptable 
circumstances, or use other crucial ways to rule them out.  
• The question of whether there should be reforms within the 
Establishment or a revolution to topple the old Establishment should 
be considered seriously. Because once a revolution against the 
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Establishment is carried out, the whole nation will pay a heavy price.  
 
2. Efficient executive organizations and advisory groups and respective 
monitoring/inspecting authorities should be created and: 
 
• The system of central and local governments, which is based on a 
sound well-educated bureaucracy, has to be efficient and incorruptible 
to carry out reforms.  
• The advisory groups should consist of those from industrial, 
professional and academic fields who can make appropriate 
suggestions relating to reforms to the government.   
• The monitpring/inspecting authorities, which have the right of 
impeachment, should constantly reexamine the results of the reforms 
and make comments or corrections to the government if necessary. 
 
3. Regarding reforms, the policies of reform should be feasible, adequate, 
efficient, and continual. Moreover, reforms should cover the full range of 
depth and breadth as well as being undertaken constantly, continually and 
insistently. If some mistakes are found, corrections or amendments should be 
implemented promptly without hesitation. Reforms including the following 
three layers should be precisely perceived: 
 
• The surface layer containing manufacturing technology of the military 
and light and heavy industries. 
• The middle layer containing the political structure and legal system. 
• A deep layer containing the type of philosophy, culture and ways of 
thinking. 
 
4. As for the common people, the late Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976) of 
the Chinese Communist Party had a slogan 'all service for the people' (yi-chieh 
wei-ren-ming fu-wu 一切為人民服務). The people are the foundation of the 
nation: any reforms without the support of the people cannot be expected to be 
satisfactory in the end. Thus in pursuit of successful reforms communication 
with the people and feedback from the people should take place.   
 
5. Once national goals have been decided, reformers must persevere with them 
until achieved; they should not abandon them or despair of achieving them. 
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6. By any account, any kind of reform eventually needs the people’s support. 
Perhaps if the reforms are launched by a creative minority and for reasons 
such as achieving social stability and a certain level of livelihood, people 
might lose some freedom at the beginning. However in the long term, 
sovereignty should be returned from the hands of oligarchy to the people. In 
short, inevitably any reforms have to be based on democracy, laws and 
institutions, which means that the majority of the people in the nation should 
take a full part in the policy-making and a sound legal system should be 
established, otherwise it is impossible to achieve the goals constantly and 
permanently.     
 
As a result, a chart in line with modernization or any kind of reform could be drawn 
up as in the Appendix. It should be flexible, adjustable and dynamic according to the 
different situations in different countries.  
 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
 
In theory, merits and demerits in the process of the modernization of China and Japan 
can be found and some precious lessons can be learned from both modern histories. 
These teachings could be applied to those who want to carry out their national 
modernization anywhere around the world. Therefore, hypothetically, a set of criteria 
could be established to re-examine what are the necessary conditions for the progress 
of modernization and a chart could be drawn to make a clear picture of a reasonable 
procedure of modernization. Whether these criteria and the chart as presented in this 
thesis are adequate, partly adequate, or not adequate at all, is, of course, a matter of 
debate, but I personally believe that in principle such lessons can be learned and such 
procedures followed. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the lingering river of human history the phenomenon of cultural assimilation has 
occurred frequently. However, when the Western countries came to the East in the 
nineteenth century in search of markets for their superabundant products resulting 
from industrialization, world history was totally changed. When the Occident, 
accompanied by a gunboat policy demanding the opening of ports for trading, 
encountered the Orient, East Asian countries from long existing civilized China to 
Japan, Korea, and Vietnam were shocked because such a thing had never happened in 
their history and nobody perceived what the essence of Western civilization was.  
   
In general, modern Western civilization might be said to have these characteristics: 
 
• Nationalism. 
• Democracy and a legal system of political institution. 
• Capitalism, in favor of mercantilism, and an emphasis on free competition in a 
free market. 
• Industrialization. 
• Modernized military troops and weapons. 
• Individualism and advocacy of human rights. 
• Scientific ways of thinking.   
   
  However, the characteristics of Oriental civilization have been: 
 
• The ideology of Confucianism. 
• Despotism and feudalism of a dynastic monarch or shogunate system in the 
political situation. 
• Sustaining a self-sufficient economic system and favouring physiocracy. 
• Traditional handicrafts manufacturing industries. 
• Traditional military troops and weapons. 
• Collectivism and the favouring of a family circle or clanship. 
• Reverence for tradition and submission to authority.  
   
Under the circumstances of an unexpected collision between these two different types 
of civilizations, nobody could imagine how those countries with an Oriental-cultural 
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background could respond properly to the West, particularly as the encounter was not 
by chance but by force. There was a potential menace from the Occident in the view 
of those East Asian countries.   
 
However, although the menace was a kind of crisis it was also a stimulus as well as 
encouragement for a nation’s innovation. To respond to the threats from the West 
these nations had to move to modernize themselves and there were two typical 
examples. One was a continental country with a vast territory and a huge population, 
namely China of the Ch’ing dynasty, and the other was an island with a relatively 
small territory and a small population, namely Meiji Japan. Through this thesis A 
Comparative Analysis of the Differences between Chinese and Japanese 
Modernization in the Mid-late Nineteenth Century, with Particular Regard to the Idea 
of ‘Rich Nation and Strong Army’, we can observe the way they responded to the 
challenge from the Western menace during the period 1840-1912. As a result of their 
responses, the former moved very slowly towards its national goal but the latter 
achieved a great success.1  
   
It is necessary to recognize the core of this issue of why Japan could be successful; 
and conversely why China moved so slowly. Through methodologies of comparison 
and analysis as well as from the observation of these dimensions including political, 
economic and financial, military, legal, communication and transportation, 
educational and cultural, and social and psychological fields, I have divided the topic 
into four temporal phases to compare these two nations’ processes of modernization. 
 
In the influences involved in the legacies (Chapter Two), we perceived that those 
elements of the legacies involved in territorial integrity, population and the political, 
military, economic and social situations in the Tokugawa Shogunate of Japan were 
relatively more conducive to modernization along Western lines than those in Ch’ing 
China. 
   
In the formative phase (Chapter Three), the central government of the Ch’ing Court 
and the regional provinces in China knew little and almost did nothing to respond to 
the menace of the West; by contrast, the Tokugawa Shogunate and the local daimyō 
had a deep sense of crisis and they had already launched a series of reforms under 
their regimes in this stage. In particular, the Restoration of Power to the Emperor on 
                                                 
1 I should emphasise that slowing down of modernization in China does not mean it did not achieve 
anything at all in its modernization. By the same token, Japan truly achieved great success in its 
modernization but democracy in politics and reverence for human rights, both with a special meaning 
in modernization, were not achieved in the Meiji period.   
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October 14 1867 and the Opening the Gates of Edo without Bloodshed in April 1868 
occurred. A bloodless revolution had taken place and the Meiji Restoration made its 
debut in Japanese modern history. 
   
In the operative phase (Chapter Four), both nations pursued a national goal of 'rich 
nation and strong army'. However, the Self-Strengthening Movement in Ch’ing China 
merely undertook a superficial reform primarily limited to military innovation and 
introduction of Western industrialization in order to retain the old dynastic stability. 
By contrast, Meiji Japan under the leadership of an oligarchy (a creative minority), 
launched a full range of reforms in pursuit of the West. As a result, in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) Japan won victory and this was a remarkable 
milestone on its way to modernization. 
   
In the consequent phase (Chapter Five), even though China had by now a better 
comprehension of the West and continued with some reforms, its path to 
modernization was still winding and frustrated. This was mainly because of the 
ineffective imperial leadership in the central government as well as the ethnic 
antipathy and power struggling between Manchu and Han officers, which seriously 
damaged cooperation in the bureaucracy and was unhelpful in generating nationalistic 
sentiment among the people. In contrast with China, Japan’s modernization had 
shown continuity, integrity, and accumulation and acceleration and attained the 
national goal of 'rich nation and strong army' in this phase. In particular, Japan won 
another war, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which encouraged it to follow the 
steps of the West towards militarism and imperialism. 
   
In addition, in the lessons from history (Chapter Six), we saw several famous 
scholars’ opinions on this issue, including both the emic (native view) and the etic 
(foreigner view). As well, a set of criteria to review what might be the best principles 
and an ideal model for modernization were set out for reference. 
  
After long consideration while reviewing the comparison of the modernization of both 
nations, as my humble conclusion I offer the following as the most important factors 
in the different results for Ch’ing China and Meiji Japan.       
   
Meiji Japan had the following features: 
 
• A racially homogeneous nation, which was adaptable to nationalism. 
• The Meiji Restoration was an anti-Establishment movement, which toppled 
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the shogunate system and established a new regime, thereby opening the door 
to modernisation. 
• Japan had a number of exceptionally talented political elites with far-sighted 
statesmanship as well as unsullied integrity at the top of the national machine; 
thus the national destination and reconstruction could be successfully made 
by their hands. 
• Under the political slogan 'rich nation and strong army', a full range of 
reforms in pursuit of modernization was carried out. As well the national goal 
of catching up with the West was very clear. 
• The goal-oriented samurai class with their efforts towards the fulfillment of 
tasks had brought their ability into full play in the process of Japan’s 
modernization.  
• The majority of Japanese people submitted to authority and showed their 
great loyalty to the emperor. In general they were easily able to be educated 
for what the government demanded.  
   
The Self-Strengthening Movement and the Hundred Day Reform and the   
Constitutional Movement in Ch’ing China had these features: 
 
• China was a heterogeneous nation and the Ch’ing dynasty was an alien 
regime established by a minority of Manchus. The ethnic diarchy within a 
monarchy of the political Establishment fundamentally pursued a power 
balance in order to retain the regime, but was not an ideal structure when the 
situation demanded innovation.  
• From the Self-Strengthening Movement down, everything was not part of a 
revolution but was carried out within the Establishment for the purpose of 
restoring the long-existing dynastic order and system. It was true that some 
reforms were carried out but for compromise and not for full modernization.  
• Lack of leaders with far-sighted statesmanship and unsullied integrity in the 
central government. 
• Under the political slogan 'rich nation and strong army', China merely 
undertook superficial reforms, which mainly included military reform and 
introducing industrialization, not a full dimension of modernization. 
• The social elite, the scholar-gentry class with a status-oriented ideology in 
society, mostly paid attention to their own social reputation or promotion in 
officialdom ahead of the national interests.  
• In general, most Chinese people were relatively conservative and passive 
with no teamwork spirit, and inertia was prevalent.   
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The lessons from history are precious and can be applied universally. The world can 
learn from these two extraordinary nations, from their mistakes as well as their 
successes on the way to modernization. This study, pretentiously hoping to build on 
the work of famous scholars who have made a great contribution to the topics of both 
nations’ modernizations, has endeavoured to reexamine what caused the different 
results in Japan as compared to China during the late of nineteenth century, in which 
one caught up with the West, the other one slowed down. 
  
“To present the past’s relevance to our present concerns” has been, in a broader sense, 
the over-arching aim of this thesis.     
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 Appendix One:           
                             Chronology  
 
      China          Japan 
1839 
 
 
 
1841 
 
 
 
 
1842 
 
 
1843 
 
 
1844 
 
 
 
 
1850 
 
 
1852 
 
 
1853 
 
 
 
 
1854 
 
 
Lin Tse-Hsu forced British traders to 
hand over opium stocks and caused 
Opium War (December 1839-1842) 
 
Convention of Chuan-pi (in Jan) was 
signed with Britain. 
Sanyuanli Incident occurred in Canton 
(in May). 
 
Treaty of Nanjing ended the Opium War 
and opened five ports to Britain. 
 
A supplementary Treaty of the Bogue 
was signed in relation to the tariff. 
 
Treaty of Wanghsia was signed with the 
United States in July.            
Treaty of Whampoa with France in 
October. 
 
The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) 
began in Kwangsi. 
 
Tseng Kuo-Fan began organizing the 
Hunan Army. 
 
The Taiping captured Nanking. 
Nien Rebellion occurred (1853-1868) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bansha no Goku (Imprisonment of the 
Companions of Barbarian Studies). 
 
 
Tempō Reform (1841-1842) initiated 
by Mizuno Tadakuni. 
 
 
 
The Order of Supply of Water and 
Food to Foreigners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four warships of the U.S. East India 
Squadron, commanded by 
Commodore Matthew Perry, called at 
Uraga.  
 
Kanagawa Treaty (Treaty of Peace and 
Amity between the U.S. and the 
Empire of Japan) was signed.      
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1855 
 
 
 
1856 
 
 
1857 
 
 
1858 
 
 
 
 
 
1860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1861 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Moslem (Panthay) Rebellion 
occured in Yunnan (1855-1873). 
 
 
Arrow Incident. 
 
 
British and French forces captured 
Guangzhou. 
 
The Anglo-French Forces captured 
Tientsin, leading to the signing of the 
Treaties of Tientsin. 
 
 
 
The signing of the Peking Conventions 
resulted in the Anglo-French Allied 
seizure of Peking on October 24th.      
The Supplementary Treaty of Peking 
was signed to recognize the Treaty of 
Aigun with Russia on November 14th. 
 
Emperor Hsien-Feng died in August and 
the Emperor T’ung Chih succeeded, but 
Empresses Dowager Tz’u-An and 
Tz’u-Hsi became co-regents. 
The Tsungli Yamen was established and 
headed by Prince Kung. The 
Cooperative Policy with the West 
inaugurated by Ch’ing Court. 
Self-Strengthening Movement 
(1861-1895) started. 
 
As well, with the same conditions as 
the Kanagawa Treaty, treaties with 
Britain and Russia were signed. 
 
Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed 
with the Dutch. 
 
 
The consul general of the U.S.A., 
Townsend Harris, took up his office in 
Japan. 
 
 
 
Ansei Commercial Treaties with the 
U.S.A., Dutch, Russia, Britain and 
French were concluded.             
Beginning of the Ansei Purge 
(1858-1860). 
 
Assassination of Ii Naosuke 
(Sakuradamongai Incident). 
A Japanese vessel, Kanrin-maru, came 
to the U.S.A. for the first time. 
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1862 
 
 
 
1864 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
1865 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1868 
 
 
 
The Tungan (another Moslem) 
Rebellion occurred (1862-1873) in the 
northwest. 
 
The Taiping Rebellion was suppressed 
under Western aid. 
The Moslem Riots (1864-1877) led by 
Yakub Beg (1820-1877) in Sinkiang 
occurred. 
 
 
 
 
Tseng Kuo-Fan and Li Hung-Chang 
jointly established the Kiang-Nan 
Arsenal in Shanghai. 
The Inspectorate of the Imperial 
Maritime Customs established in Peking 
under Robert Hart’s aid. 
 
Tso Tsung-T’ang established the 
Foochow Navy Yard with a naval school 
attached. 
 
 
 
 
France annexed three Cochin-China 
(Central and Southern Vietnam) 
provinces. 
Tso Tsung-T’ang began campaigns 
against the Moslem Rebellion in the 
Northwest. 
 
Nian Rebellion was terminated. 
 
 
 
Incident of Sakashita mongai. 
Incident of Namamugi. 
The Anglo-Satsuma War. 
 
Incident of Ikedaya.          
Incident of Kinmon. 
The artillery bombardment on 
Shimonoseki by four nations.        
The first of the Chōshū expeditions by 
the Shogunate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satsuma-Chōshū Alliance formed 
against Tokugawa shogunate. 
The second of the Chōshū expeditions 
by the Shogunate.              
Tokugawa Yoshinobu became the 15th 
Shogun. 
 
Formal return of political authority to 
the emperor by Tokugawa Yoshinobu. 
Return of Political Rule to the 
Emperor (taisei hōkan). 
 
 
 
Restoration of Imperial Rule; Meiji 
Restoration. 
Boshin Civil War (1868-1869) began. 
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1869 
 
 
 
 
1870 
 
 
1871 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1872 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1873 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1874 
 
 
 
1875 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tianjin massacre 
 
 
Japanese aggression on Taiwan 
(1871-1874).                 
Russian occupation of Ili (1871-1881). 
 
 
 
 
 
China Merchants’ Steam Navigation 
Company proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Muslim Rebellion (Panthay) in Yunnan 
was terminated. As well a Muslim 
Rebellion (Tungun) in the Northwestern 
Region was terminated too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five-Article Charter Oath 
promulgated (gokajō no goseimon).  
 
The Capital transferred to Tokyo.   
Formal return of domainal registers to 
the Emperor Meiji. (hanseki hōkan). 
The end of Boshin Civil War. 
 
Commoners could choose their own 
names. 
 
Establishment of the Administrational 
Prefecture System (haihan chiken).  
Iwakura Diplomatic Mission 
(1871-1873).                  
The proclamation of the Ordinance of 
Liberation. 
 
 
The Education Order was promulgated
Commencement of the establishment 
of the Ryukyu Islands. 
A nationwide family register finished. 
 
 
 
Gregorian Calendar adopted on 1st 
January. 
Conscription Ordinance enacted. 
Land Tax Reform Law issued. 
Declaration of the Law of Transferring 
Stipends to Bonds (chitsuroku hōkan).
 
Itagaki Taisuke and others submitted 
the Tosa Memorial. 
The Expedition to Taiwan. 
 
The Incident of Kangwha. 
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1876 
 
 
1877 
 
 
 
1878 
 
 
 
 
1879 
 
 
 
1880 
 
 
 
 
 
1881 
 
 
 
 
1883 
 
 
 
1884 
 
 
 
1885 
 
 
Start of three-year drought and famine 
in North China. 
 
Establishment of Chinese legations in 
Western capitals and Tokyo. 
Tso Tsung-T’ang subjugated Sinkiang. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liuqiiu (Ryukyu) islands annexed by 
Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France and China confronted each other 
for control of Tongking in Annam 
(Vietnam.)  
 
The Sino-French War over Annam 
occurred, (1884-1885). France 
destroyed Fuzhou Shipyard. 
 
Treaty of Tianjin concluded Sino-French 
War. 
 
Treaty of Kangwha signed with Korea.
Disestablishment of samurai. 
 
Satsuma Rebellion; Saigō Takamori 
committed suicide. 
 
 
Establishment of the Military General 
Staff Office to regulate the military 
power controlled by the emperor. 
 
 
Establishment of Ryukyu Prefecture. 
 
 
 
Formation of the League for 
Establishing a National Assembly. 
Public Assembly Ordinance issued to 
control the Freedom and People’s 
Rights Movement. 
 
Imperial rescript promised the 
promulgation of a constitution and the 
convening of a national assembly. 
Jiyūtō (Liberal Party) is formed. 
 
Completion of Rokumeikan (a hall 
built as a sign of adopting the 
Westernization policy.) 
 
Promulgation of the Ordinance of the 
Nobility (kazokurei). 
 
 
The first Cabinet led by Itō Hirobumi 
occurred, the Cabinet system formed. 
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1886 
 
 
1887 
 
 
1888 
 
 
1889 
 
 
1890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1894 
 
 
 
 
 
1895 
 
 
 
1896 
 
 
The Li-Itō Convention signed in 
Tientsin to settle the Sino-Japanese 
dispute in Korea. 
 
The construction of the Summer Palace 
with naval funds resumed. 
 
 
 
 
The Pei-yang Navy formally established 
under Li, Hung-Chang’s direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). 
Sun Yat-Sen founded a secret society to 
restore China’s Prosperity. 
 
 
 
China was defeated by Japan and the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. 
Tripartite Intervention. 
 
Secret Sino- Russian Treaty was signed.
 
 
A convention signed with Ch’ing 
China to settle the dispute in Korea. 
 
 
Establishment of the Hokkaido Board.
 
 
Establishment of the System of 
Bureaucrats’ Advanced Examination. 
 
Establishment of the Privy Council. 
 
 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan 
promulgated. 
 
The first election for the House of 
Representatives. 
Imperial Rescript on Education 
distributed to all schools. 
Convention of the first session of the 
Imperial Diet.                 
Japan started to develop its heavy 
industry. 
 
Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 
1894 signed, abolishing 
extraterritoriality.          
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 
began. 
 
The Treaty of Shimonoseki was 
signed. 
Tripartite Intervention.  
 
The Shōwai Cabinet (松隈内閣) 
formed. 
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1897 
 
 
 
 
 
1898 
 
 
 
 
1899 
 
 
1900 
 
1901 
 
1902 
 
1904 
 
 
1905 
 
 
 
 
 
1908 
 
 
 
1909 
 
 
1910 
 
Scramble for concessions by Germany, 
England, Russian, and France. 
(1897-1898).               
Germany obtained a ninety-nine year 
lease on Jiao-zhou Bay. 
 
The Hundred Day Reform.        
Great British obtained a ninety-nine 
year lease on the Xiang-gang New 
Territory. 
 
 
 
 
The Boxer Rebellion occurred. 
 
Boxer Protocol was signed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formation of the Revolution Alliance 
(T’ung-meng hui) led by Sun Yat-Sen in 
Tokyo.                       
China started to undertake constitutional 
reforms. 
 
Death of Emperor Guang-Xu, Pu-Yi the 
successor. 
Death of Empress Dowager. 
 
First elections for provincial assemblies.
 
 
First National Assembly convened. 
 
Yahata Steel Factory constructed.  
The gold standard system confirmed. 
 
 
 
 
The Waihan Cabinet (隈板内閣) 
formed. 
 
 
 
Japan freed from extraterritoriality 
from the West. 
 
Dispatch of an expedition to China to 
suppress the Boxer Rebellion.  
 
 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. 
 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 
began in Ch’ing China’s territory. 
 
The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Itō Hirobumi was assassinated in 
Korea. 
 
The High Treason Incident. 
The Annexation of Korea. 
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1911 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Double Tenth Revolution occurred at 
Wuchang. 
 
 
The Republic of China was established 
and Sun Yat-Sen was recommended as 
the president. The Ch’ing’s Emperor 
Pu-Yi announced abdication. 
 
Treaties signed with the Western 
powers that restored the right of tariff 
autonomy to Japan.  
 
The Death of Emperor Meiji; 
accession of Emperor Taishō.  
First Movement to Protect 
Constitutional Government founded. 
 
 
Source: For the the Chinese part: based upon K.H. Kim, Japanese Perspective on 
China’s Early Modernization (Michigan, 1974), pp. 3-12; Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The 
Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), pp. 342-347; J.A.G. Roberts, A 
Chronological Table of Modern China (Great Britain, 1998), and Gilbert Rozman, A 
Chronological Table of The Modernization of China (New York, 1981). For the 
Japanese part: based upon Suzuki Hushiko ed., Eigo de yomu Nihonshi (Japanese 
History: 11 Experts Reflect on the past) (Tokyo, 1996); Kanabako, Yoshiaki eds., 
Nihonshi sōran (Conspectus of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 2001); Hamashima, 
Masaaki eds., Shinshō Nihonshi ( New Vision of Japanese History) (Tokyo, 1998).   
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                     Appendix 2: An idealized model for undertaking modernization or any reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Creative 
Minority 
Supe
reflection 
achieve- 
ment 
National 
Goals 
command execution 
reflection 
and support 
The 
People 
education 
and 
influence 
reflection 
respect 
Advisory 
Groups 
advice 
reflection 
observation 
Bureaucratic
Systems 
 
reflection 
consultation 
inspection 
reflection 
Reforms 
reflection rvisory 
hority  Aut
Chart, Maps, Pictures, Figures  
 
 
Chart 
 
Chart 1. An Ideal Model for Undertaking Modernization or any Reform. 
 
Maps 
 
Map 1. European Contacts with the East to 1700. 
Map 2. Ch’ing China – Physical Features. 
Map 3. The Opium Trade in China in the Early Mid Nineteenth Century. 
Map 4. Japan on the Eve of the Meiji Restoration. 
Map 5. Tokugawa Japan: Major Daimyo Domains. 
Map 6. Tokugawa Japan: Traffic Situations on Land and by sea. 
Map 7. The Opening of the Treaty Ports. 
Map 8. A Simple and Plain Illustration: Ch’ing China during the Self-Strengthening 
Movement Period. 
Map 9. Foreign Encroachment on China, c.1900. 
 
Pictures 
 
Picture 1. Bound Feet Bare and Shod. 
Picture 2. Mandarin with Opium Pipe. 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Tz’u-Hsi.               Figure 2. Prince Kung.                          
Figure 3. Wen-Hsiang.                Figure 4. Tseng Kuo-Fan. 
Figure 5. Tso Tsung-T’ang.            Figure 6. Li Hung-Chang.    
Figure 7. Meiji Emperor.              Figure 8. Itō Hirobumi. 
Figure 9. Kido Takayoshi.            Figure 10. Yamagata Aritomo. 
Figure 11. Ōkubo Toshimichi.         Figure 12. Ōkuma Shigenobu. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Tz'u-Hsi Fig. 2: Prince Kung  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 4: Tseng Kuo-Fan Fig. 3: Wen-Hsiang 
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Fig. 5: Tso Tsung-T'ang Fig. 6: Li Hung-Chang 
       Fig. 7: Emperor Meiji Fig. 8: Itō Hirobumi 
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Fig. 9: Kido Takayoshi       Fig. 10: Yamagata Aritomo 
    Fig. 11: Ōkubo Toshimichi Fig. 12: Ōkuma Shigenobu 
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